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Abstract
We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority
vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imper-
fect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend
a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show
theoretically and empirically that communication can undermine efficiency
of the vote and hence reduce welfare in a common interest setting. Both
efficiency and existence of fully informative equilibria in which vote recom-
mendations are always truthfully given and followed hinge on the structure of
the communication network. If some voters have distinctly larger audiences
than others, their neighbors should not follow their vote recommendation;
however, they may do so in equilibrium. We test the model in a lab experi-
ment and find strong support for the comparative-statics and, more generally,
for the importance of the network structure for voting behavior.
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1 Introduction
Motivation. Majority voting is a major form of collective decision making. As
such, it is intensely studied in economics. However, the largest part of the literature
ignores pre-vote communication, although in reality, people often receive advice
before they vote. For instance, family members, neighbors or Facebook friends who
are more deeply interested in politics or better informed might try to convince others
to vote like them. Vote recommendations seem to be frequent: Approximately
30% of the U.S. population report that they give vote recommendations to their
peers often or sometimes (see Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 2004, p. 323). Hence,
the question arises whether decentralized pre-vote communication is harmless or
even desirable, or whether such communication can be harmful. Surprisingly, the
effects of (partly) private advice on voting are largely understudied.1 We show that
pre-vote communication in the form of vote recommendations can impede efficient
information aggregation even if voters are sophisticated and interests are perfectly
aligned. We restrict our analysis to a common-interest setting to take the assumption
to the extreme that voters’ preferences are sufficiently aligned to allow for truthful
communication. Thus, we demonstrate a negative effect of communication that is,
other than in the cheap-talk literature, not due to limited degrees of truthfulness, but
rather to the exogenous structure of the communication network. Hence, our setting
predominantly applies to large elections, involving a high degree of uncertainty, and
concerning a “common good” like national security or growth or, in the case of
shareholder votes, the future of the company in question. However, we show that
our results are robust to the introduction of propaganda by voters with extreme
biases.
A negative effect of private pre-vote communication on efficiency can occur if
the social network connecting voters who are imperfect experts on the issue at stake
with other voters is not sufficiently balanced. In insufficiently balanced networks,
one voter has a somehow larger audience than the other voters without having
much better information. Since in some such networks it is an equilibrium strategy
to follow the vote recommendations one receives, wrongly informed voters may get
too much weight in the vote. Then, the voting outcome is less efficient than it would
have been in the absence of pre-vote communication. We show that this result is
robust: It even holds true if the number of informed voters goes to infinity.
We conducted two experiments to test our theoretical predictions. The labora-
tory data validate the comparative statics of our theory and reveal that in the lab,
too, truthful communication sometimes impedes efficient information aggregation.
To better understand when pre-vote communication can be harmful and when
it is harmless, consider communication networks in which imperfectly informed vot-
ers give vote recommendations to their neighbors. Such a communication stage is
1Under general conditions, it has been shown that public communication leads to efficient
information aggregation due to deliberation of private signals (Gerardi and Yariv, 2007, and Goeree
and Yariv, 2011). However, pre-vote communication need not be public, but can also be – at least
partly – private, as illustrated by the examples above. To our knowledge, the effects of private pre-
vote communication have been only addressed in the contribution of Golub and Jackson (2012). In
a setting of na¨ıve learning among non-strategic voters, they show that private communication in
homophilous networks can undermine efficient information aggregation in the intermediate term.
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introduced into a standard common-interest voting game. Nature draws the binary
state of the world and the signals that voters receive on the true state. Both states
of the world are equally likely. Each informed voter receives only one signal, and
signals are independent across voters. Some voters have audiences of one or more
other voters and can send one out of two possible messages to their audience or
keep silent. Then, a vote takes place to decide which of two possible policies shall
be implemented. Only the policy matching the true state of the world generates a
strictly positive payoff for all individuals (the other policy generates a zero payoff
for everyone). Voters individually and simultaneously decide between voting for one
or the other policy and abstaining. Voting is costless.2 The policy that gets a simple
majority of votes is implemented. In case the voting outcome is a tie, the policy
to be implemented is randomly drawn, where both policies have equal probability.
Voters are strategic; i.e., they condition their behavior on pivotality.
A focal stragegy in this setting is to truthfully transmit one’s own signal to one’s
neighbours in the social network and to vote according to one’s updated belief about
the “correct” policy. We call this strategy sincere behavior and investigate when it
is an equilibrium and when efficient. Consider an informed voter whose audience
– consisting of her neighbors – is a substantial part of the voting population and
follows (only) her vote recommendation; i.e., this voter is an opinion leader. Being
pivotal with a vote that follows the opinion leader’s recommendation implies that
many voters from the rest of the population voted for the opposite, which implies, in
turn, that they had information contradicting the opinion leader’s recommendation.
Hence, conditioning on pivotality, it is more likely that the vote recommendation of
the opinion leader is wrong rather than correct. More generally, in highly unbalanced
networks in which the power to influence opinions is insufficiently justified by the
expertise of the opinion leaders, sincere behavior is neither informationally efficient
nor equilibrium behavior. However, we state as a main result that for “mildly
unbalanced” communication networks sincere behavior is both an equilibrium and
informationally inefficient; and neither existence nor inefficiency vanish in the limit.
An important feature of our model is that the exogenously given network struc-
ture only determines the system of communication channels that can potentially be
used, while there is always an equilibrium without communication. Indeed, there is
an alternative focal strategy: Voters who are better informed than others vote for
the policy indicated by their signal and the others abstain. In line with the litera-
ture, we call this strategy “let the experts decide” (henceforth: LTED). Importantly,
we show that LTED is always efficient in the limit, i.e., if the number of voters con-
verge to infinity, independent of the network structure. Hence, in a class of “mildly
unbalanced” networks the problem of efficiency becomes one of equilibrium selection
between sincere behavior and LTED, which is essentially an empirical question.
Testing our theoretical predictions in two lab experiments, we find that (i) indi-
vidually, uninformed voters are indeed more inclined to abstain when they listen to
an overly powerful opinion leader, that (ii) collectively, LTED is more often chosen
2With costs of voting, the pivot probability which might change across equilibria in different
networks would affect the willingness to abstain. Since we want to isolate the effects of commu-
nication on voting behavior, we abstract from voting costs. In the lab, costless voting makes the
“willingness to delegate to the expert” harder to find and hence more surprising.
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over sincere behavior if the network becomes more unbalanced, but that (iii) sincere
behavior still occurs frequently even in highly unbalanced networks, causing a loss
in efficiency, compared to more balanced networks. (iv) Informed voters tend to
pass on their signals to their audience whenever they feel well informed but become
more reluctant to do so when they are in the position of an overly powerful opinion
leader and feel not too well informed.
In the experiments, the loss in informational efficiency is the larger, the more
unbalanced the communication network becomes. Intuitively, the more unbalanced
the network structure, the less balanced is the power to influence opinions such that
the final outcome is determined by the messages of a few agents, in contrast to
the Marquis de Condorcet’s original idea of aggregating information in the entire
collective (De Caritat, 1785).
Related literature. Condorcet’s argument that majority voting among indepen-
dently informed voters efficiently aggregates private signals, i.e., his “Jury The-
orem,” is a cornerstone of the justification of the majority rule, and, even more
generally, of making collective decisions by voting. His argument has been seriously
challenged by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996,
1997, 1998) who study voters as strategic actors. As they show, to vote in line with
one’s private information, i.e., to “sincerely” cast the vote for the alternative that
maximizes unconditional expected utility, is not automatically an optimal decision.
When restricting attention to the cases in which one’s own vote is decisive, the
resulting conditional expected utility may be different. Hence, we assume strate-
gic voting when solving our model, but also address the question when sincere and
strategic voting lead to the same behavior.
In the absence of communication, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) find that it is
optimal for rational voters with common interests to abstain if they are uninformed
and to vote in line with their independent private signal if they are informed.3,4
This LTED behavior not only forms an equilibrium, but also exhibits informational
efficiency. In their experimental study of the model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996), Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2010) find that this equilibrium provides
a good prediction for real behavior. Morton and Tyran (2011) have extended the
model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) to include heterogeneity in information
quality among the informed voters and find that less well informed voters generally
tend to abstain and delegate the collective decision to the better informed voters.
Hence, the tendency to “delegate to the expert” seems quite strong in the lab. This
suggests that the LTED equilibrium might be a good prediction even in more general
models of information aggregation by majority votes. Accordingly, we consider it to
be a benchmark equilibrium in our model, too.
3Since Feddersen’s and Pesendorfer’s ingenious contribution, the finding that uninformed voters
in a common interest setting are better off abstaining from the vote has been dubbed the swing
voter’s curse. More generally, a voter is “cursed” if his optimal strategy conditional on his pivotality
differs from what he would deem optimal if he did not condition his strategy on being pivotal, i.e.,
what he would choose as a dictator. We adopt this way of speaking.
4If one deviates from the assumption of common interests by introducing a number of “parti-
sans” who always vote into a pre-specified direction, then abstention does no longer need to be the
optimal strategy of the uninformed voters.
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However, the selection of this equilibrium hinges on the assumption that all
participating voters enter the majority vote with independent private pieces of in-
formation – which is fulfilled in the standard model of common interest voting.5 But
the picture becomes more complicated when a mechanism is introduced that leads
to correlated information among voters, despite their private independent signals.
To our knowledge, the existing literature on common interest voting has considered
two such mechanisms: Public communication (deliberation), and additional public
signals.6 Coughlan (2000) and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) find that delib-
eration under the majority rule fosters efficiency. Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show
that introducing public communication prior to the vote admits the same set of
(sequential) equilibria for a whole set of voting rules. Intuitively, the information
aggregation that the vote has to achieve in the standard model is shifted up the
game tree and is now obtained in the communication stage already. Goeree and
Yariv (2011) validate this insight experimentally and document that public com-
munication fosters informational efficiency under general conditions. By contrast,
introducing a public signal on the state of the world prior to the vote changes the
picture dramatically. Kawamura and Vlaseros (2016) find that the presence of a
public signal generates a new class of equilibria in which voters discard their private
information in favor of the public signal and information aggregation is inefficient,
even if voters condition their strategy on their pivotality.7
We introduce a third way of correlating voters’ information into the standard
model of common interest voting: private communication between voters. To our
knowledge, private communication before voting has so far only been modeled as
na¨ıve exchange among voters who do not condition on pivotality (Golub and Jack-
son, 2012).8 In contrast, we study strategic voters who are Bayesian learners. We
show that the way in which private communication affects information aggregation
is different from the effects of public communication: Although efficient equilib-
ria always exist (in particular, the LTED equilibrium), there are also equilibria (in
5Levy and Razin (2015) provide a model on informed voting which includes heterogeneous
preferences among voters, different sources of information for each voter and voters who neglect
the correlation between their information sources. They show that correlation neglect may improve
the informational efficiency of the vote since it makes voters put more weight on information than
on the conflict of interest.
6In a recent theory paper, Battaglini (2016) allows for communication between citizens in
separate audiences so that information becomes correlated among the citizens in one audience.
However, in his model, citizens cannot vote on policies directly but coordinate on public protest
instead, potentially signing a petition against the policy maker’s default policy. Battaglini shows
that communication in social media can improve information aggregation and transmission via
public protests.
7Somewhat relatedly, the literature on hidden profiles reports that in group discussions prior
to group decisions, information shared with other group members gets too much weight compared
to unique private information. See, e.g., the meta-study by Lu, Yuan, and McLeod (2012).
8For a society of na¨ıve learners, it is known that information aggregation is inefficient in the
long term when some agents are overly powerful (Golub and Jackson, 2010). In their application of
the homophily theory to voting, Golub and Jackson (2012) assume that every voter has the same
expected number of links and is hence equally influential. Then information aggregation is efficient
in the limit, but not necessarily in the intermediate term: They show that inefficiency can arise,
when there are multiple groups with more links within group than across groups (i.e. homophily)
and when the signals are not distributed equally across groups.
5
particular, the sincere equilibrium) in which information is inefficiently aggregated.
The latter equilibria and their corresponding “sincere” strategies are more frequently
played in the lab than the former such that private communication indeed under-
mines informational efficiency if some voters are too powerful communicators. Our
general model incorporates both private communication and public communication
as a special case, and hence builds a bridge between the two.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
In the next section, we introduce a simple model of vote recommendations, restrict-
ing our analysis to a specific subset of communication networks and to homogeneous
signal qualities. We characterize conditions on the network structure under which
the two focal strategy profiles, i.e., sincere behavior and LTED, are equilibria and
compare them to the conditions under which they are efficient. In section 3, we
present the design of the laboratory experiments and in section 4, we report the ex-
perimental results. In section 5, we study the general model with arbitrary networks
and heterogeneous signal precisions. We report that our main results are robust in
the general model and also hold true in the limit. All propositions of section 2 are
generalized in section 5 and the corresponding proofs are collected in Appendix B.
In section 6, we conclude.
2 A Simple Model of Vote Recommendations
2.1 Set-Up
Nature draws one state of the world, ω, which has two possible realizations, A
and B, that occur with equal probability and are not directly observable. There
is a finite set of agents partitioned into a group of experts M and a group of non-
experts N . Experts j ∈ M receive a private independent signal sj ∈ {A∗, B∗}
about the true state of the world. The signal is imperfectly informative with qual-
ity pi = Pr {sj = A∗ | ω = A} = Pr {sj = B∗ | ω = B} ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. We preliminarily
assume that pi = p ∀i ∈M and that non-experts i ∈ N do not receive a signal, but
can potentially receive a message from an expert. A graph g represents the com-
munication structure between non-experts and experts. We preliminarily assume
that g is bipartite, consisting of links (i, j) ⊆ N ×M only. Degree di is the number
of links of agent i. An expert j with dj ≥ 1 is called sender and all non-experts
linked to j are called the “audience of j.” Our final preliminary assumption is that
different audiences do not overlap, i.e., the degree of each non-expert is at most one,
such that no agent can access more than one piece of information.9 We will drop
our preliminary assumptions in section 4.
After receiving the signal, each sender may send message “A” or message “B” or
an empty message ∅ to her audience. Then, all agents participate in a majority vote
the outcome of which determines which of two alternative policies, PA or PB, shall
9This assumption assures that information aggregation can only take place in the voting stage
but not in the communication stage and hence is the natural counterpart to public communication
and deliberation.
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be implemented. Voters simultaneously vote for one of the two policies or abstain.
If one policy obtains a simple majority, i.e. a plurality, of votes, it is implemented;
otherwise, the policy to be chosen is randomly drawn with equal probability from
the two alternatives.
All experts and non-experts are assumed to be unbiased in the sense that they
want the policy to match the state of the world. More precisely, their utility is
represented by u(PA|A) = u(PB|B) = 1 and u(PB|A) = u(PA|B) = 0.10,11
The sequence of actions is as follows. First, nature draws the state of the world
and the signals of the experts. Second, each sender decides which message to com-
municate to her audience, if any. Third, all agents vote or abstain and the outcome
is determined by the simple majority rule. The full description of the game including
the network structure is common knowledge.12
Strategies are defined as follows: A communication and voting strategy σj of
a sender j ∈ M defines which message to send and whether and how to vote for
each signal received, i.e., σj : {A∗, B∗} → {A,B, ∅} × {A,B, ∅} if dj ≥ 1 and
σj : {A∗, B∗} → {A,B, ∅} if dj = 0. We can abstract from the timing of these
two actions (communication and voting) here. A voting strategy of a non-expert
i ∈ N with a link is a mapping from the set of messages into the voting action
σi : {A,B, ∅} → {A,B, ∅}, and a voting strategy of an agent i ∈ N without a link
is simply a voting action σi ∈ {A,B, ∅}. A strategy profile σ consists of all experts’
and all non-experts’ strategies.
We analyze this model using the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, i.e.,
agents use sequentially rational strategies, given their beliefs, and beliefs are updated
according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible. We focus on two strategy profiles, one
with information transmission (“sincere”) and one without information transmission
(“let the experts decide”, in short: LTED). These are the two strategy profiles
predominantly discussed in the literature on voting. Still, social networks generally
give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria, and focality of strategies is ultimately an
empirical question. We address this question in our laboratory experiments. It turns
out that exactly the two strategy profiles that we focus on are the only relevant ones
in the lab.
Note that if all non-experts in a given audience choose not to condition their
voting action on the message received, then the outcome of the game is as if com-
munication was not possible at all (“babbling equilibrium”). Similarly, if all non-
experts in a given audience vote B if the message is A and vote A if the message
is B, then the outcome of the game is as if their sender had chosen another com-
munication strategy, where messages A and B are permuted (“mirror equilibria”).
We will not differentiate between mirror equilibria, i.e., on the basis of the syntax
of information transmission. Instead, we will identify equilibria via the semantics of
information transmission, i.e., on the basis of the meanings that messages acquire
10Here, we follow the convention to define cardinal utility levels, although this assumption is not
necessary.
11An extended model with heterogeneous preferences, in particular with biased agents who
always favor one of the two alternatives, is studied in online Appendix C.1.
12Knowing the network structure prevents potential inefficiencies due to imperfect information
about the network structure.
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in equilibrium.13
A desirable property of an equilibrium is informational efficiency which is defined
as follows.
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile σ is efficient if it maximizes the ex ante proba-
bility of the implemented policy matching the true state of the world.
Observe that an efficient strategy profile σ maximizes the sum of ex ante expected
utilities of all experts and non-experts since they are unbiased. Given efficient
strategy profiles, the probability of matching the true state is maximized but not
equal to one because it might always happen by chance that many experts receive the
wrong signal. Letting the number of experts grow, this probability approaches one
as in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. Observe also that in this simple setting an efficient
strategy profile is characterized by always implementing the policy indicated by the
signal that has been received by most experts, which we call the majority signal.
For convenience, we let the number of experts m := |M | be odd such that there is
always a unique majority signal indicating the policy that should be implemented.14
While the definition of informational efficiency above is binary, strategy profiles
can also be ranked according to their informational efficiency by comparing their
corresponding ex ante probabilities of matching the true state.
Hereafter, we will slightly misuse notation by using “A” and “B” to denote the
corresponding state of the world, message content, and policy, whenever the context
prevents confusion.
2.2 “Let the Experts Decide”
One important feature of this simple model is that informational efficiency can
always be obtained in equilibrium, regardless of the network structure. Consider for
instance the strategy profile σ∗ in which all experts vote in line with their signal and
all non-experts abstain. Under the simple majority rule this LTED strategy profile
σ∗ is efficient since for any draw of nature the signal received by a majority of experts
is implemented. Moreover, because preferences are homogeneous, efficient strategy
profiles do not only maximize the sum of utilities, but also each individual agent’s
utility. Thus, there is no room for improvement, as already argued in McLennan
(1998).
Proposition 2.1. There exist efficient equilibria for any network structure. For
instance, the LTED strategy profile σ∗ is efficient and an equilibrium for any network
structure.
Importantly, while efficient strategies constitute an equilibrium, the reverse does
not hold true: Existence of an equilibrium does not imply that it is efficient. On the
contrary, there are (trivial and non-trivial) inefficient equilibria of the game. One
non-trivial inefficient equilibrium will be discussed as Example 3 below.
13This is standard in the cheap talk literature starting with Crawford and Sobel (1982).
14Admitting an even number of experts would not change the results qualitatively, but it would
make the analysis cumbersome because more cases had to be distinguished.
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Among the efficient equilibria, we consider the LTED equilibrium σ∗ focal for
two reasons. First, it is simple: All experts use the same type of strategy and all
non-experts use the same type of strategy. Second, it is intuitive to abstain as a non-
expert and to vote in line with one’s signal as an expert, as already argued by, e.g.,
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and experimentally shown by Morton and Tyran
(2011). However, since it is also intuitive for experts to send informative messages
and for receivers to vote according to their messages, it may nonetheless be difficult
to coordinate on σ∗. In particular, consider the strategy profile σˆ in which experts
communicate and vote for the policy indicated by their signal and non-experts vote
in line with their message and abstain if they did not receive any information. This
strategy profile σˆ is sincere in the sense that each agent communicates and votes
for the alternative that she considers as most likely given her private information.15
We now proceed by investigating the sincere strategy profile.
2.3 Sincere Voting
Balanced networks. To characterize under which conditions on the network
structure the sincere strategy profile σˆ is an equilibrium, we define two intimately re-
lated balancedness requirements. Both the content and the purpose of the following
definition will be explained with the help of simple examples below.
Definition 2.2 (Balancedness). (a) Let M ′ ⊂M denote the set of the m′ = m+1
2
experts with the lowest degree.16 A network is called “strongly balanced” if
this set is involved in at least half of all links, i.e.
∑
j∈M ′ dj ≥
∑
k∈M\M ′ dk.
(b) For an expert j ∈ M , let Mj be the set of expert sets M ′′ ⊆ M that contain
expert j and form a slight majority when adding their audiences of non-experts,
i.e.
∑
k∈M ′′(dk+1)−
∑
l∈M\M ′′(dl+1) ∈ {0, 1, 2}. A network is called “ weakly
balanced ” if for every expert j ∈ M , non-emptiness of this set, i.e. Mj 6= ∅,
implies that there is at least one element consisting of a weak majority of
experts, i.e. ∃M ′′ ∈Mj such that m′′ ≥ m+12 .
To illustrate strong and weak balancedness, we use the following two examples.
Example 1. Let n = 4, m = 5, and the degree distribution of experts (d1, d2, d3, d4, d5) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 0) as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1. This network is strongly bal-
anced since d3 + d4 + d5 ≥ d1 + d2; and it is weakly balanced since every slight
majority of voters in which a given expert j ∈ {j1, j2, j3, j4, j5} partakes comprises a
weak majority of experts, too.
Example 2. Let n = 4, m = 5, and the degree distribution of experts (d1, d2, d3, d4, d5) =
(4, 0, 0, 0, 0) as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1. This network violates
weak balancedness. Indeed, M1 = {{j1}} such that there is no M ′′ ∈ M1 with
15The LTED strategy profile σ∗, in contrast, is not “fully sincere” for the following reason. The
aspect that information is not transmitted either means that senders do not communicate their
signal or that receivers do not follow their message.
16If there are several of these sets, we can choose any one. If m was even, we would require
m′ = m+22 in this definition.
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m′′ ≥ m+1
2
= 3. Put differently, expert 1 can partake in a slight majority of voters
that contains only a minority of experts (himself).
In general, strong balancedness requires that even the majority of experts with
the smallest degrees, which is called M ′ in the definition, is involved in at least
half of all links. This simply means that every majority of experts is involved in
at least half of all links, which requires a rather even degree distribution. Weak
balancedness restricts a related requirement to certain sets of experts Mj. Indeed,
strong balancedness always implies weak balancedness (since it implies for all j and
all M ′′ ∈ Mj that m′′ ≥ m+12 ). Networks violating weak balancedness also violate
strong balancedness and will be called unbalanced hereafter.
The two properties capture some kind of balance between a group’s expertise
(which depends on the number of signals) and its power (which depends on the size
of the audiences). For instance, in Example 1, experts are equally powerful, whereas
in Example 2, expert 1 is overly powerful, compared to the other experts.17
Proposition 2.2. The sincere strategy profile σˆ is efficient if and only if the network
is strongly balanced. The sincere strategy profile σˆ is an equilibrium if (a) the network
is strongly balanced, and only if (b) the network is weakly balanced.
Applied to our two examples, Proposition 2.2 implies that the sincere strategy
profile σˆ is efficient and an equilibrium in Example 1 but neither efficient nor an
equilibrium in Example 2. The intuition of Proposition 2.2 can be illustrated with
these two examples.18
Consider first strong balancedness in Example 1. Observe that under the sincere
strategy profile σˆ any three experts who vote and communicate the same alternative
determine the final outcome. Thus, for any draw of nature the policy indicated
by the majority signal is implemented, which means that information is aggregated
efficiently and hence σˆ is an equilibrium. Likewise, in any strongly balanced network
the majority signal receives a majority of votes since the set of experts who have
received this signal has a majority of votes when considering their own votes and
the votes of their audiences.
Consider now weak balancedness, which is violated in Example 2. To see why σˆ
is inefficient in Example 2, consider a draw of nature by which the most powerful
expert, i.e., the expert j1 with the highest degree, receives the minority signal.
Assume now, for the sake of argument, that the sincere strategy profile σˆ is played.
In this case the minority signal determines which policy is implemented; information
is hence aggregated inefficiently. To see why σˆ is not an equilibrium, consider the
following two deviation incentives. First, the most powerful expert would want to
deviate to not communicating, but still voting for, the policy indicated by her signal.
This would lead to an efficient strategy profile that is outcome-equivalent to LTED
since the non-experts then abstain. Second, the non-experts, too, can improve by
17A formal definition of power is given in online Appendix C.5. It relies on the cooperative
framework of simple games, in which individual power is measured by the Shapley-Shubik index
or the Banzhaf index, which both count the number of “swings” a voter has (cf., e.g., Roth, 1988).
18Note that Proposition 2.2 provides one sufficient and one necessary condition for the sincere
strategy profile σˆ to be an equilibrium, but no condition that is both sufficient and necessary. For
such a condition see Proposition C.4 in online Appendix C.2.
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Figure 1
Figure 1: Left: Example 1, which is a network satisfying strong balancedness. Right: Example 2,
the star network, which is an unbalanced network.
deviating. In particular, consider a non-expert receiving message A. His posterior
belief that A is true is pi(A|A) = p > 12 . However, his posterior belief that A is true,
given that he is pivotal, is pi(A|A, piv) < 12 because in this simple example pivotality
only occurs when all other experts have received signal B∗. Thus, abstention or
voting the opposite of the message is a strict improvement for any non-expert.
Example 2 provides a simple illustration of the swing voter’s curse. The argu-
ment, however, is much more general. Assume that all agents play according to the
sincere strategy profile σˆ and consider the receivers who belong to a large audience.
These receivers know that their sender is very powerful. Hence, if they are pivotal
in the vote, this implies that a considerable number among the other experts must
have got a signal that contradicts the message they received. Thus, if following the
message has any effect on the outcome, it has most likely a detrimental effect. If
a receiver realizes that he is “cursed” in this sense, he wants to deviate from the
sincere strategy and prefers to abstain or to vote the opposite.
Inefficient equilibria. For networks that satisfy the necessary condition (weak
balancedness), but violate the sufficient condition (strong balancedness) the sincere
strategy profile σˆ is inefficient but potentially still an equilibrium. More generally,
the question arises whether there are equilibria with information transmission prior
to the vote that are inefficient.
Proposition 2.3. There are networks in which the sincere strategy profile σˆ is both
an equilibrium and exhibits informational inefficiency.
One example demonstrating the above proposition is given below.
Example 3 (weakly balanced). Let n = 4, m = 5, and the degree distribution of
experts (d1, ..., d5) = (2, 2, 0, 0, 0) as illustrated in Figure 2. In this network the sin-
cere strategy profile σˆ is inefficient because the network violates strong balancedness.
However, the sincere strategy profile σˆ is an equilibrium in this network (see proof
of Proposition 5.3 in Appendix B).
11
Figure 2
Figure 2: Example 3, a network in which the sincere strategy profile σˆ is both inefficient and an
equilibrium.
Overall, we can conclude that communication need not, but can impair infor-
mation aggregation in equilibrium, depending on the balancedness of the network
structure. In strongly balanced networks (such as in Example 1), σˆ is both effi-
cient and an equilibrium. In weakly balanced networks that are no longer strongly
balanced (such as in Example 3), σˆ can still be an equilibrium, but is always in-
formationally inefficient. Finally, in unbalanced networks (such as in Example 2)
neither property holds. There the swing voter’s curse occurs such that non-experts
can profitably deviate from σˆ by not following their message.
2.4 Equilibrium Selection
Whether real people, both individually and collectively, account for the swing voter’s
curse in unbalanced networks is an empirical question. Therefore, it may be help-
ful to bring the theory to the lab and find out how experimental subjects play the
game in various networks that differ in the balancedness of their degree distribution.
Hence, one purpose of the laboratory experiment is to test the comparative-statics
of our theory. The other, equally important, purpose is to empirically study equi-
librium selection. In particular, in the case of weakly balanced networks that are
not strongly balanced the quality of information aggregation depends on whether
the agents manage to coordinate on the efficient LTED equilibrium or whether they
coordinate on the inefficient sincere equilibrium, or on other potential equilibria.
This question is hard to answer theoretically, since both the LTED strategy profile
σ∗ and the sincere strategy profile σˆ are intuitive and seem focal.
To theoretically prepare experimental equilibrium selection, we address the ques-
tion of additional, non-focal equilibria. We extend the equilibrium analysis of our
Examples 1, 2, and 3, which is particularly useful since these examples are also imple-
mented in our experiment. In online Appendix C.3, we give a full characterization of
all equilibria conforming to four selection criteria (Purity, Symmetry, Monotonicity,
and Neutrality). It shows that one more strategy than considered so far contributes
to equilibrium formation, namely a delegation strategy according to which experts
with an audience delegate their vote to their audience by revealing their signal and
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abstaining themselves. Moreover, there are equilibria in which experts who are never
pivotal abstain from voting without delegating their vote. However, there are no
additional strategies that arise as composites of equilibria in these examples. All
equilibria conforming to our selection criteria are composites of the LTED strategy
profile, the sincere voting profile, and the delegation or abstention strategies of ex-
perts. Which of these equilibria are indeed focal will be assessed by the empirical
frequency with which each of them is played in the laboratory experiments.
3 Experimental Design
We conducted two experimental studies. In Study I, we implement the empty net-
work, in which communication is precluded, and the three examples – Example 1, 2,
and 3 – analyzed above. The empty network serves as a benchmark, since the sin-
cere strategy profile σˆ is impossible to play in the empty network because there are
no communication channels. Hence, the LTED equilibrium is the only focal equilib-
rium in the empty network. The other three networks differ in the way described in
section 2.3. Hence, Study I directly tests our simple model.
In Study II, we again implement the empty network and three examples, the
latter, however, now belonging to a slightly extended version of our model in Ap-
pendix C.1 which includes some biased senders. These four networks differ in the
following respects: Network 1 is the empty network. Network 2 is the weakly bal-
anced network and is the unique network among the four in which the sincere strat-
egy profile σˆ is both an equilibrium and inefficient, as demonstrated in the proof of
Proposition C.3. Network 3, which we call the unbalanced network, makes sender 1
too powerful compared to the other sender, and the strategy profile σˆ, which is again
inefficient, is no longer an equilibrium, though possible to play. The same holds true
for network 4, the star network, which is even more unbalanced.
In total, our experimental design implements the eight different communication
networks depicted in Figure 3. Each of these networks corresponds to one exper-
imental treatment; and within each study, treatments are varied within subjects
(i.e., all participants in a given session of one study play the communication and
voting game in all four networks) in random order. Voter groups - i.e., subject
groups interacting in one network - consist of five experts and four non-experts in
study I and of three experts, four computerized partisans, and four non-experts in
Study II. The four partisans divide into two A-partisans who always communicate
and vote A and two B-partisans who always communicate and vote B. In online
Appendix C.1, we provide a full description of the model with partisans and show
that, unsurprisingly, all theoretical results obtained for the model without partisans
(Propositions 2.1-2.3) carry over (Propositions C.1-C.3).
Comparing the networks in Study I with those in Study II, we can summarize
that both studies implement the empty network (in which information transmission
is precluded), a weakly balanced network (in which σˆ is an equilibrium), and the
star network (in which σˆ is not an equilibrium).19 While Study I accompanies the
19Note that the second network in Study I and the second network in Study II look quite similar,
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weakly balanced network with a strongly balanced network to have an example
in which σˆ is efficient, Study II accompanies the star network with an unbalanced
network that features different sender degrees within one treatment. Apart from the
baseline treatment, the empty network, the density of the networks is held constant
while the equality of the degree distribution is decreasing. Moreover, the expected
probability of a message being true in the sincere strategy profile, given that the
receiver in Study I knows that he listens to an expert, while the reciever in Study II
does not know whether he listens to a partisan or an expert, is approximately equal
and hence roughly comparable in both studies. In sum, Study I and Study II are
not directly comparable, but similar with regard to the non-experts. The clear-cut
comparisons are across treatments within each study.
Figure 3
Figure 3: Upper panel: The four treatments of the Study I. Lower panel: The four treatments of
the Study II.
The experiments were conducted in the WISO-lab of the University of Hamburg
in November 2014 and August and September 2015, using the software z-Tree. We
ran seven sessions within Study I and five sessions within Study II with 3∗9 = 27, re-
spectively 4∗7 = 28, participants in each session. All subjects in a session played the
game described above in all four networks over 40 rounds in total. For the recruit-
ment of a total of 329 subjects, we used the software tool hroot (Bock, Baetge, and
Nicklisch, 2014). Virtually all subjects were undergraduate or master students at the
but are essentially different: The former is strongly balanced, the latter only weakly balanced.
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University of Hamburg from a variety of fields. None of them had previously partic-
ipated in a related experiment. At the beginning of each session, subjects randomly
received the role of an expert or the role of a non-expert. These roles were fixed
throughout the experiment. In each round, subjects were randomly matched into
groups of nine in Study I and groups of seven in Study II. At the end of each round,
the participants learned the chosen policy, the true state, and the voter turnout in
their group. Groups were newly formed each round by random re-matching. Each
network game was played in ten rounds in total, but the order of networks across
rounds was randomized. Instructions that described the experimental session in de-
tail were handed out at the beginning of each session and were followed by a short
quiz that tested the subjects’ understanding of the game.20 Hence, the experiment
started only after each subject understood the rules of the game. Moreover, there
were four practicing rounds, one for each treatment, that were not payout relevant.
During the entire session, each subject always knew his own network position and
the structure of the network. The quality of the signal that the experts received
was p = 0.6 in Study I and p = 0.8 in Study II which guaranteed that the expected
probability of a non-empty message being true under the sincere strategy profile was
approximately equal across both studies. At the end of each session, three rounds
were randomly drawn and payed out in cash and in private. On average, sessions
in Study I and Study II lasted for 1.5 hours and subjects earned EUR 14.3 and
EUR 16.7 on average, respectively.21
4 Experimental Results
Table 1 in Appendix A gives a summary of the number of observations. On the group
level we have 840 and 800 observations in Study I and Study II, respectively. On the
individual level we have 7,560 (5,600) observations in Study I (II) with 40 decisions
per subject. In total, 189 (Study I) and 140 subjects (Study II) participated in the
experiments.
Pooling all treatments, experts vote for the signal they received 84% and 92% of
all times in Study I and II, respectively. If they have an audience they also commu-
nicate their signal 75% and 90% of all times. Those who do not communicate their
signal usually send an empty message. Non-experts vote in line with their received
message on average 69% and 57% of all times. Those who receive a non-empty
message but do not follow it usually abstain. Abstention is also the most common
behavior of non-experts who did not receive a message. The behavior of non-experts
exhibits more variance than expert behavior, in particular in Study II, but also in
Study I. Hence, we examine treatment effects for non-experts and experts sequen-
tially. After analyzing individual behavior in section 4.1, we will turn to the question
of equilibrium selection in section 4.2. We will address efficiency in section 4.3. All
tables reporting our experimental results can be found in Appendix A.
20The instructions can be found in Appendix D.
21The norm in the WISO-lab at the University of Hamburg was EUR 10 per hour.
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Figure 4: Frequency of non-experts’ following behavior by treatment. Vote message means to vote
A (B) when the message received is A (B). Vote opposite means to vote A (B) when the message
received is B (A). Displayed are responses to non-empty messages. The left panel displays results
for Study I. The right panel displays results for Study II. Differences between the (strongly and
weakly) balanced networks and the unbalanced networks (i.e. the star network and the unbalanced
network) are significant on the p < 0.01 level (cf. Table 3).
4.1 Results on Individual Behavior Across Networks
First, we analyze under which conditions on the network structure non-experts who
receive a vote recommendation follow it, i.e., whether laboratory participants ac-
count for our novel form of the “swing voter’s curse.” Second, we investigate com-
munication behavior of experts, i.e., when participants pass on their signal to their
audience.
Following of vote recommendations. Non-experts in our experiments receive
vote recommendations. Apart from the empty treatments, every non-expert is linked
to an expert sender, who in most cases sends a non-empty message. The equilibrium
analysis of our model showed that the vote recommendation of an expert should only
be followed if this expert is not “too powerful” (in terms of audience size). More
precisely, the sincere strategy profile σˆ in which all non-experts follow their messages
is an equilibrium in the strongly and weakly balanced networks of our experiments,
but not in the unbalanced network and the star network (which is also unbalanced).
As displayed in Figure 4 (and in Table 2 in column ‘vote message’), in around 70%
to 80% of the cases non-experts vote according to their received message in the
balanced networks where the sincere strategy profile is an equilibrium, but they do
so only in around 50% of the cases in the unbalanced networks such as the star.
These differences are highly significant as can be seen from the logistic regressions
in Table 3, which take the weakly balanced networks as the baseline category. This
holds independent of whether we restrict attention to non-experts who received a
non-empty message or whether we also consider abstaining in the case of an empty
message as “following.” Moreover, regressions in Tables 3a even show that non-
experts tend to follow vote recommendations most often in the strongly balanced
network, in which the sincere strategy profile is not only an equilibrium but also
efficient.
To get more detailed evidence on when non-experts follow their vote recommen-
dations, we move on to heterogeneity among individual participants. Figure 5 shows
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Figure 5: Frequency of individual following behavior by treatment (and position). The variable
‘never’, respectively ‘always,’ reports the fraction of individual participants who never respectively
always followed the non-empty vote recommendation they received for each network position. The
left panel displays results for Study I. The right panel displays results for Study II. Differences
between the (strongly and weakly) balanced networks and the star network are significant on the
p < 0.01 level (cf. Table 4). Difference within the unbalanced network between position 4 (sender
has degree one) and positions 1-3 (sender has degree three) are significant on the p < 0.01 level
(cf. Table 4b).
how many of the non-experts never and how many always followed their message
in a given position. As many as 57%, respectively 46%, of the non-experts always
follow their message when they are in the strongly balanced balanced network, re-
spectively the weakly balanced network. For the star network this number reduces
to 30% (25%) in Study I (II), strongly suggesting that non-experts react to the
relative degree of their sender, as predicted by theory.
To further test this hypothesis, it is useful to observe how the network position
affects behavior of the non-experts on top of the network type. We do so by con-
centrating on the unbalanced network of Study II in which the degree varies across
senders. In this network, non-experts in positions 1-3 are linked to a sender with
degree three such that following her message is not a best response to the sincere
strategy profile σˆ. By contrast, the non-expert in position 4 who is linked to the
sender with degree one should best respond to σˆ by following his message. As can
also be seen from Figure 5, 61% of the subjects always follow their message when
they listen to the sender with degree one, while only 30% do so when linked to
the sender with degree three. Differences in individual behavior across positions
are tested with Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, which are reported in Table 4. When
the sender has degree three or four (i.e., in the star network and in the unbalanced
network in positions 1-3) the non-experts’ following behavior is different from their
behavior in all other network positions. When including situations in which indi-
vidual participants receive an empty message (lower block of Table 4), the same
picture arises. Hence, the sender’s (relative) degree has a strong influence on fol-
lowing: a substantial fraction of individuals never follows the vote recommendation
of too influential senders. However, another substantial fraction always follows.
Non-experts who do not follow a message mostly abstain, as can be seen in
Figure 4. Thus, the flipside of a significant decrease in followers is a significant
increase in abstentions for the unbalanced networks.
Result 1. Non-experts follow their vote recommendation significantly more often in
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Figure 6: Frequency of experts’ communication behavior by treatment. Send signal means to send
message A (B) when the signal received is A∗ (B∗). Send opposite means to send message A (B)
when the signal received is B∗ (A∗). The left panel shows results for Study I. The right panel shows
results for Study II. Differences are significant on the p < 0.01 level in Study I (cf. Table 6a), but
not significant in Study II (cf. Table 6b).
the (strongly and weakly) balanced networks than in the unbalanced networks (i.e.,
the star and the unbalanced network). Within a given unbalanced network, non-
experts linked to the sender with the highest degree follow significantly less often
than non-experts linked to the sender with the lowest positive degree.
Vote recommendations of experts. As mentioned earlier, around 80% of the
time experts vote and communicate in accordance with their signal, which is playing
the sincere strategy σˆj (Table 5). While experts vote in line with their signal in a
large majority of cases, there are some deviations from the sincere strategy profile on
the communication stage, as can be seen from Figure 6. Information transmission is
lowest in Study I in the star network, where only 61% of the senders communicate
their signal, whereas 35% choose the empty message. This is a significant difference
in communication behavior, as Table 6a reveals. Moreover, experts send a truth-
ful message more frequently in the strongly balanced network than in the weakly
balanced network. These effects are not present in Study II (Table 6b).22
To further analyze whether experts condition their behavior on the network
structure and their position, we inspect heterogeneity among individual participants.
In Study I, experts’ behavior in the star network differs from their behavior in the
other treatments, both when comparing only senders, i.e., experts with a link, and
only non-senders. This is revealed by Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (Table 7). Both
senders and non-senders are more often sincere in the balanced networks, where this
is a best response to the sincere behavior of all others, than in the (unbalanced)
star network, where this is not a best response. In particular, around 32% of the
senders in the star network never choose the sincere strategy profile in Study I.
The fact that in 73% of these latter cases the sender’s signal determines her vote
and the empty message is chosen is an indication that these experts actively target
the LTED equilibrium. Interestingly, this effect cannot be observed in Study II,
in which partisans are present and in which signal quality of experts is higher. In
22The latter effect cannot be addressed by Study II since there is no treatment with a strongly
balanced network. The former effect, i.e., the reluctance to send the signal in the star network,
may vanish in Study II based on a behavioral reaction to the presence of partisans or to the higher
signal quality.
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Study II, experts are sincere in a large majority of cases and there are no systematic
deviations from this strategy.23
Thus, although some experts seem to target the LTED equilibrium in the star
network in Study I, most of the time experts play sincere, independent of the com-
munication structure. Note that this does not necessarily imply that those experts
never target the LTED equilibrium; it might also mean that the subjects in the
role of the experts intentionally delegate equilibrium selection (or “strategy profile
selection”) to the non-experts.24 As our experimental data reveal, it is indeed the
non-experts who strongly condition their behavior on the network structure.
4.2 Equilibrium Selection
Our setting is prone to give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria. For the Examples 1-3,
all equilibria that satisfy our four selection criteria (Purity, Symmetry, Monotonic-
ity, and Neutrality) are reported in online Appendix C.3. In the strongly balanced
network there are 19 different equilibria. In the weakly balanced and the star net-
work, we have 9 and 5 different equilibria, respectively. (In the empty network there
is only one). In the equilibrium analysis of our model, however, we focused on two
pure and symmetric strategy profiles that we consider focal, namely on the sincere
profile σˆ and the LTED profile σ∗. Hence, the question arises how often these two
strategy profiles are indeed played in the lab, both in general and depending on the
network structure.
When checking how frequently actual behavior in a group is consistent with
one of the existing equilibrium strategy profiles, it turns out that most of these
equilibria are never played. There are two equilibria which are frequently played,
however: the sincere and the LTED.25 Besides these two focal equilibria there is
only one more equilibrium that is actually played. This is an equilibrium only in
the strongly balanced network, which is highly similar to sincere behavior, but with
the difference that one of the four non-experts abstains.26 Hence, by focusing on the
sincere strategy profile and the LTED strategy profile, we do not miss other relevant
equilibria.
Table 8 reports in the last column to which extent the two focal strategy profiles
can predict the actual outcomes given the actual distribution of signals. In every
treatment of both studies more than 80% of the actual outcomes are predicted by
at least one of the two focal strategy profiles. Hence, the focus on the two focal
equilibria is well justified by the data. It remains to investigate which of the two is
played more frequently.
23The only difference in expert sincerity that is significant on the five percent level in Study II
occurs when comparing the unbalanced network with the star network. This effect suggests that
experts without a link less often vote in line with their signal in the unbalanced network than in
the star network. Since both these networks are unbalanced, the sincere strategy profile is not an
equilibrium in any of them and hence the effect is outside of what our theory addresses.
24Another reason might be lying aversion which is common in lab experiments. Not sending a
message or sending a message that contradicts the own signal might “feel like” lying.
25Sometimes there is more than one equilibrium strategy profile that induces LTED.
26In online Appendix C.3 this equilibrium is denoted by v1, r = 3 and illustrated in Figure 11,
Panel (a).
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Figure 7: Frequency of behavior consistent with strategy profiles σ∗ and σˆ by treatment. A
strategy profile is “almost” played if at most one agent has chosen a different strategy. The left
panel shows results for Study I. The right panel shows results for Study II. All differences – apart
from the comparison between the strongly and weakly balanced networks and the unbalanced and
star networks – are significant on the p < 0.05 level (Tables 9 and 10).
Figure 7 and Table 8 show the frequency with which groups play either LTED
σ∗ or sincere σˆ. We consider a group as playing almost a strategy profile if at
most one of the nine, respectively seven, subjects has chosen a different strategy.27
In the empty network, in which σˆ cannot be played, we find the highest level of
coordination on σ∗. Considering the networks in which both profiles are possible to
play, a decrease in network balancedness leads to a drop in the frequency with which
groups coordinate (almost) on the sincere strategy profile σˆ and to a sizable increase
in the frequency with which groups coordinate (almost) on the LTED strategy profile
σ∗. Fisher exact tests reveal that – apart from the comparison between the strongly
and weakly balanced networks in Study I and the unbalanced and star networks in
Study II – these differences are significant (Tables 9 and 10).
Result 2. In the (strongly and weakly) balanced networks, groups coordinate mostly
on the sincere strategy profile σˆ. With decreasing balancedness of the network, groups
coordinate less often on σˆ and more often on the LTED equilibrium σ∗. Coordination
on σ∗ is highest in the empty network. Equilibrium selection in favor of σ∗ is mainly
driven by non-experts who do not follow their message but also by some experts who
send an empty message.
In sum, we find that the comparative-static predictions of the theory are well
supported by our experimental findings.
4.3 Efficiency
Before we proceed to our results on the efficiency of information aggregation, a few
remarks on uninformed voting are in order.
27Recall that every group in Study I consists of nine real subjects, while every group in Study II
consists of seven real subjects and four computerized partisans. The partisans play according to
σ∗ and σˆ by default.
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Figure 8
Figure 8: Histogram of individual uninformed voting. For each participant the variable ‘individual
uninformed voting’ counts the number of votes (for A or B) as a fraction of the number of instances
where the individual is uninformed. For each non-expert this occurs ten times in the empty
treatment and it also occurs in the other treatments when an empty message is received. The left
panel displays results for Study I. The right panel displays results for Study II. The size of the bar
shows the fraction of participants in percent.
Uninformed voting. Non-experts who receive no message, either because they
are in the empty network or because their sender chose the empty message, are
uninformed. In most of these cases the uninformed non-experts abstain, but in
a substantial fraction of around 30% of cases there is a vote by the uninformed
non-experts, as can be seen from Table 2. This behavior seems independent of
the network structure. To explore individual heterogeneity in uninformed voting
the histograms in Figure 8 depict the frequency of voting actions as a fraction
of an individual’s incidences of being uninformed. The distribution of individual
uninformed voting is clearly U-shaped with two dominant categories: Around 50%
of the participants never vote when uninformed, while there are almost 20% of the
participants who always vote when uninformed.
This finding is in line with the literature, since positive rates of uninformed vot-
ing are found in all experiments on common-interest voting. Since uninformed votes
are no better than flips of a coin, they have detrimental effects on informational
efficiency, well documented in the literature.28 In our experiment, it is the empty
network in which all non-experts, trivially, receive no message; hence, if they par-
ticipate in the vote, this necessarily implies uninformed voting. Consequently, the
absolute number of uninformed votes is much higher in the empty network than in
the other networks. Thus, the possibility to communicate may serve informational
efficiency by reducing the extent of uninformed voting. However, there might also
be detrimental effects of communication as we will see next.
Informational efficiency. Informational efficiency is the higher the more often
the signal received by the majority of experts determines the voting outcome. Fig-
ure 9 displays the degree of informational efficiency of voting outcomes across net-
28Grosser and Seebauer (2016) find a 30% rate of uninformed voting. Elbittar, Gomberg, Mar-
tinelli, and Palfrey (2014) even find that 60% of the uninformed vote.
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works. As is easy to see, in both experiments the star network performs worst in
terms of informational efficiency. Moreover, informational efficiency seems to be
decreasing in balancedness of the network structure.
To test whether differences in informational efficiency across networks are signif-
icant, we create the variable efficiency that takes the value −1 if the voting outcome
matches the minority signal, the value 0 if a tie occurs, and the value 1 if the vot-
ing outcome matches the majority signal. Fisher exact tests reveal that the star
network exhibits significantly less informational efficiency than the weakly balanced
and the empty network in Study II, while the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in
Study I. Other differences are not significant (except between the empty and the
unbalanced network in Study II). Note that efficiency is also heavily affected by
signal distributions. If, for instance, the five experts in Study I, or the three experts
in Study II, happen to receive the same signal, say A∗, then it is easier to imple-
ment the majority signal A∗ than when there are signals for both A and B, where
voting errors are more likely to impair informational efficiency. We call a signal
distribution of the form “5:0” (“3:0”) uniform in Study I (II), a signal distribution
of the form “3:2” (“2:1”) non-uniform in Study I (II), and a signal distribution of
the form “4:1” almost uniform. Controlling for the signal distribution reduces the
noise in the analysis of efficiency. Using ordered logit models, we regress efficiency
on the network type, controlling for the signal distribution. Results are displayed
in Table 12. We find again that informational efficiency is lower in the star network
than in the empty network in Study II (p < 0.05). Additionally, there is some evi-
dence for the same effect in Study I (p < 0.1). There is also weak evidence that the
unbalanced network is less efficient than the empty network (p < 0.1). Moreover,
in Study II the star network is also less efficient than the weakly balanced network
(p < 0.01).29
Result 3. Informational efficiency is lower in the star network, compared to the
empty network. In Study II, there is also weak evidence that the unbalanced network
exhibits lower informational efficiency than the empty network and evidence that
the star network exhibits lower informational efficiency than the weakly balanced
network.
The superiority of the empty network compared to the unbalanced networks
is so striking because any strategy profile that is possible to play in the empty
network is also feasible in these unbalanced networks. Providing participants with
the possibility to communicate can hence have a detrimental effect on their voting
outcome.
Economic efficiency. To test whether the low informational efficiency in the
star network, and probably also in the unbalanced network, affects subjects in an
economically meaningful way, we compute the expected payoff EP for each group
in each round. If the group decision matches the true state, each member of the
group earns 100 points. Hence, the variable EP coincides with the likelihood (in
29This we do not find in Study I probably because one of the differences in behavior between the
two experiments is that in Study I several senders in the star network choose the empty message,
which mitigates the issue of unbalanced communication.
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Figure 9: Frequency of informationally efficient group decisions by treatment. Left panel displays
results for Study I. ‘Win’ means that the outcome of voting is the majority signal. ‘Tie’ means that
there were as many votes for A as for B such that the outcome is correct with probability one half.
Right panel displays results for Study II. Differences between the weakly balanced network and
the star network are significant on the p < 0.01 level in Study II (Tables 11b and 12b). Differences
between the empty network and the star network are significant on the p < 0.05 level in Study II
(Tables 11b and 12b). Differences between the empty network and the star network are significant
on the p < 0.1 level in Study I when controlling for the distribution of signals (Table 12a).
percentage points) of a correct collective decision, given all signals in the group.
For instance in Study I, if four experts have received signal A∗ and one expert B∗
and the outcome of the majority vote is A, then EP = p
4(1−p)
p4(1−p)+(1−p)4p ∗ 100 which
is approximately 77.14 for p = 0.6.30 Computing EP by network type yields on
average 61 (73) points in the star network in Study I (II) and on average 64 (79)
points in the other networks in Study I (II), as displayed in Table 13.31
Recall that when not controlling for the distribution of signals, there is additional
noise because some treatments might happen to exhibit uniform signals and hence
higher expected payoffs more often than others. We test for significant differences
using OLS regressions and control for uniformity of signals (Table 14). The findings
are analogous to those of Result 3: The inefficiency of the unbalanced networks, in
particular of the star network, is confirmed (p < 0.1 in Study I and p < 0.05, respec-
tively p < 0.1, in Study II). In addition, there is now evidence in both experiments
that the star network exhibits lower efficiency than the weakly balanced network
(p < 0.1 in Study I and p < 0.05 in Study II).
Result 4. Expected payoffs are lower in the star network, compared to the empty
network. There is also evidence that the unbalanced networks (including the star)
exhibit lower expected payoffs than both the empty network and the weakly balanced
network.
30If we consider reasonable values of EP to lie between the EP of a dictator who is randomly
chosen from M and the EP of an efficient strategy profile, then the range for Study I is [60, 68.3]
and the range for Study II is [62.9, 89.6].
31Table 13 additionally displays the actual number of correct group decisions (‘success’), which
is a less reliable measure of economic efficiency than EP due to the noise induced by imperfect
signals. As confirmed by t-tests (not in the appendix) the empirical values of EP are significantly
below the EP of an efficient strategy profile, except for the case of a uniform signal in Study I,
i.e., a signal distribution of the form “5:0,” which virtually always leads to the efficient majority
decision.
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Result 4 consists of two separate findings. The comparison among the networks in
which communication is possible shows that an unbalanced communication structure
can be detrimental to efficiency. The comparison of the unbalanced networks with
the empty network, where communication is precluded, shows that communication
itself can be detrimental to efficiency, confirming Result 3 above.
Propaganda and partisans. In Study II, the expected signal quality of approx-
imately 60% results from experts having a high signal quality of 80% and from
partisans whose color coincides with the true state in 50% of the cases. This sug-
gests that a large part of the inefficiency of the pre-vote communication in the star
network of Study II can be traced back to partisans in position 1, which is called
the center of the star network. Indeed, having a partisan at the center decreases the
expected payoff EP from 80.0 to 67.4 (see Table 13b, rows 5-6), which is a highly
significant difference. However, the worst scenario still occurs if an expert with a
minority signal is in the center of the star: In these cases, the expected payoff (EP )
is only 37.6 (Table 13b, rows 7-8). This finding is corroborated in Study I where
the expected payoff decreases from 65.1 to 53.5 if the expert in the center gets the
minority signal. Hence, while the average inefficiency of the star network is mainly
due to partisan propaganda sent from the center, the vulnerability of the outcome
to one expert’s information is due to the network structure alone.
Avoidability of inefficiency. Finally, we consider only the inefficient group de-
cisions and ask how many deviations would have been necessary in order to induce
the efficient outcome. For this purpose, Table 15 reports how many more votes
the minority signal received, compared to the majority signal, when the former de-
termined the voting outcome or when a tie occurred. On average we have a vote
difference of 0.68 (1.14) in Study I (II), reflecting that most inefficient outcomes are
close calls such as ties (where the vote difference is zero) or wins of the minority
signal by one vote (where the vote difference is one). We compare this number to
the number of experts and the number of non-experts who voted for the minority
signal to see who could have prevented the inefficiency. In the non-empty networks,
there are on average roughly two non-experts who voted for the minority signal. If
they abstained, the efficient outcome would have been reached in most of the cases.
In the empty network, inefficiency frequently means that a tie has been reached. As
there is on average roughly one non-expert who, without having any information,
voted for the minority signal, we can conclude that also in this network structure
inefficiency could have been avoided by more abstention of the non-experts. This
observation indicates that there are two sources of inefficiency on the side of the
non-experts: First, uninformed voting when communication is missing; and second,
following too powerful leaders under unbalanced communication.
To summarize, it appears that a strong decrease in balancedness, i.e., a sizable
shift of audience from some senders to one other (or a few others), impairs efficient
information aggregation and therefore also voters’ welfare. Hence, although we
find evidence in favor of the comparative statics of our theory and our subjects
do switch from sincere voting to the LTED equilibrium if network balancedness
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decreases, this switching behavior is not pronounced enough to prevent detrimental
effects of unbalanced communication on informational efficiency. If instead, preplay
communication is prohibited altogether, voters can indeed be better off.
Despite these deviations, our experimental results confirm that our simple model
already captures one important aspect of pre-vote communication in social networks,
namely that balancedness of the network structure affects both the choice between
sincere behavior and LTED, and efficiency. Moreover, sincere behavior and LTED
indeed seem to be the only relevant strategy profiles. To see whether the effects
of balancedness are robust if admitting arbitrary network structures and a large
population, we now set out to generalize our model.
5 The General Model
We now take the model as it is defined in section 2 and integrate the following
two extensions. First, we relax the assumptions that only experts receive signals
and that all experts’ signals are of equal quality p. Instead we assume that every
agent i receives a signal with idiosyncratic signal quality pi ∈
[
1
2
, 1
)
. Second, we
relax the assumptions on the network structure. We now admit arbitrary network
structures in which agents can receive multiple messages and be informed by nature
in addition.
5.1 Set-Up
As before, nature draws one state of the world ω ∈ {A,B} with uniform prob-
ability. There is a finite set of voters V . All agents i ∈ V receive a private
independent signal si ∈ {A∗, B∗} about the true state of the world with quality
pi = Pr {si = A∗ | ω = A} = Pr {si = B∗ | ω = B} ∈
[
1
2
, 1
)
. Let gV be the set of all
subsets of V of size two. A network g ⊆ gV represents the communication structure
between the agents. A voter of degree di ≥ 1 is called sender and all voters linked
to her are called her neighbors, who are denoted by Vi := {j ∈ V | ij ∈ g}.
The voting stage and the preferences are as defined in section 2. In particular,
after receiving the signal, each agent may send message “A” or message “B” or
an empty message ∅ to her neighbors. Then, all agents simultaneously participate
in the majority vote. Note that senders may be neighbors of other senders now.
Strategies can now be defined as follows: A communication strategy mi of a voter
i ∈ V with di ≥ 1 defines which message to send for each signal received, i.e.
mi : {A∗, B∗} → {A,B, ∅}. A voting strategy vi of a voter i ∈ V defines whether
and how to vote for each signal received and for each profile of messages received,
i.e., vi : {A∗, B∗} × {A,B, ∅}di → {A,B, ∅} if di ≥ 1 and σj : {A∗, B∗} → {A,B, ∅}
if dj = 0. Again, we denote by σi = (mi, vi) a communication and voting strategy
of a voter and by σ = (σi)i∈V a strategy profile.
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32This model nests our model of section 2 as follows. Let experts M ⊆ V be a subset of voters
who receive an informative signal of quality pj = p >
1
2 and let N = V \M be the non-experts,
whose signal is uninformative, i.e. pi =
1
2 . Moreover, we assumed that g is bipartite such that all
links involve exactly one expert and one non-expert and that non-experts have at most one link.
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In the general model the definition of experts and non-experts has to be re-
considered. Order the voters by their signal quality in decreasing order such that
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ p|V | (in case of equalities fix any such order) and consider the m
best informed voters as the experts, i.e. set M := {j1, j2, ..., jm} ⊆ V with pm > 12 .
Consistently, the LTED strategy profile σ∗,m will be parametrized by the number of
experts m, which we require to be odd.33
In the simple model with homogeneous signal precision the “expertise” of a set of
voters could be assessed simply by the number of signals they have received, which is
the number of experts in the set. For idiosyncratic signal precision, each signal must
be considered with its quality pi, which enters into a group’s expertise with its “log-
odds” weight log( pi
1−pi ) (e.g., Shapley and Grofman, 1984). Hence, a set of voters S is
better informed than another set S ′ if and only if
∑
i∈S log(
pi
1−pi ) >
∑
j∈S′ log(
pj
1−pj ),
which simplifies to
∏
i∈S
pi
1−pi >
∏
j∈S′
pj
1−pj .
In this more general set-up the definition of the sincere strategy profile σˆ has to
be extended since voters may receive multiple messages, while still all voters with an
informative signal communicate their signal. Consistent with the tag “sincere” we
assume that agents vote for the message that has the higher posterior probability to
coincide with the true state, given their private information, i.e. a voter i who has
received signal A∗ from nature and message A by the subset S of her neighbors Vi
votes for A if and only if
∑
j∈S∪{i} log(
pj
1−pj ) >
∑
k∈Vi\(S∪{i}) log(
pk
1−pk ) and abstains if
indifferent; and vice versa for a voter who has received signal B∗. For a voter j who
talks to agents with a sufficiently low signal quality (i.e. log(
pj
1−pj ) >
∑
k∈Vi log(
pk
1−pk ))
this simply means to vote in line with her signal. For a voter without an informative
signal who listens to some equally well informed experts, σˆ means to vote in line
with the message A or B that he has received more often; if both messages have
been received equally frequently or if there is no message at all, she abstains. We
can now reconsider our three theoretical results, Propositions 2.1 - 2.3, in the more
general set-up.
5.2 “Let the experts decide” Revisited
Propositions 2.1 shows for the particular model that the LTED strategy profile σ∗ is
efficient and an equilibrium. In the general model, every odd number m = 1, 3, 5, ...
that is not larger than the number of informed agents defines a LTED strategy
profile σ∗,m, in which all members of M vote their signal and all voters outside of
M abstain. We find that each of these strategy profiles is an equilibrium and that
efficiency holds at least asymptotically.
Proposition 5.1 (LTED, general). There exist equilibria for any network structure.
For instance, for any odd number m of experts (i.e. m voters with signal precision
strictly above 1
2
and weakly above all other voters’), the LTED strategy profile σ∗,m
is an equilibrium for any network structure. This strategy profile is efficient if and
only if
∏
j∈M ′
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \M ′
pk
1−pk , where M
′ := {jm+1
2
, jm+3
2
, ..., jm} ⊆ M is the
set of the m+1
2
experts with the lowest signal precision. Moreover, letting the number
33The profile σ∗,m could also be called “let some(!) experts decide.”
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of experts m grow in this strategy profile σ∗,m, the probability of a correct decision
approaches one.
This result shows robustness of the LTED equilibrium to the two extensions.
First, trivially, more general network structures cannot affect an equilibrium which
does not involve information transmission. Second, the LTED equilibrium extends
to heterogeneous signal precisions. Efficiency of LTED, however, only holds in finite
populations if even the weakest majority of experts (M ′) holds more expertise than
the strongest minority of experts together with all non-experts. This means that
efficiency in finite populations requires that the experts’ signal quality is not too
heterogeneous and that the non-experts’ signal quality is sufficiently low, compared
to the experts’.
However, we show in the proof of Proposition 5.1 (in Appendix B) that the
potential inefficiency of LTED vanishes when the absolute number of experts m
grows large. In that sense not only existence, but also efficiency of LTED extends
to the general model.
5.3 Sincere Voting Revisited
We now turn to the extension of Propositions 2.2 and hence to the sincere equilibrium
σˆ. The intuition that the sincere equilibrium σˆ requires a network structure that
balances a group of experts’ “expertise” with their “power” fully carries over. We
only have to extend the notion of balancedness, which requires some additional
notation.34
For a fixed set of agents S ⊆ V , partition the voters V into believers V +(S),
non-believers V −(S), and neutrals V 0(S) as follows: i is called a believer of the
set S, i.e. i ∈ V +(S), if, from what i can observe in his neighborhood (Vi ∪
i), S is better informed than the complementary set, i.e.
∑
j∈(Vi∪i)∩S log(
pj
1−pj ) >∑
k∈(Vi∪i)\S log(
pk
1−pk ). Analogously, i is called a non-believer of the set S, i.e. i ∈
V −(S), if, from what i can observe in his neighborhood (Vi∪i), S is less well informed
than the complementary set, i.e.
∑
j∈(Vi∪i)∩S log(
pj
1−pj ) <
∑
k∈(Vi∪i)\S log(
pk
1−pk ). Fi-
nally, i is called a neutral with respect to the set S, i.e. i ∈ V 0(S), if he is neither
a believer nor a non-believer, which happens when the above condition holds with
equality. In the special case of homogenous signal precision, the number of links
into a given set S determines whether an agent is a believer, a non-believer, or a
neutral.
Definition 5.1 (Balancedness, general). (a) Given a profile of signal precisions
pj, a network is called “strongly balanced” if every set of voters which is better
informed than the complementary set has more believers than non-believers,
i.e. ∀S ⊆ V , ∏j∈S pj1−pj >∏k∈V \S pk1−pk implies |V +(S)| > |V −(S)|.
(b) For a voter i ∈ V , let Si collect all sets of voters S, of which i is a believer,
i.e. i ∈ V +(S), and which have slightly more believers than non-believers, i.e.
34Applying the corresponding upcoming Definition 5.1 to the specific set-up of section 2 leads
to a notion of balancedness that is equivalent to Definition 2.2. This is shown in the online
Appendix C.4.
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|V +(S)|−|V −(S)| ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Let Qi collect all subsets of these sets that belong
to i’s neighborhood, i.e. Qi := {Q ⊆ V |Q = (Vi ∪ i) ∩ S for some S ∈ Si}. A
network is called “ weakly balanced” if for every voter i ∈ V and for every Q ∈
Qi, there is a corresponding set of agents S with Q ⊆ S ∈ Si, which is weakly
better informed than the complementary set, i.e.
∏
j∈S
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \S
pk
1−pk .
Strong balancedness requires that any group of voters S which is better informed
than the complementary set is also considered as better informed by a majority of
voters. Weak balancedness addresses groups of voters Q within a given voter’s
neighborhood, which together with some voters outside of the neighborhood would
have slightly more believers than non-believers. When the agent is a believer of
such a group Q, there must be one corresponding group of voters outside the agent’s
neighborhood such that both groups together are weakly better informed than the
complementary set.
Proposition 5.2. The sincere strategy profile σˆ is efficient if and only if the network
is strongly balanced. The sincere strategy profile σˆ is an equilibrium if (a) the network
is strongly balanced and only if (b) the network is weakly balanced.
To interpret Proposition 5.2 part (a), consider first the special case of homoge-
nous signal precision pi = p for all voters i. Strong balancedness then means
that every voter i is equally powerful.35 Turning to heterogeneous signal preci-
sion, strong balancedness means that heterogeneity in expertise is matched by the
heterogeneity in power. For instance, as we have discussed, in Example 2, the
star network, as well as in Example 3, sincere voting is not efficient for homoge-
neous signal precision. However, in Example 2 sincere behavior σˆ would be efficient
if signal precisions were, e.g., (p1, ..., p9) = (.9, .6, .6, .6, .6, .5, .5, .5, .5). Similarly,
in Example 3, sincere behavior would be efficient if, e.g., signal precisions were
(p1, ..., p9) = (.9, .9, .6, .6., .6, .5, .5, .5, .5). Hence strong balancedness does not gen-
erally refer to an equality of power, but rather to a balance of power with expertise.36
To interpret Proposition 5.2 part (b), consider an agent i who observes message
A from all agents in a set Q, of which i is a believer. Sincere behavior is to follow
this message. Deviations from sincere behavior only affect the outcome when the
number of A votes under σˆ is slightly larger than the number of B votes. Suppose
that in any of those cases A is less likely to be true than B. Then i can beneficially
deviate from σˆ by voting B. We have constructed a violation of weak balancedness
and argued that then σˆ is not an equilibrium. In fact, the agent i in the example
is “cursed” in the sense that when he follows the vote recommendations of the set
Q whenever his vote has an effect, it has the undesirable effect of switching the
outcome to the less likely state.
This is illustrated by the following example.
35This result is shown as Proposition C.9 in online Appendix C.5. Power is defined as the
Shapley-Shubik index or the Banzhaf index in a cooperative voting game that incorporates how
many believers each coalition has. Online Appendix C.5 introduces this framework, provides
the result, and also gives some intuition for how individual power is determined by the network
structure.
36With our experimental design we purposefully keep expertise constant among experts to ob-
serve unbalanced power directly in the network structure.
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Figure 10: Example 4, a network in which weak balancedness is violated. Voter i1 is “cursed” if
his signal differs from the signals of voters i2 and i3.
Example 4 (not weakly balanced). Let V = {i1, i2, ..., i9}, the network g as illus-
trated in Figure 10, and let the signal precision of all agents i be equal pi = p >
1
2
.
This network violates weak balancedness: Consider agent i1 and set Q = {i2, i3}.
Agent i1 is a believer of set Q since he assigns more expertise to this set than to
the complementary set, of which he can only observe himself ((V \Q) ∩ V1 = {i1}).
Q together with X = {∅} forms a set S = Q ∈ S1, which has slightly more be-
lievers than non-believers since there are five believers ({i1, i2, i3, i8, i9}) and four
non-believers ({i4, i5, i6, i7}). S is the only extension of Q that has this property.
Weak balancedness would require that S is better informed than the complementary
set, but S = {i2, i3} is less well informed than V \ S = {i1, i4, i5, i6, i7, i8, i9}. Thus,
by Proposition 5.2 part (b), the sincere strategy profile σˆ is not an equilibrium.
In the example, agent i1 has an incentive to deviate from the sincere strategy
profile when he infers from their messages that the agents Q = {i2, i3} have received,
e.g., signal A∗, while he has received signal B∗. Given this private information, A
is clearly more likely to be true than B since two out of three “observable” voters
have received signal A∗. However, conditioning on pivotality implies that at least
five voters ({i1, i4, i5, i6, i7}) must have received signal B∗. Thus, in this situation
the unconditional posterior of voter i1 differs strongly from the posterior conditional
on pivotality, which is the reason for the “swing voter’s curse.” The source of this
curse is the power of agents i2 and i3 regarding the votes of agents i1, i8, and i9.
More generally, suppose there is an agent who observes a set of agents Q sending
the same message, say A. If for any additional set of agents whose votes for A
would render i pivotal (call this set X), it holds that these two sets together are less
well-informed than the complementary set V \ (Q ∪X), then voting for A is not a
best response.
Inefficient equilibria revisited. Turning to Proposition 2.3, the existence of
inefficient equilibria with information transmission trivially extends to the more
general framework. Thus, there are network structures and distributions of exper-
tise that lead to inefficient equilibria. However, the question arises whether the
29
inefficiency that we uncovered for unbalanced information transmission vanishes for
large electorates, as it does for LTED.
To address this question, reconsider Example 3 and the corresponding network
illustrated in Figure 2 and let it grow infinitely in discrete steps t = 1, 2, 3, ... by
adding two non-experts to each audience and two experts without an audience in
each step. The t-th network then has two experts of degree 2t and 2t + 1 experts
of degree zero. This example demonstrates the following proposition (cf. proof of
Proposition 5.3).
Proposition 5.3. There are networks in which the sincere strategy profile σˆ is both
an equilibrium and exhibits informational inefficiency. This inefficiency does not
necessarily vanish when the number of experts grows large.
In the empirical part of this paper we have seen that inefficiency does not only
arise through inefficiency of equilibria, but also due to inefficiency of focal strategy
profiles that are not equilibria. In particular, the sincere strategy profile is played
even if inefficient. The proposition above shows that this inefficiency need not vanish
when the number of voters grows.
5.4 Multiplicity
In the sincere strategy profile σˆ, all communication channels, i.e. links in g, are used.
Generally, the information transmission network g∗ under some strategy profile σ
need not coincide with the exogenous network g, but can be any subnetwork (g∗ ⊆ g)
of it, which uses some but not necessarily all of the given communication channels (cf.
online Appendix C.3). For instance, any network g that contains a subnetwork g′ ⊆
g which satisfies strong balancedness admits an efficient equilibrium by using the
subnetwork as communication network, i.e., g∗ = g′. Our model extension admits
denser networks g and hence gives rise to many more information transmission
networks g∗ ⊆ g than our baseline model. As a consequence, coordination on an
efficient equilibrium might become even harder than in the baseline model.
Private versus public communication. With overlapping audiences, we can
not only model private communication but also public communication. Communi-
cation is fully public if the network g is complete (g = gV ), i.e., every voter is linked
to every other voter. In that case, the sincere strategy profile σˆ is efficient and an
equilibrium. In this deliberation equilibrium the optimal alternative can be deduced
by every voter such that this information aggregation within each individual deter-
mines votes unanimously (and other voting rules than the majority rule would also
admit a similar equilibrium, cf. Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). More generally, in every
network g, in which a non-empty subset S of voters is linked to all experts, there are
efficient equilibria in which the members of S vote for the more likely alternative.
This is how public communication admits efficient information aggregation in the
communication stage.
At the other extreme of the spectrum, communication can be fully private as in
the model studied in section 2, i.e. when the network g is bipartite and voters in one
group (the non-experts) have at most degree one. There each voter holds at most
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one piece of information after communication such that information aggregation
can only occur in the voting stage. Arguably, in reality communication is neither
fully public nor fully private. Receiving multiple messages and an own signal leads
to information aggregation already in the communication stage. Participation in a
majority election further aggregates information in the voting stage. Whether such
institutions are efficient depends on the balancedness of the social network.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed communication in social networks prior to a vote and have shown
theoretically and empirically that it can lower efficiency of the voting outcome even
in a common-interest setting. In contrast to public communication, where infor-
mation aggregation occurs in the communication stage, we have studied private
communication, which only admits information aggregation in the voting stage.
Both scenarios can be considered as extreme cases of more general communication
structures, which we have incorporated in the generalization of our model.
If the social network is not balanced, i.e., if it gives too much weight to voters
with too little expertise, and if, at the same time, the network is not too unbalanced
either, then it is an equilibrium to give and follow vote recommendations although
the resulting outcome of the resulting election is less likely to be optimal than under
no communication. We have compared two focal strategy profiles – one without
and one with private vote recommendations – in a simple model of communication
between imperfectly informed and uninformed voters. In the first strategy profile,
the uninformed abstain and the informed vote in line with their own information
(“let the experts decide”). In the second strategy profile, the informed report their
information to their neighbors in the network and everyone votes according to his
or her updated belief (sincere behavior). In two experiments, we have shown that
these two strategy profiles are indeed the only relevant ones, and that communication
indeed causes inefficiency. We have extended the experimental and theoretical set-
up to include partisans and propaganda and have shown that unbalanced networks
make the voting outcome vulnerable to the influence of propaganda. Finally, we
have generalized our model to include pre-vote communication between arbitrary
voters with varying levels of expertise and in arbitrary network structures. In the
general model, sincere behavior still implies that everyone communicates truthfully
and votes in line with his or her updated belief. We demonstrated that the findings
from our simple model do not only remain robust but also hold in the limit when
the population size converges to infinity. Hence, the structure of social networks
and the balance – or the lack thereof – between voters’ expertise and the size of
their audience in the communication network are important for the functioning of
democracy.
31
A Appendix: Tables
Table 1a. Observations
treatment groups experts non-experts senders receivers
empty 210 1,050 840 0 0
strongly balanced 210 1,050 840 840 840
weakly balanced 210 1,050 840 420 840
star 210 1,050 840 210 840
Total 840 4,200 3,360 1,470 2,520
Table 1a: Number of observations in Study I. Senders are experts who are in a network position
with an audience. Non-experts are receivers if they are linked to a sender.
Table 1b. Observations
treatment groups experts non-experts senders receivers
empty 200 600 800 0 0
weakly balanced 200 600 800 347 800
unbalanced 200 600 800 178 800
star 200 600 800 83 800
Total 800 2,400 3,200 608 2,400
Table 1b: Number of observations in Study II. Senders are experts who are in a network position
with an audience. The number of partisan senders is not displayed. Non-experts are receivers if
they are linked to a sender (expert or partisan).
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Table 2a. Behavior of non-experts
vote message vote opposite vote uninformed sincere
empty - - 265 575
(N = 840) - - 31.6% 68.5%
s. balanced 577 52 29 664
(N = 840) 79.7% 7.2% 25.0% 79.1%
w. balanced 480 37 49 609
(N = 840) 72.5% 5.6% 27.5% 72.5%
star 286 66 108 470
(N = 840) 52.2% 12.0% 37.0% 56.0%
Total 1,343 155 451 2,318
(N = 3, 360) 69.4% 8.0% 31.6% 69.0%
Table 2a: Behavior of non-experts by treatment in Study I. In the empty network all non-experts
are uninformed. In the other networks this happens only if an expert sender chose the empty
message. The action ‘vote message’ means that A (B) is voted after message A (B) has been
received. In addition to the displayed categories ‘vote message’ and ‘vote opposite’ non-experts
who received message A or B could abstain. In addition to the displayed category ‘vote uninformed’
non-experts who received an empty message could abstain. Non-experts with no message or an
empty message are sincere if they abstain. Non-experts with message A (B) are sincere if they
vote A (B).
Table 2b. Behavior of non-experts
vote message vote opposite vote uninformed sincere
empty - - 220 580
(N = 800) - - 27.5% 72.5%
weakly balanced 540 37 6 557
(N = 800) 69.5% 4.8% 26.1% 69.6%
unbalanced 417 61 11 438
(N = 800) 54.3% 7.9% 34.4% 54.8%
position 1-3 278 52 9 293
(N = 600) 48.3% 9.0% 37.5% 48.8%
position 4 139 9 2 145
(N = 200) 72.4% 4.7% 25.0% 72.5%
star 360 59 7 377
(N = 800) 46.4% 7.6% 29.2% 47.1%
Total 1,317 157 244 1,952
(N = 3, 200) 56.7% 6.76% 27.8% 61.0%
Table 2b: Behavior of non-experts by treatment (and position) in Study II. The network positions
in the unbalanced network refer to Figure 3. In the empty network all non-experts are uninformed.
In the other networks this happens only in 79 cases, where an expert sender chose the empty
message. The action ‘vote message’ means that A (B) is voted after message A (B) has been
received. In addition to the displayed categories ‘vote message’ and ‘vote opposite’ non-experts
who received message A or B could abstain. In addition to the displayed category ‘vote uninformed’
non-experts who received an empty message could abstain. Non-experts with no message or an
empty message are sincere if they abstain. Non-experts with message A (B) are sincere if they
vote A (B).
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Table 3a. Dependent variable: Following of non-experts
Logit 1 Logit 2
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
strongly balanced 0.398∗ (0.215) 0.358∗∗ (0.174)
star -0.882∗∗∗ (0.181) -0.730∗∗∗ (0.139)
Intercept 0.970∗∗∗ (0.193) 0.969∗∗∗ (0.152)
N 1,934 2,520
Log-likelihood -1133.96 -1501.53
Wald χ2(2) 38.48 45.48
p-value Wald test 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3a: Estimation results for Study I: Logistic regression with decision to follow message as
dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for subjects. Baseline category
is the weakly balanced network. Model 1 restricts attention to non-experts who received message
A or B. Model 2 also considers non-experts who received an empty message, for which following
means abstention. Following coincides with sincere behavior of non-experts.
Table 3b. Dependent variable: Following of non-experts
Logit 1 Logit 2
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
unbalanced -0.651∗∗∗ (0.170) -0.639∗∗∗ (0.164)
star -0.968∗∗∗ (0.193) -0.945∗∗∗ (0.186)
Intercept 0.824∗∗∗ (0.200) 0.830∗∗∗ (0.194)
N 2,321 2,400
Log-likelihood -1543.26 -1595.30
Wald χ2(2) 25.61 25.91
p-value Wald test 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3b: Estimation results for Study II: Logistic regression with decision to follow message as
dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for subjects. Baseline category
is the weakly balanced network. Model 1 restricts attention to non-experts who received message
A or B. Model 2 also considers non-experts who received an empty message, for which following
means abstention. Following coincides with sincere behavior of non-experts.
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Table 4a. Individual sincere behavior of non-experts by position
never always s. balanced w. balanced star
s. balanced 4.8% 57.1% 0.127 0.000
w. balanced 8.33% 46.43% 0.000
star 23.8% 29.8%
empty 19.1% 54.8% 0.033 0.545 0.032
s. balanced 1.2% 51.2% 0.008 0.000
w. balanced 0.0% 31.0% 0.000
star 1.2% 16.7%
Table 4a: Individual behavior of non-experts by position in Study I: for each individual in each
network position (he is in) there is a variable capturing the frequency of sincere actions. The first
block restricts attention to instances in which a non-empty message is received and thus reports on
following of non-empty vote recommendations. The second block considers all ten decisions of each
individual in each position. In the empty network a non-expert never receives a message. Column 2
and 3 report the fraction of participants who never respectively always chose the sincere strategy
in the given position. Columns 4-6 of the table show the p-values of Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test.
Table 4b. Individual sincere behavior of non-experts by position
never always empty w. balanced unbalanced star
w. balanced 15.0% 46.3% 0.000
unbalanced pos. 4 20.3% 60.8% 0.855 0.000
unbalanced pos. 1-3 33.8% 30.0% 0.000 0.001a 0.533
star 32.5% 25.0%
empty 17.5% 60.0% 0.572 0.001
w. balanced 11.3% 43.8% 0.000
unbalanced pos. 4 17.6% 59.5% 0.873 0.964 0.000
unbalanced pos. 1-3 22.5% 25.0% 0.003 0.000 0.001a 0.444
star 21.3% 18.8%
Table 4b: Individual behavior of non-experts by position in Study II: for each individual in each
network position (he is in) there is a variable capturing the frequency of sincere actions. The
network positions refer to the lower panel of Figure 3. The first block restricts attention to
instances in which a non-empty message is received and thus reports on following of non-empty
vote recommendations. The second block considers all decisions of each individual in each position.
In the empty network a non-expert never receives a message. Column 2 and 3 report the fraction
of participants who never respectively always chose the sincere strategy in the given position.
Columns 4-6 of the table show the p-values of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. Note a:
This is the comparison between non-experts in network positions 1-3 and network position 4 in the
unbalanced treatment.
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Table 5a. Behavior of experts
vote signal vote opposite send signal send opposite sincere
empty 919 62 - - 919
(N = 1, 050) 87.5% 5.9 % - - 87.5%
strongly balanced 884 75 671 53 798
(N = 1, 050) 84.2% 7.1% 79.9% 6.3% 76.0%
weakly balanced 878 74 301 30 803
(N = 1, 050) 83.6% 7.1% 71.7% 7.1% 76.5%
star 854 84 128 9 794
(N = 1, 050) 81.3% 8.0% 61.0% 4.3% 75.6%
Total 3,535 295 1,100 92 3,314
(N = 4, 200) 84.2% 7.0% 74.8% 6.3 % 78.9%
Table 5a: Behavior of experts by treatment in Study I. The action ‘vote (send) opposite’ means
vote (send message) A when signal is B∗ and vice versa. In addition to the displayed categories
‘vote signal’ and ‘vote opposite’ experts could abstain. In addition to the displayed categories ‘send
signal’ and ‘send opposite’ experts could send an empty message. Experts without an audience
are sincere if they vote their signal. Experts with an audience are sincere if they vote their signal
and also send it.
Table 5b. Behavior of experts
vote signal vote opposite send signal send opposite sincere
empty 560 21 - - 560
(N = 600) 93.3% 3.5% - - 93.3%
weakly balanced 550 31 309 15 530
(N = 600) 91.7% 5.2% 89.1% 4.3% 88.3%
unbalanced 552 22 158 4 534
(N = 600) 92.0% 3.7% 88.8% 2.3% 89.0%
star 556 27 76 1 550
(N = 600) 92.7% 4.5% 91.6% 1.2% 91.7%
Total 2,218 101 543 20 2,174
(N = 2, 400) 92.4% 4.2% 89.3% 3.3% 90.6%
Table 5b: Behavior of experts by treatment in Study II. The action ‘vote (send) opposite’ means
vote (send message) A when signal is B∗ and vice versa. In addition to the displayed categories
‘vote signal’ and ‘vote opposite’ experts could abstain. In addition to the displayed categories ‘send
signal’ and ‘send opposite’ experts could send an empty message. Experts without an audience
are sincere if they vote their signal. Experts with an audience are sincere if they vote their signal
and also send it.
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Table 6a. Sincere senders
Logit 1: Send Signal Logit 2: Sincere
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
strongly balanced 0.451∗∗∗ (0.166) 0.505∗∗∗ (0.159)
star -0.483∗∗ (0.200) -0.486∗∗∗ (0.186)
Intercept 0.928∗∗∗ (0.161) 0.619∗∗∗ (0.159)
N 1,470 1,470
Log-likelihood -812.55 -884.94
Wald χ2(2) 15.68 20.39
p-value Wald test 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6a: Estimation results for Study I: Logistic regression sincere senders by treatment. Senders
are experts with at least one link. Dependent variable in Model 1 is ‘send signal,’ which is 1 if the
expert’s message equals her signal (and zero otherwise). Dependent variable in Model 2 is sincere
behavior, which equals 1 if sender both sends and votes her signal. Robust standard errors in
parentheses adjusted for subjects. Baseline category is the weakly balanced network.
Table 6b. Sincere senders
Logit 1: Send Signal Logit 2: Sincere
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
unbalanced -0.029 (0.286) 0.080 (0.293)
star 0.289 (0.341) 0.506 (0.359)
Intercept 2.096∗∗∗ (0.264) 1.878∗∗∗ (0.253)
N 608 608
Log-likelihood -206.44 -226.34
Wald χ2(2) 1.03 2.27
p-value Wald test 0.598 0.322
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6b: Estimation results for Study II: Logistic regression sincere senders by treatment. Senders
are experts with at least one link. Dependent variable in Model 1 is ‘send signal,’ which is 1 if
the expert’s message equals her signal (and zero otherwise). Dependent variable in Model 2 is
sincere behavior, which equals 1 if sender both sends and votes her signal. Robust standard errors
in parentheses adjusted for subjects. Baseline category is the weakly balanced network. Observe
that models are not well-specified according to Wald test.
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Table 7a. Individual sincere behavior of experts by position
never always s. balanced w. balanced star
empty: pos. 1-5 1.9% 59.1% 0.161 0.450 0.000
s. balanced: pos. 5 12.6% 70.5% 0.353 0.715
w. balanced: pos. 3-5 2.9% 61.9% 0.047
star: pos. 2-5 1.9% 52.4%
s. balanced: pos. 1-4 4.8% 49.5% 0.039 0.003
w. balanced: pos. 1-2 12.5% 43.3% 0.085
star: pos. 1 31.6% 43.2%
Table 7a: Individual behavior of experts by position in Study I: for each individual in each network
position (she is in) there is a variable capturing the frequency of sincere actions. The network
positions refer to the upper panel of Figure 3. The first block compares experts who are not
senders across treatments. The second block compares experts who are senders across treatments.
Experts are at most ten times in each position. Column 2 and 3 report the fraction of participants
who never respectively always chose the sincere strategy in the given position. Columns 4-6 of the
table show the p-values of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.
Table 7b. Individual sincere behavior of experts by position
never always empty w. balanced unbalanced star
empty pos. 1-7 0.0% 73.3% 0.755 0.157 0.485
w. balanced pos. 5-7 1.7% 78.3% 0.142 0.629
unbalanced pos. 3-7 0.0% 73.3% 0.026
star pos. 2-7 0.0% 76.7%
w. balanced pos. 1-4 1.7% 68.3% 0.334
unbalanced pos. 1 11.1% 80.0% 0.914 0.503a 0.954
unbalanced pos. 2 8.7% 87.0% 0.095 0.655
star pos. 1 10.2% 85.7%
Table 7b: Individual behavior of experts by position in Study II: for each individual in each
network position (she is in) there is a variable capturing the frequency of sincere actions. The
network positions refer to the lower panel of Figure 3. The first block compares experts who
are not senders across treatments. The second block compares experts who are senders across
treatments. Experts are at most ten times in each position. Column 2 and 3 report the fraction
of participants who never respectively always chose the sincere strategy in the given position.
Columns 4-6 of the table show the p-values of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. Note
a: This is the comparison between experts in network position 1 and network position 2 in the
unbalanced treatment.
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Table 8a. Strategy profiles
LTED σ∗ almost LTED sincere σˆ almost sincere explained
empty 11.0% 41.4% 81.9%
(N=210)
strongly balanced 0.0% 2.4% 10.0% 35.2% 81.0%
(N=210)
weakly balanced 1.0% 5.7% 7.6% 27.6% 82.9%
(N=210)
star 2.4% 12.4% 2.4% 13.8% 90.5%
(N=210)
Total 3.6% 15.5% 6.7% 25.6% 84.0%
(N=840)
Table 8a: Frequency of strategy profiles. A group plays “almost” a strategy profile if there is at
most one player whose strategy differs from the profile. An outcome is explained if the actual
outcome in a group (i.e. majority decision A or B) is predicted by at least one of the two strategy
profiles, given the distribution of signals.
Table 8b. Strategy profiles
LTED σ∗ almost LTED sincere σˆ almost sincere explained
empty 21.5% 62.5% 83.0%
(N=200)
weakly balanced 0.0% 5.5% 16.0% 51.0% 89.5%
(N=200)
unbalanced 1.5% 13.5% 3.0% 31.5% 94.5%
(N=200)
star 5.5% 21.5% 5.5% 26.5% 95.5%
(N=200)
Total 7.1% 25.8% 8.2% 36.3% 90.6%
(N=800)
Table 8b: Frequency of strategy profiles. A group plays “almost” a strategy profile if there is at
most one player whose strategy differs from the profile. An outcome is explained if the actual
outcome in a group (i.e. majority decision A or B) is predicted by at least one of the two strategy
profiles, given the distribution of signals.
Table 9a. Fisher exact tests on almost σ∗
strongly balanced weakly balanced star
empty 0.000 0.000 0.000
strongly balanced 0.135 0.000
weakly balanced 0.026
Table 9a: p-values of Fisher exact tests comparing the frequency of the “LTED” strategy profile
σ∗ between two treatments in Study I. A group plays “almost” σ∗ if there is at most one player
whose strategy differs from the profile.
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Table 9b. Fisher exact tests on almost σ∗
weakly balanced unbalanced star
empty 0.000 0.000 0.000
weakly balanced 0.010 0.000
unbalanced 0.048
Table 9b: p-values of Fisher exact tests comparing the frequency of the “LTED” strategy profile
σ∗ between two treatments in Study II. A group plays “almost” σ∗ if there is at most one player
whose strategy differs from the profile.
Table 10a. Fisher exact tests on almost σˆ
weakly balanced star
strongly balanced 0.115 0.000
weakly balanced 0.001
Table 10a: p-values of Fisher exact tests comparing the frequency of the sincere strategy profile
σˆ between two treatments (in the empty network σˆ cannot be played) in Study I. A group plays
“almost” σˆ if there is at most one player whose strategy differs from the profile.
Table 10b. Fisher exact tests on almost σˆ
unbalanced star
weakly balanced 0.000 0.000
unbalanced 0.321
Table 10b: p-values of Fisher exact tests comparing the frequency of the sincere strategy profile
σˆ between two treatments (in the empty network σˆ cannot be played) in Study II. A group plays
“almost” σˆ if there is at most one player whose strategy differs from the profile.
Table 11a. Fisher exact tests on efficiency
strongly balanced weakly balanced star
empty 0.299 0.543 0.170
strongly balanced 0.705 0.117
weakly balanced 0.429
Table 11a: p-values of Fisher exact tests comparing efficiency between two treatments in Study I.
Efficiency is 1 if majority signal wins, 0 in case of a tie, and −1 if majority signal loses.
Table 11b. Fisher exact tests on efficiency
weakly balanced unbalanced star
empty 0.323 0.022 0.002
weakly balanced 0.219 0.007
unbalanced 0.244
Table 11b: p-values of Fisher exact tests comparing efficiency of two treatments in Study II.
Efficiency is 1 if majority signal wins, 0 in case of a tie, and −1 if majority signal loses.
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Table 12a. Dependent variable: Efficiency
ologit 1 ologit 2
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
empty -0.016 (0.185)
strongly balanced 0.110 (0.265) 0.095 (0.238)
weakly balanced 0.016 (0.185)
star -0.236∗ (0.141) -0.252 (0.174)
uniform signal 3.173∗∗∗ (0.593) 3.173∗∗∗ (0.593)
almost uniform signal 1.579∗∗∗ (0.367) 1.579∗∗∗ (0.367)
Intercept cut 1 -1.296 (0.110) -1.311 (0.152)
Intercept cut 2 -0.492 (0.121) -0.508 (0.126)
N 840 840
Log-likelihood -580.612 -580.612
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12a: Estimation results for Study I: Ordered logit. Efficiency is 1 if majority signal wins, 0
in case of a tie, and −1 if majority signal loses. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted
for sessions. Less clusters than parameters simply mean that joint significance (Wald test) cannot
be tested. The first model uses the empty network as baseline category. The second model uses
the weakly balanced network as baseline category.
Table 12b. Dependent variable: Efficiency
ologit 1 ologit 2
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
empty -0.059 (0.140)
weakly balanced 0.059 (0.140)
unbalanced -0.276∗ (0.164) -0.335 (0.210)
star -0.711∗∗ (0.319) -0.770∗∗∗ (0.243)
uniform signal 2.027∗∗∗ (0.135) 2.027∗∗∗ (0.135)
Intercept cut 1 -1.611 (0.208) -1.670 (0.251)
Intercept cut 2 -0.572 (0.122) -0.631 (0.179)
N 800 800
Log-likelihood -513.262 -513.262
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12b: Estimation results for Study II: Ordered logit. Efficiency is 1 if majority signal wins,
0 in case of a tie, and −1 if majority signal loses. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted
for sessions. Less clusters than parameters simply mean that joint significance (Wald test) cannot
be tested. The first model uses the empty network as baseline category. The second model uses
the weakly balanced network as baseline category.
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Table 13a. Efficiency, expected payoff EP and success
treatment win lose EP success
empty 74.3% 11.9% 64.2 62.9%
strongly balanced 77.6% 13.3% 64.2 65.7%
weakly balanced 74.3% 14.8% 63.7 60.5%
star (N = 210) 68.6% 18.6% 60.8 60.5%
star with majority signal for position 1 (N = 132) 81.1% 9.1% 65.1 62.1%
star with minority signal for position 1 (N = 78) 47.4% 34.6% 53.5 57.7%
Total 73.7% 14.6% 63.2 62.4%
Table 13a: Efficiency, expected payoff EP , and success in Study I. ‘Win’ (respectively ‘lose’) means
that the outcome of voting is the majority signal (respectively the minority signal); in addition to
the displayed categories ‘win’ and ‘lose’ the outcome can be a tie. EP can be interpreted as the
likelihood in percent that the group decision matches the true state. ‘Success’ is the fraction of
group decisions which were actually correct. If we consider reasonable values of EP to lie between
the EP of a dictator who is randomly chosen from M and the EP of an efficient strategy profile,
then the reasonable range is [60.0, 68.3].
Table 13b. Efficiency, expected payoff EP and success
treatment win lose EP success
empty 77.0% 6.5% 79.5 70.5%
w.balanced 80.5% 8.0% 81.0 81.5%
unbalanced 76.0% 13.5% 77.4 78.0%
star (N = 200) 68.5% 18.0% 72.6 70.5%
star with partisan in position 1 (N = 117) 60.7% 20.5% 67.4 65.0%
star with real subject in position 1 (N = 83) 79.5% 14.5% 80.0 78.3%
star with majority signal for position 1 (N = 66) 95.5% 3.0% 90.9 90.9%
star with minority signal for position 1 (N = 17) 17.7% 58.8% 37.6 29.4%
Total 75.5% 11.5% 77.6 75.1%
Table 13b: Efficiency, expected payoff EP , and correct outcome in Study II. ‘Win’ (respectively
‘lose’) means that the outcome of voting is the majority signal (respectively the minority signal);
in addition to the displayed categories ‘win’ and ‘lose’ the outcome can be a tie. EP can be
interpreted as the likelihood in percent that the group decision matches the true state. ‘Success’ is
the fraction of group decisions which were actually correct. If we consider reasonable values of EP
to lie between the EP of a dictator who is randomly chosen from M and the EP of an efficient
strategy profile, then the reasonable range is [62.9, 89.6].
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Table 14a. Dependent variable: Expected payoff EP
OLS 1 OLS 2
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
empty -0.231 (0.644)
strongly balanced -0.110 (1.489) -0.341 (1.196)
weakly balanced 0.231 (0.644)
star -1.356∗ (0.646) -1.587∗ (0.678)
uniform signal 33.309∗∗∗ (0.506) 33.309∗∗∗ (0.506)
almost uniform signal 18.202∗∗∗ (1.680) 18.202∗∗∗ (1.680)
Intercept 54.272∗∗∗ (0.567) 54.503∗∗∗ (0.424)
N 840 840
R2 0.534 0.534
p-value F-test 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14a: Estimation results for Study I: OLS with expected payoff EP as dependent variable.
Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for sessions. The first model uses the empty
network as baseline category. The second model uses the weakly balanced network as baseline
category.
Table 14b. Dependent variable: Expected payoff EP
OLS 1 OLS 2
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
empty 0.754 (0.796)
weakly balanced -0.754 (0.796)
unbalanced -3.528∗∗ (0.997) -2.773∗∗ (0.915)
star -7.703∗ (2.847) -6.949∗∗ (2.219)
uniform signal 31.214∗∗∗ (0.844) 31.214∗∗∗ (0.844)
Intercept 64.411∗∗∗ (1.312) 63.656∗∗∗ (1.625)
N 800 800
R2 0.347 0.347
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14b: Estimation results for Study II: OLS with expected payoff EP as dependent variable.
Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for sessions. The first model uses the empty
network as baseline category. The second model uses the weakly balanced network as baseline
category.
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Table 15a. Avoidability of inefficiency
vote difference “wrong” experts “wrong” non-experts preventable
empty 0.74 2.26 1.11 51.9%
(N = 54)
s. balanced 1.09 2.19 2.04 72.3%
(N = 47)
w. balanced 1.24 2.22 1.87 59.3%
(N = 54)
star 1.41 2.15 2.05 60.6%
(N = 66)
Total 1.14 2.20 1.77 60.6%
(N = 221)
Table 15a: Avoidability of inefficiency in Study I. The variable ‘vote difference’ refers to the
absolute difference of the number of votes. A vote difference of, e.g., 2 means that the minority
signal has received two more votes than the majority signal; and a vote difference of 0 means that
a tie has occurred. The label “wrong” refers to an agent who voted for the minority signal. The
table reports the mean of these variables over all inefficient cases, i.e., for all groups where the
majority signal did not receive a majority of votes. Column 5 ‘preventable’ reports the fraction of
groups that would have avoided an inefficient outcome if all “wrong” non-experts abstained.
Table 15b. Avoidability of inefficiency
vote difference “wrong” experts “wrong” non-experts preventable
empty 0.33 1.09 1.13 76.1%
(N = 46)
w. balanced 0.56 1.13 2.05 87.2%
(N = 39)
unbalanced 0.75 0.98 2.06 91.7%
(N = 48)
star 0.95 0.90 2.30 87.3%
(N = 63)
Total 0.68 1.01 1.92 85.7%
(N = 196)
Table 15b: Extent of inefficiency in Study II. The variable ‘vote difference’ refers to the absolute
difference of the number of votes. A vote difference of, e.g., 2 means that the minority signal
has received two more votes than the majority signal; and a vote difference of 0 means that a tie
has occurred. The label “wrong” refers to an agent who voted for the minority signal. The table
reports the mean of these variables over all inefficient cases, i.e., for all groups where the majority
signal did not receive a majority of votes. Column 5 ‘preventable’ reports the fraction of groups
that would have avoided an inefficient outcome if all “wrong” non-experts abstained.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.1
We first show that σ∗,m is an equilibrium for any odd m. We start with showing
that the experts j ∈ M indeed prefer to vote their signal, then we turn to showing
that that non-experts indeed prefer to abstain.
W.l.o.g. consider an expert j who has received signal A∗. He is pivotal if and
only if A wins by one vote (m is odd). This happens if and only if there is a set of
experts S of size m−1
2
who have received signal A∗ as well, while the m−1
2
remaining
experts M \ (S ∪ j) have received the signal B∗. Given that we are in this case
(j has received signal A∗, all agents in S have received signal A∗, and all agents in
M \ (S ∪ j) have received signal B∗), A is weakly more likely to be true than B if
and only if
pj·
∑
S⊂M\j:|S|=m−1
2
∏
i∈S
pi·
∏
k∈M\(S∪j)
(1−pk) ≥ (1−pj)·
∑
Q⊂M\j:|Q|=m−1
2
∏
i∈Q
(1−pi)·
∏
k∈M\(Q∪j)
pk.
(B.1)
Observing that∑
S⊂M\j:|S|=m−1
2
∏
i∈S
pi ·
∏
k∈M\(S∪j)
(1− pk) =
∑
Q⊂M\j:|Q|=m−1
2
∏
k∈M\(Q∪j)
pk ·
∏
i∈Q
(1− pi)
yields that (B.1) holds if and only if pj ≥ 1 − pj, which holds by assumption.
Thus, j ∈M does not deviate from voting the received signal.
Now, we turn to a non-expert i ∈ V \M . Suppose w.l.o.g. that he has received
signal A∗. Then he is pivotal if and only if B wins by one vote under σ∗,m. This
happens if and only if there is a set of experts S ⊂M of size m−1
2
who has received
signal A∗ and the m+1
2
remaining experts M \S have received signal B∗. Given that
we are in this case (i and all experts in S have received signal A∗ and all experts in
M \S have received signal B∗), A is weakly less likely to be true than B if and only
if
pi·
∑
S⊂M :|S|=m−1
2
∏
j∈S
pj ·
∏
k∈M\S
(1−pk) ≤ (1−pi)·
∑
Q⊂M :|Q|=m−1
2
∏
j∈Q
(1−pj)·
∏
k∈M\Q
pk. (B.2)
For every summand S on the LHS there is a summand Q on the RHS which
almost coincides but differs in two factors, e.g.
S : p1p2...pm−1
2
· (1− pm+1
2
)(1− pm+3
2
)...(1− pm) · pi
Q : (1− pm)(1− pm−1)...(1− pm+3
2
) · pm+1
2
pm−1
2
...p1 · (1− pi)
differ in the factors pi and (1− pi) and the factors pm+1
2
and (1− pm+1
2
). For a pair
S,Q that differs in the factor pk and (1−pk), besides pi and (1−pi), let k(S) := k and
let α(S) > 0 be the common part common part of S and Q. Then we can reorganize
(B.2) by subtracting the right-hand side (RHS) on both sides and expressing the
common and different part of each pair as follows:∑
S⊂M :|S|=m−1
2
α(S) · [(1− pk(S)) · pi − pk(S) · (1− pi)] ≤ 0. (B.3)
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We observe that (1 − pk(S)) · pi ≤ pk(S) · (1 − pi) for pi ≤ pk(S), which holds by
assumption because signal precision of non-expert i is by definition smaller than of
any expert k(S). Thus, B.3 holds. Hence, for a non-expert i pivotality implies that
the outcome of the vote is more likely to be correct than what he can induce with
a deviation.
We now show that σ∗,m is efficient if and only if the following condition holds:
(*)
∏
j∈M ′
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \M ′
pk
1−pk , where M
′ := {jm+1
2
, jm+3
2
, ..., jm} ⊆M is the set of
the m+1
2
experts with the lowest signal precision.
For a given draw of nature denote by S the set of agents who have received signal
A∗. Generally, a strategy profile is efficient if and only if the outcome is A whenever
A is more likely to be the true state than B, i.e. whenever∑
j∈S
log(
pj
1− pj ) >
∑
k∈V \S
log(
pk
1− pk ) (B.4)
and the outcome is B whenever inequality B.4 is reversed (e.g., Shapley and Grof-
man, 1984, Theorem II).
Suppose, σ∗,m is efficient. Consider the draw of nature S = M ′, i.e. in which
all members of M ′ have received signal A∗, while all others have received signal B∗.
Since m′ > m
2
, A wins under σ∗,m. By efficiency it must hold that
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) ≥∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk ), which is equivalent to
∏
j∈M ′
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \M ′
pk
1−pk , i.e. condition
(*) is satisfied.
Now suppose condition (*) is satisfied. Since M ′ is the smallest majority of
experts with the least expertise, any set S ⊇M ′ holds more expertise than M ′ such
that condition (*) is equivalent to
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) ≥
∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk ) if and only if
|M ∩ S| > m
2
. Take any draw of nature and denote by S the set of agents who have
received signal A∗. Suppose first that inequality B.4 holds. Then by (*), |M∩S| > m
2
holds. Under σ∗,m the outcome is A. Suppose the reverse of inequality B.4 holds.
Then by (*), |M ∩ S| < m
2
holds and B wins. Hence, σ∗,m is efficient.
Finally, we show that letting the number of experts m grow in this strategy
profile σ∗,m, the probability of an efficient outcome approaches one.
For every m, the probability of an efficient outcome under σ∗,m is larger than in
the hypothetical case that every expert in M has signal precision pm > 0.5 (which
is the lowest among the experts) and also votes her signal. For the hypothetical
case, the Condorcet Jury theorem applies, showing that the probability of a correct
decision approaches one as m→∞. Hence, this is also true for σ∗,m.
Proof of Proposition 5.2
Strong balancedness. We first show equivalence between strong balancedness
and efficiency of σˆ.
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For a given draw of nature denote by S the set of experts who have received
signal A∗. Generally, a strategy profile is efficient if and only if the outcome is A
whenever A is more likely to be the true state than B, i.e. whenever∑
j∈S
log(
pj
1− pj ) >
∑
k∈V \S
log(
pk
1− pk ) (B.5)
and the outcome is B whenever inequality B.5 is reversed (e.g., Shapley and Grof-
man, 1984, Theorem II). Now, consider that under σˆ an agent i votes A if and only
if he is a believer of the group S who have received signal A∗, i.e. i ∈ V +(S). Indeed,
a voter i ∈ V votes A if and only if A has the higher posterior probability to be
the true state of the world given i′s information, which is
∑
j∈(Vi∪i)∩S log(
pj
1−pj ) >∑
k∈(Vi∪i)\S log(
pk
1−pk ), which is the definition of i ∈ V +(S). Hence, the number of
A votes is |V +(S)|, while the number of B votes is |V −(S)| (again, for the draw of
nature that gives signal A∗ to S and signal B∗ to V \ S).
If inequality B.5 holds, then strong balancedness implies |V +(S)| > |V −(S)| such
that A receives a majority of votes. If inequality B.4 is reversed, then by strong bal-
ancedness B receives a majority of votes. If the RHS and LHS of inequality B.5 are
equal, then both states of the world are equally likely and any outcome is consistent
with efficiency. Hence, strong balancedness implies efficiency of σˆ.
Now, suppose that g is not strongly balanced. Then there is a set S ⊆ V with∑
i∈S log(
pi
1−pi ) >
∑
j∈V \S log(
pj
1−pj ), but |V +(S)| ≤ |V −(S)|. Suppose all i ∈ S
receive signal A∗ and all j ∈ V \ S receive signal B∗. Then σˆ leads to outcome B
or to a tie, while A is more likely to be true. Hence, efficiency of σˆ requires strong
balancedness. (We have established that σˆ is efficient if and only if the network is
strongly balanced.)
Efficiency of a strategy profile implies that it is an equilibrium, since every
player’s expected utility is maximal.
Weak balancedness. Suppose weak balancedness is violated, i.e. there is a voter
i ∈ V and a set Q ∈ Qi, such that there is no corresponding set of agents S with
Q ⊆ S ∈ Si and
∏
j∈S
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \S
pk
1−pk , i.e. which is weakly better informed than
the complementary set. Then ∀S ∈ Si, we have
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) <
∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk )
and Si 6= ∅ because Qi 6= ∅ by assumption.
Consider a draw of nature such that within i’s neighborhood all voters in Q have
received signal A∗ and all others (Vi∪i)\Q have received signal B∗. Since i ∈ V +(S)
for Q ⊆ S ∈ Si, it also holds that i ∈ V +(Q), and i will vote for A under σˆ.
Consider the deviation of i to vote B in this case (i.e. when from his own signal
and the messages of Vi, i infers that within (Vi ∪ i) exactly subset Q has received
signal A∗). Let X denote the set of other agents j ∈ V \ (Vi ∪ i) who have received
signal A∗. If (Q ∪ X) /∈ Si, then the deviation has not affected the outcome since
it is not the case that there is a slight majority for alternative A under σˆ. If
(Q ∪X) ∈ Si, then the deviation has turned the outcome from A to B, or from A
to a tie, or from a tie to B. This improves expected utility if the probability that
B is the true state is larger than that A is true. By the property that ∀S ∈ Si, we
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have
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) <
∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk ), B is indeed more likely to be true than A.
Hence, when weak balancedness is violated there is a beneficial deviation from σˆ.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
We show existence of inefficient strategy profiles with the network introduced in
Example 3 and extensions of it. For any t = 1, 2, ... we consider a network with two
experts of degree 2t, 1 + 2t experts of degree zero and 4t non-experts of degree one.
For t = 1 this is exactly the network depicted in Figure 2. All experts have signal
quality pj = p > 0.5, all non-experts signal quality pi = 0.5. For any t = 1, 2, ...,
denote the corresponding game by Γt and the sincere strategy profile in that game
by σˆt.
Under σˆt, 3+6t agents participate in the vote. If the two senders receive the same
signal, say A∗, then A is the outcome since the two senders induce 2∗(1+2t) ≥ 2+3t
A-votes. If both senders receive different signals, A∗ and B∗, then A wins if and
only if A receives k ≥ 1 + t votes of the 1 + 2t experts with degree zero. Supposing
that A is the true state, the probability that the outcome is A provides the general
probability that the outcome coincides with the true state since σˆt treats A and B
interchangeably. Thus, under σˆt the probability that the outcome coincides with
the true state is
EU(σˆt) = p2 ∗ 1 + 2p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + (1− p)2 ∗ 0. (B.6)
Inefficiency. We establish inefficiency of σˆt for any t and also in the limit. (Recall
that a strategy profile is efficient if and only if for any draw of nature it selects the
outcome that maximizes the probability to match the true state.) Consider the draw
of nature in which both senders receive signal A∗ and all other experts receive signal
B∗. An efficient strategy profile would implement (the majority signal) B∗, but σˆt
leads to A.
For an efficient strategy profile σt the probability that the outcome coincides
with the true state is below one for finite t, but converges to one for growing t,
i.e. limt→∞EU(σt) = 1 when σt efficient. Under σˆt, when both senders happen to
receive the incorrect signal, then the outcome does not coincide with the true state.
Thus, the probability of implementing the incorrect outcome under σˆt is at least
(1 − p)2, which is independent of t. Hence, limt→∞EU(σˆt) ≤ 1 − (1 − p)2 < 1, i.e.
inefficiency does not vanish for growing t.
Now, we establish that σˆt is an equilibrium for any t. We show first that there
is no profitable deviation that occurs on the voting stage only. Then we show that
there is no profitable deviation that affects both stages voting and communication.
Deviations on the voting stage only. Consider a voter i ∈ V who considers to
deviate from σˆt by changing his voting strategy vi. This can be a non-expert who
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does not follow the received message or an expert who does not vote the received
signal, but chooses some different strategy instead.
Suppose one sender (i.e. a voter with pj = p > 0.5 and dj = 2t) receives signal
A∗ and the other sender receives signal B∗. Then A receives more votes than B
under σˆt if and only if more experts with degree zero (i.e. voters with pj = p > 0.5
and dj = 0) have received signal A
∗. Hence, when the two senders have not received
the same signal, then σˆt always implements the majority signal and thus induces
the outcome that is more likely to be true. Hence, if there is a beneficial deviation,
then it must also change outcomes in which both senders have received the same
signal.
Suppose that both senders have received the same signal, say A∗. Then the
number of A-votes under σˆt is at least 2 + 4t (since two senders, and 2 ∗ 2t non-
experts vote for A) and the number of B-votes is hence at most 3 + 6t− (2 + 4t) =
1 + 2t. The number of A-votes thus exceeds the number of B-votes by at least
2 + 4t − (1 + 2t) = 1 + 2t ≥ 3 votes. Hence, a single agent who changes her vote
cannot affect the outcome if the two senders have received the same signal.
Taken together a deviation that only changes one vote is neither beneficial if both
senders have received the same signal nor if they have received different signals. This
precludes deviation incentives of non-experts, of experts with degree zero, as well as
of senders who consider to deviate in their voting behavior only, i.e. all deviations
that happen on the voting stage only. We now turn to deviations that also affect the
communication stage, i.e. which involve a sender who does not truthfully transmit
her signal, and show that any of those is neither beneficial.37
Deviations on both stages. Consider a sender j ∈ V with dj > 0. This expert
has (3 × 3)2 = 81 strategies because she chooses one of three messages and one of
three voting actions after receiving one of two signals.38 To evaluate different strate-
gies we can assume w.l.o.g. that the expert has received signal A∗ because neither
the utility function nor the strategy profile depends on the label of the alternatives.
This reduces the number of strategies to the following nine: (mj(A
∗), vj(A∗)) ∈
{(A,A), (A,B), (A, ∅), (B,A), (B,B), (B, ∅), (∅, A), (∅, B), (∅, ∅)}. The first strategy
(A,A) is sincere and hence not a deviation. The strategies (A,B) and (A, ∅) only
involve deviations on the voting stage and are hence not beneficial by the paragraph
above. This leads to the following six remaining deviations σ˜ and their correspond-
ing expected utilities EU(σ˜t):39
37For large t this is simple to show. In the case in which the deviating agent receives the correct
signal, say A∗, and the other sender receives the incorrect signal, the probability that the outcome
is A approaches zero for growing t. Hence, the expected utility of any such deviation is bounded
from above by limt→∞EU(σ˜t) ≤ 1− p(1− p)2 < 1− (1− p)2 = limt→∞EU(σˆt).
38In general, voters with positive degree di > 0 have more pure strategies. In this example, the
senders are linked to non-experts (i.e voters i with pi = 0.5) who are assumed by convention not
to send a message under σˆt. Since a message of an uninformed voter is meaningless, a change of
convention would not affect the result.
39Deviations that involve to vote and/or communicate an alternative unconditionally, i.e. inde-
pendent of the signal, need not be considered here because of the symmetry between the alter-
natives. Indeed, if it is beneficial to vote B after receiving A∗, then it is also beneficial to vote
A after receiving B∗, which is to vote the opposite of the signal. Similarly, there is no need to
consider strategies that involve the empty message and/or to abstain only after one of the two
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1. Sender j sends the opposite message and votes the signal.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=t
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p)2t+1−k+p(1−p)+(1−p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p) (B.7)
2. Sender j sends the opposite message and votes the opposite.
EU(σ˜t) = [p2 + (1− p)2]
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p) (B.8)
3. Sender j sends the opposite message and abstains.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
[
1
2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1 +
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
+ p(1− p) + (1− p)2
[
1
2
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t +
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
(B.9)
4. Sender j sends the empty message and votes the signal.
EU(σ˜t) = p2 + p(1− p)p2t+1 + p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k (B.10)
5. Sender j sends the empty message and votes the opposite.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p) + (1− p)2p2t+1 (B.11)
6. Sender j sends the empty message and abstains.
EU(σ˜t) = p2[1− 1
2
(1−p)2t+1] +p(1−p)1
2
p2t+1 +p(1−p)[1− 1
2
(1−p)2t+1] + (1−p)2 1
2
p2t+1
(B.12)
The derivation of the expressions (B.7)-(B.12) is shown in online Appendix C.6. We
can now compare the expected utility EU(σ˜t) of each deviation, which is given by
(B.7)-(B.12), with the expected utility of the sincere strategy profile EU(σˆt), which
is given by (B.6).
Consider, for instance, the fifth deviation: Sender j sends the empty message
and votes the opposite of the signal. There are 3 + 4t votes and 2 + 2t is a majority.
Denote by (sj, sk) the signals of the two senders. There are four possibilities.
signals. Indeed, if it is beneficial e.g. to abstain after having received signal A∗, then it is also
beneficial to abstain after having received signal B∗, which is to abstain unconditionally. Hence,
if none of the six symmetric deviations is an improvement over σˆt, then neither is a deviation that
treats the alternatives A and B asymmetrically.
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• (A∗, A∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 2t − (1 + 2t) = 1 A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero.
• (A∗, B∗): A never wins since B receives at least 2 + 2t votes.
• (B∗, A∗): A wins since it receives at least 2 + 2t votes.
• (B∗, B∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 2t− 1 = 2t+ 1 A∗-signals among the
experts of degree zero, i.e. all of them have signal A∗.
We now show that this deviation is not beneficial by considering the change in
expert j’s expected utility (which is the expected utility of every agent). Supposing
that the true state is A, the expected utility is the likelihood that A is indeed
implemented. Hence,
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p) ∗ 0 + p(1− p) ∗ 1 + (1− p)2p2t+1,
which directly simplifies to (B.11).
For the upcoming simplifications we use the following two properties:
1.
∑2t+1
k=0
(
2t+1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k = 1 and
2.
(
2t+1
k
)
=
(
2t+1
2t+1−k
)
for any k = 0, ..., 2t+ 1.
Let ∆ := EU(σˆt)− EU(σ˜t). Then
∆ = p2
[
1−
2t+1∑
k=1
(...)
]
+p(1−p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k − 1
]
−(1−p)2p2t+1
∆ = p2
[
2t+1∑
k=0
(...)−
2t+1∑
k=1
(...)
]
+ p(1− p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k − 1
]
−(1− p)2p2t+1
∆ = p2(1− p)2t+1 + p(1− p)
[
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)−
2t+1∑
k=0
(...)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−∑tk=0(...)
+ p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− (1− p)2p2t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥p(1−p)∑2tk=t+1(...)
To simplify the last part of the equation notice the following:
• First, ∑2t+1k=t+1(pk(1− p)2t+1−k = ∑2tk=t(pk(1− p)2t+1−k + (2t+12t+1)p2t+1(1− p)0.
• Second, (2t+1
2t+1
)
p2t+1(1− p)0 = p2t+1.
• Third, p(1− p)p2t+1 − (1− p)2p2t+1 = [p(1− p)− (1− p2)]p2t+1 ≥ 0.
51
Thus,
∆ ≥ p2(1− p)2t+1 − p(1− p)
t∑
k=0
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p)
2t∑
k=t+1
(...)
∆ ≥ p2(1− p)2t+1 − p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
0
)
p0(1− p)2t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−p(1− p)
t∑
k=1
(...) + p(1− p)
2t∑
k=t+1
(...)
∆ ≥ p(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
[
2t∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k −
t∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
Hence, ∆ ≥ 0 if
2t∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k ≥
t∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k. (B.13)
To show that inequality B.13 holds, we substitute k in the first sum by l ≡ 2t+1−k
and consistently sum over l = 1, ..., t (instead over k = t + 1, ..., 2t). Moreover, we
use
(
2t+1
k
)
=
(
2t+1
2t+1−k
)
.
t∑
l=1
(
2t+ 1
l
)
p2t+1−l(1− p)l −
t∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k ≥ 0
t∑
l=1
(
2t+ 1
l
)(
p2t+1−l(1− p)l − pl(1− p)2t+1−l) ≥ 0.
For every l = 1, ..., t, we have 2t + 1 − l > l. This implies for the expression in
brackets that the first product (p2t+1−l(1 − p)l) is larger than the second product
(pl(1− p)2t+1−l). Hence, the inequality above holds, which implies inequality B.13.
Thus, EU(σˆt) ≥ EU(σ˜t) and hence this deviation σ˜t is not beneficial.
Using the same techniques as for the this deviation, we can show for all six
deviations σ˜t that EU(σ˜t) ≤ EU(σˆt).40 Hence, no deviation that involves both
stages communication and voting is profitable.
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C.1 Partisans
C.1.1 Model with Partisans
We have so far assumed that all agents have the same preferences, namely they
want the policy to match the state of the world. Now, we introduce agents who
try to induce a specific policy regardless of the state of the world, e.g., due to
the expectation of personal perquisites. We call them A-partisans or B-partisans
according to their preferred policy. Throughout we assume that the number of A-
partisans equals the number of B-partisans. We introduce partisans into the specific
model of section 2 as members of the set M who can potentially communicate with
non-experts in N . Non-experts cannot directly observe whether “their” sender is an
expert or a partisan, but the number of experts mE and the number of partisans
mA = mB are known.
Formally, we assume that the network g is given and that nature draws an
allocation of the given experts and partisans to the nodes in M . Assuming that
each allocation has the same probability, the probability that a given sender is an
expert is simply mE
m
. We consider the position of each expert or partisan as her
private information. Since partisans have no incentive to utilize signals about the
true state of the world, we assume that they do not receive a signal.
We extend the definition of the two focal strategy profiles σ∗ (LTED) and σˆ
(sincere) to the model with partisans by assuming that the latter communicate and
vote their preferred alternative.1 For each partisan j voting and communicating
1Since there is a random draw of experts and partisans to positions in M , formally, the strategy
space is defined slightly differently than in the baseline model. This has no consequences for the
results of this section.
1
the preferred alternative is a best response to σ∗−j, respectively to σˆ−j. For the
LTED strategy profile σ∗ we assume that all non-experts abstain independent of
their received message.
The notion of informational efficiency of Definition 2.1 still applies to this exten-
sion of the model. Note, however, that an informationally efficient strategy profile
only maximizes the expected utility of all experts and non-experts, but generally
not of any partisan.
The extension of the baseline model that incorporates partisans does not alter
the results we have established so far. In particular, given that the number of A-
partisans equals the number of B-partisans, Propositions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 carry over.
This is formally shown as Propositions C.1, C.2, and C.3 in the next subsection.
C.1.2 Propositions with Partisans
Proposition C.1. In the model with an equal number of partisans (mA = mB),
there exist efficient equilibria for any network structure. For instance, the LTED
strategy profile σ∗ is efficient and an equilibrium for any network structure.
Proof. Since the votes of the partisans balance each other out, the LTED strategy
profile σ∗ always implements the majority signal and is hence efficient. Therefore, it
maximizes the expected utility for any expert and any non-expert.2 Thus, we only
have to check potential deviations of partisans. Deviations in the communication
strategy are ineffective because all members of the audience abstain unconditionally
under σ∗. Changing the voting action cannot increase expected utility because an A-
partisan cannot increase the likelihood that A is chosen when deviating from voting
for A; and analogously for B-partisans.
Proposition C.2. In the model with an equal number of partisans (mA = mB), the
sincere strategy profile σˆ is efficient if and only if the network is strongly balanced.
The sincere strategy profile σˆ is an equilibrium if (a) the network is strongly balanced,
and only if (b) the network is weakly balanced.3
Proof. We first address strong balancedness and then turn to weak balancedness.
Strong balancedness. We first show equivalence between strong balancedness
and efficiency of σˆ. Generally, a strategy profile is efficient if and only if the outcome
is A whenever A∗ is the majority signal and the outcome is B whenever the A∗ is the
minority signal (recall that the number of experts is odd and hence the number of
signals is odd as well). Strong balancedness requires that
∑
j∈M ′ dj ≥
∑
k∈M\M ′ dk,
for the set M ′ ⊂ M which consists of the m′ = m+1
2
experts/partisans with the
lowest degree. Since every set M ′′ ⊂ M of size m′′ = m+1
2
has a weakly larger sum
of degrees than M ′, strong balancedness is equivalent to the statement that every
2With the presence of partisans efficient strategy profiles are not automatically equilibria any-
more, but efficient strategy profiles with partisans who cannot improve are.
3Strong and weak balancedness are defined in Definition 2.2. Since the set M now also con-
sists of partisans, the wording of the definition can be extended from “experts” j ∈ M to “ex-
perts/partisans” j ∈M .
2
set of experts/partisans M ′′ ⊂M with at least m+1
2
members is involved in at least
half of all links, i.e.
∑
j∈M ′′ dj ≥
∑
k∈M\M ′′ dk.
For a given draw of nature denote by S the set of experts who have received
signal A∗. Consider that under σˆ a non-expert i votes A if and only if he is either
linked to an expert who has received signal A∗ or to an A-partisan. Hence, the
total number of A-votes is |S|+ |MA|+
∑
j∈(S∪MA) dj, where MA denotes the set of
A-partisans.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that A∗ is the majority signal. Then |S| ≥ m+1
2
and strong
blancedness implies that
∑
j∈(S∪MA) dj ≥
∑
k∈(M\(S∪MA)) dk. Thus, the number of
non-experts who vote for A is larger or equal than the number of non-experts who
vote for B. Noticing that the number of partisans is equal (mA = mB) and that
there are more experts who vote for A than experts who vote for B yields that A
is implemented. Thus, the majority signal is implemented whenever the network is
strongly balanced.
Now, suppose that the network is not strongly balanced. Then by Definition 2.2
the set M ′ ⊂ M , which consists of the m′ = m+1
2
experts/partisans with the lowest
degree, is not involved in at least half of all links, i.e.
∑
j∈M ′ dj <
∑
k∈M\M ′ dk. Con-
sider the following draw of nature: AllmA(< m
′)A-partisans are allocated to i ∈M ′,
no B-partisan is, all experts in M ′ receive signal A∗, and no expert with signal B∗
does. Since mA = mB and m
′ = m+1
2
, A∗ is the majority signal (there are m+1
2
−mA
A∗-signals and m−1
2
−mB B∗-signals). However, the number of B-votes is at least
the number of A-votes because there is only one more expert voting A than B, while
by the violation of strong balancedness there is at least one more non-expert who
votes B. Thus, a violation of strong balancedness implies inefficiency of σˆ. Thereby,
we have established that σˆ is efficient if and only if the network is strongly balanced.
Now, suppose strong balancedness is satisfied. Then σˆ is efficient and, hence, ex-
perts and non-experts cannot improve by deviating. When an A-partisan effectively
deviates from σˆ either she or her audience stops voting for A. This does not increase
the likelihood that A is implemented. This holds analogously for B-partisans. Thus,
there is no profitable deviation for any player.
Weak Balancedness. Suppose weak balancedness is violated. Then by Defini-
tion 2.2 there is a expert/partisan j with a non-empty setMj such that ∀M ′′ ∈Mj
we have m′′ < m+1
2
. Recall that the set Mj consists of all subsets M ′′ ⊆ M that
contain expert/partisan j and form a slight majority when adding their audiences
of non-experts, i.e.
∑
k∈M ′′(dk + 1)−
∑
l∈M\M ′′(dl + 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2}. If for some draw
of nature all A-partisans belong to such a set M ′′ and all experts receive signal A∗
if and only if they belong to M ′′, then the outcome under σˆ is that A receives 0, 1,
or 2 votes more than B.
Consider now a draw of nature such that the particular j of above is an expert
with signal A∗. Under σˆ, j would vote for A. Consider the deviation of j to vote B.
Let S denote the set of experts (including j) who have received signal A∗ and MA
the set of A-partisans. If (S ∪MA) /∈ Mj, then the deviation has not affected the
outcome since it only turns one vote from A to B, which can only affect outcomes
3
in which A wins by 0, 1, or 2 votes. If (S ∪MA) ∈ Mj, then the deviation has
turned the outcome from A to B, or from A to a tie, or from a tie to B. This
improves expected utility if the probability that B is the true state is larger than
that A is true. By the property that ∀M ′′ ∈ Mj, we have m′′ < m+12 , there are
more B∗-signals than A∗-signals such that B is indeed more likely to be true than
A. Hence, when weak balancedness is violated there is a beneficial deviation from
σˆ.
Proposition C.3. In the model with an equal number of partisans (mA = mB),
there are networks in which the sincere strategy profile σˆ is both an equilibrium and
exhibits informational inefficiency.
Proof. We show the proposition by an example. Let m = 7, mA = mB = 2,
and n = 4. Let the network structure be as in the weakly balanced network of
the experimental treatments in Study II (i.e., the second network in the lower
panel of Figure 3) such that the degree distribution of the experts and partisans
is (d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0). We first show that σˆ exhibits infor-
mational inefficiency and then that σˆ is an equilibrium.
Inefficiency. To see that σˆ is inefficient, consider the relation between the signal
distribution and the voting outcome. Suppose that two experts have received signal
A∗ and one expert has received signal B∗. Assume that the four non-experts happen
to be linked to the two B-partisans, to the expert who received the signal B∗, and
to one of the experts who received signal A∗. In this case, σˆ implies that B wins by
one vote. Since this is an instance in which the majority signal is not chosen by the
group, σˆ is not efficient in the current network.
Equilibrium. We show that none of the agents has an incentive to deviate from σˆ.
Consider first any non-expert i ∈ N . He is pivotal if without his vote the outcome
of the election is a tie (5:5). This occurs either if there are two messages of each
kind and i has received the majority signal as the message; or if there are three
messages of the minority signal and one message of the majority signal and i has
received the minority signal as the message. Non-expert i’s belief that his message,
say A, is true, conditional on his pivotality, amounts to
pi(A|A, piv) =
3p2(1− p) 47 ∗ 920 + 3p(1− p)2 37 ∗ 420
3p2(1− p) 47 ∗ 920 + 3p(1− p)2 37 ∗ 420 + 3p(1− p)2 47 ∗ 920 + 3p2(1− p) 37 ∗ 420
and simplifies to
pi(A|A, piv) = p
2(1− p)3 + p(1− p)2
[p2(1− p) + p(1− p)2] (3 + 1) >
1
2
.
Hence, non-expert i’s expected utility from following the message as prescribed by
σˆ is larger than his utility from abstention or voting the opposite.
Now, consider an expert j with dj = 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that j has received
signal A∗. By deviating from σˆj this expert only changes the outcome if A would
4
win by one vote (it is not possible that A wins by two votes). The draws of nature
that lead to this outcome are all such that A∗ is the majority signal. If A∗ were the
minority signal and expert j with dj = 0 had received A
∗, alternative B would get
at least six votes (because there are two B-partisans and two experts with signal
B∗ and at least two of them have a non-expert who listens to them) and always win
under σˆ. Thus, j can only affect the outcome if A∗ is the majority signal. Since the
probability that A is correct is then above 0.5, a deviation from σˆj cannot increase
expert j’s expected utility.
Now, consider an expert j with dj = 1. A deviation only affects the outcome
if the signal that j has received wins under σˆ, but not when j deviates. W.l.o.g.
assume that expert j has received signal A∗. Since j can reduce the number of votes
for A by at most two and increase the number of votes for B by at most two (when
he communicates and votes the opposite), the outcomes #A : #B that expert j
can overturn are 7:4 and 6:5. We proceed by showing for each of these outcomes
that the probability that A is correct is above 0.5 such that there is no incentive to
deviate from σˆ, which implements A. The outcome 7:4 with j receiving A is reached
under σˆ only if signals were 3:0 or 2:1 in favor of A. Since in these two cases the
probability that A is true is above 0.5, overruling outcome 7:4 decreases expected
utility. The outcome 6:5 can be based on two situations (as in the discussion of
non-experts above). First, it is possible that A∗ is the majority signal and there
were two messages A and two messages B. Second, it is possible that A∗ is the
minority signal and two A-partisans plus one expert (the one holding the minority
signal) have sent message A. Using the probabilities of these two events, we observe
that A is more likely to be true than B, given that j has received signal A∗ and the
outcome is 5:4, if and only if the following inequality holds:
3p2(1− p)2
3
∗ 9
20
+ 3p(1− p)2 1
3
∗ 4
20
≥ 3p(1− p)2 2
3
∗ 9
20
+ 3p2(1− p)1
3
∗ 4
20
.
The equation compares the probability that A is true when signals are 2:1 and 1:2
on the left-hand side with the probability that B is true when signals are 2:1 and
1:2 on the right-hand side, given that j has received signal A∗ and the outcome is
5:4. The inequality simplifies to
(
3p2(1− p)− 3p(1− p)2) [2
3
∗ 9
20
− 1
3
∗ 4
20
,
]
≥ 0,
which is true (since p > 1
2
). Hence, any outcome that an expert with an audience can
overturn in this example is more likely to match the true state than the alternative.
Finally, partisans cannot improve by a deviation because, given the others’ strate-
gies under σˆ, they can only reduce the likelihood of their preferred outcome by a
deviation. Hence, σˆ is an equilibrium despite its informational inefficiency.
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C.2 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
Proposition C.4. In the specific model introduced in section 2, let m be odd and∑
j dj =: l be even. The sincere strategy profile σˆ is an equilibrium if and only if the
following conditions hold.
1. If ∃i ∈ N with di = 0, then∑
x=1,3,...,m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
[ν(x, 1)− ν(−x, 1)] ≥ 0, where
ν(x, 1) denotes the number of “sub-multisets” of multiset {d1 + 1, ..., dm + 1}
which are of size m+x
2
and whose elements sum up to m+l+1
2
.4
2. ∀dj ∈ {d1, ..., dm} such that dj > 0 and for all y¯ ∈ {1, 2, dj, dj + 1, dj +
2, 2dj, 2dj + 1, 2dj + 2} the following holds:
(i) if y¯ even, then
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
·∑y=1,3,...,y¯−1 ν(x, y|dj) ≥ 0, and
(ii) if y¯ odd, then
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
·
[∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2
(
ν(x, y|dj) + 12ν(x, y¯|dj)
)] ≥ 0,
where ν(x, y|dj) denotes the number of “sub-multisets” of multiset {d1+1, ..., dm+
1} which include element dj + 1, are of size m+x2 , and whose elements sum up
to m+l+y
2
.
Proof. Part I shows necessity; part II shows sufficiency.
Part I. “ONLY IF”. Suppose σˆ is an equilibrium. We show that the two condi-
tions of Prop. C.4 are satisfied.
1. Since σˆ is an equilibrium, no player can beneficially deviate. In particular, if
there is a non-expert i ∈ N without a link, i.e., the qualification of the first
condition of Prop. C.4 holds, then for any deviation σ′i ∈ Σ′i = {A,B}, we have
EU(σˆ−i, σˆi) ≥ EU(σ−i, σ′i). W.l.o.g. suppose that σ′i = B. Letting y denote
the outcome under σˆ defined as the number of votes for A minus the number
of votes for B, we observe that the deviation reduces the outcome y by one
vote (because i votes for B instead of abstaining). The deviation σ′i thus only
affects the outcome if y = +1 and turns it into y′ = 0 (i.e., if A wins by one
vote under σˆ, while there is a tie under σ′ := (σˆ−i, σ′i)). Restricting attention
to these draws of nature, we must still have that the sincere strategy profile
leads to higher expected utility since it is an equilibrium by assumption:
EU|y=1(σˆ−i, σˆi) ≥ EU|y=1(σˆ−i, σ′i) =
1
2
. (C.1)
The right-hand side (RHS) is 1
2
because this is the expected utility of a tie.
Some more notation is helpful. Let x denote a distribution of signals defined
4In a multiset the same numbers can occur several times. In full analogy to the notion of a
subset, we call a multiset that is contained in another multiset a “sub-multiset.”
6
as the number of A∗-signals minus the number of B∗-signals received by all
experts. Let P (x|A) denote the likelihood that the signals are x when the true
state is A, and likewise for P (x|B). Let Pˆ (x, y) designate the probability that
signals x lead to outcome y under σˆ. Then we can rewrite inequality C.1 as
1
2
∑
x=−m,−m+2,...,m P (x|A)Pˆ (x, 1)
1
2
∑
x=−m,−m+2,...,m
(
P (x|A)Pˆ (x, 1) + P (x|B)Pˆ (x, 1)
) ≥ 1
2
, (C.2)
since the expected utility under σˆ when restricting attention to the draws of
nature that lead to a win of A by one vote equals the probability that A is
true under these conditions.
This simplifies to∑
x=−m,−m+2,...,m
P (x|A)Pˆ (x, 1) ≥
∑
x=−m,−m+2,...,m
P (x|B)Pˆ (x, 1) (C.3)
and further to ∑
x=−m,−m+2,...,m
(P (x|A)− P (x|B)) Pˆ (x, 1) ≥ 0. (C.4)
Now, we split the sum into positive and negative values of x and finally rejoin
them by using P (x|A) = P (−x|B):∑
x=−m,−m+2,...,m
(P (x|A)− P (x|B)) Pˆ (x, 1) ≥ 0
⇔
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(P (x|A)− P (x|B)) Pˆ (x, 1)
+
∑
x=−m,−m+2,...,−1
(P (x|A)− P (x|B)) Pˆ (x, 1) ≥ 0
⇔
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(P (x|A)− P (x|B)) Pˆ (x, 1)
+
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(P (−x|A)− P (−x|B)) Pˆ (−x, 1) ≥ 0
⇔
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(P (x|A)− P (x|B)) Pˆ (x, 1)
+
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(P (x|B)− P (x|A)) Pˆ (−x, 1) ≥ 0
⇔
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(P (x|A)− P (x|B)) [Pˆ (x, 1)− Pˆ (−x, 1)] ≥ 0
⇔
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(P (x|A)− P (−x|A)) [Pˆ (x, 1)− Pˆ (−x, 1)] ≥ 0.
Independent of the strategy profile, P (x|A) = ( mm+x
2
)
p
m+x
2 (1 − p)m−x2 . For a
draw of signals with difference x (in numbers of A∗-signals and B∗-signals),
7
the outcome y = +1 is reached under σˆ if there are exactly m+l+1
2
votes for A.
All of the A-votes under σˆ can be partitioned such that each element of the
partition is referred to an expert j with signal A∗. Such an expert accounts for
dj+1 votes because there is her vote and the votes of her audience. Hence, the
probability that draw of nature x leads to outcome y = +1 is determined by
the frequency with which m+x
2
experts who have received signal A∗ account for
exactly m+l+1
2
votes. This frequency is given by the number of “sub-multisets”
of multiset {d1 + 1, ..., dm + 1} which have size m+x2 and whose elements sum
up to m+l+1
2
.
Considering all possible allocations of m+x
2
A∗-signals among m experts, there
are
(
m
m+x
2
)
possibilities (which is the number of all “sub-multisets” of multiset
{d1 + 1, ..., dm + 1} of size m+x2 ). Therefore, the probability that signals x lead
to outcome y = +1 is
Pˆ (x,+1) =
ν(x, 1)(
m
m+x
2
) ,
where ν(x, 1) denotes the number of “sub-multisets” of multiset {d1+1, ..., dm+
1} of size m+x
2
and sum m+l+1
2
.
Plugging the equations for P (x|A) and Pˆ (x, 1) into the inequality derived
above yields:∑
x=1,3,...,m
((
m
m+x
2
)
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 −
(
m
m−x
2
)
(1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
·
[
ν(x, 1)(
m
m+x
2
) − ν(−x, 1)( m
m−x
2
) ] ≥ 0. (C.5)
Since
(
m
m−x
2
)
=
(
m
m+x
2
)
, these factors cancel out such that we get
∑
x=1,3,...,m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
[ν(x, 1)− ν(−x, 1)] ≥ 0. (C.6)
This shows that the first condition of Prop. C.4 is indeed implied by the
assumption that σˆ is an equilibrium.
2. Let us turn to the second condition of Prop. C.4 by considering some expert
j ∈ M with dj > 0. W.l.o.g. let her signal be A∗. Under the sincere strategy
profile j will vote and communicate her signal, i.e., A. Abstention reduces
the outcome y by one vote, voting the opposite reduces the outcome y by
two votes. Sending no message reduces the outcome by dj votes. Sending
the opposite message reduces the outcome by 2dj votes. Therefore, there are
feasible deviations for j that reduce the outcome by a number of votes y¯ which
is in the following set {1, 2, dj, dj + 1, dj + 2, 2dj, 2dj + 1, 2dj + 2}.
By the assumption that σˆ is an equilibrium, there is no beneficial devia-
tion for j. That is, for any deviation σ′j ∈ Σ′j, we have EU sj=A∗(σˆ−j, σˆj) ≥
8
EU sj=A
∗
(σˆ−j, σ′j). Considering some deviation σ
′
j and the corresponding reduc-
tion of the outcome by y¯, the implemented alternatives only differ for draws of
nature such that y > 0 and y′ ≤ 0, i.e for outcomes y such that 0 < y ≤ y¯ (be-
cause only then the reduction of support for the received signal has any effect).
Therefore, the inequality of expected utility must also hold when focusing on
these cases, i.e.
EU
sj=A
∗
|0<y≤y¯(σˆ−j, σˆj) ≥ EU sj=A
∗
|0<y≤y¯(σˆ−j, σ
′
j). (C.7)
(i) Suppose first that y¯ is even. Then the deviation σ′j turns all outcomes
in which A wins and 0 < y ≤ y¯ − 1 into a win of alternative B (outcomes
y = y¯ are not possible because y is odd). Therefore, the expected utility of
strategy profile σˆ (respectively, σ′ := (σˆ−j, σ′j)), focusing on these cases, is the
probability that A (respectively, B) is true in these cases. Let Psj=A∗(x|ω =
A) =: PA(x|A) denote the probability that the signal distribution is x and
that expert j has received signal A∗ when the true state is A, and similarly for
Psj=A∗(x|ω = B) =: PA(x|B). Moreover, let Pˆsj=A∗(x, y) =: PˆA(x, y) be the
probability that the signals x lead to outcome y under σˆ, given that expert j
has received signal A∗. Note that PˆA(x, y) is not defined for x = −m because if
all experts have received signal B∗ it is not possible that expert j has received
signal A∗. Then we can rewrite inequality C.7 as∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
PA(x|A)
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−1
PˆA(x, y) ≥∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
PA(x|B)
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−1
PˆA(x, y).
(C.8)
inequality C.8 incorporates that the likelihood of A being true is greater or
equal than the likelihood of B being true given that the deviation is effective
and that expert j has received signal A∗.5 This inequality simplifies to∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(PA(x|A)− PA(x|B))
·
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−1
PˆA(x, y) ≥ 0.
(C.9)
Independent of the strategy profile, PA(x|A) =
(
m
m+x
2
)
p
m+x
2 (1−p)m−x2 · m+x2
m
and
PA(x|B) =
(
m
m−x
2
)
p
m−x
2 (1 − p)m+x2 · m+x2
m
. The factor before the multiplication
sign is the probability that there are exactly m+x
2
A∗-signals. Given such a
distribution, the factor after the multiplication sign is the probability that
expert j has received signal A∗.
For a distribution of signals x, the outcome y is reached under σˆ if there are
exactly m+l+y
2
votes for A. All of the A-votes under σˆ can be partitioned
5To get the absolute probabilities of A (respectively B) being true, we can divide the LHS
(respectively the RHS) of inequality C.8 by the sum of the LHS and the RHS.
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such that each element is referred to an expert k with signal A∗. Such an
expert accounts for dk + 1 votes (because there is her vote and the votes of
her audience). By assumption, expert j has received signal A∗ and thus there
are at least dj + 1 votes for A under σˆ. The probability that draw of nature x
leads to outcome y is determined by the frequency that the m+x
2
experts who
have received signal A∗ account for exactly m+l+y
2
votes. Hence, this frequency
is given by the number of “sub-multisets” of multiset {d1 +1, ..., dm+1} which
include element dj + 1, are of size
m+x
2
, and whose elements sum up to m+l+y
2
.
Considering all possible allocations of m+x
2
A∗-signals among m experts such
that j also receives signal A∗, there are
(
m−1
m+x
2
−1
)
possibilities (which is the
number of all “sub-multisets” of multiset {d1 + 1, ..., dm + 1} which include
element dj + 1 and are of size
m+x
2
). Therefore, the probability that signals x
lead to outcome y, given that expert j has received signal A∗, is
PˆA(x, y) =
ν(x, y|dj)(
m−1
m+x
2
−1
) ,
where ν(x, y|dj) denotes the number of “sub-multisets” of multiset {d1 +
1, ..., dm + 1} which include element dj + 1, are of size m+x2 , and whose el-
ements sum up to m+l+y
2
.
Hence, we can rewrite inequality C.9 as follows∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(PA(x|A)− PA(x|B))
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−1
PˆA(x, y) ≥ 0
⇔
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(( m
m+x
2
)
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2
m+x
2
m
−
(
m
m−x
2
)
(1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
m+x
2
m
) ∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−1
ν(x, y|dj)( m−1
m+x
2 −1
) ≥ 0
⇔
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(
m
m+x
2
) m+x
2
m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
·
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−1
ν(x, y|dj)( m−1
m+x
2 −1
) ≥ 0.
We have used that
(
m
m+x
2
)
=
(
m
m−x
2
)
. Finally, we observe that the factors
(
m
m+x
2
)
,
m+x
2
m
, and 1
( m−1m+x
2 −1
)
simplify to one because
( mm+x
2
)
( m−1m+x
2 −1
)
= mm+x
2
such that we get
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
) ∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−1
ν(x, y|dj) ≥ 0
(C.10)
We have shown that inequality C.10, which coincides with condition 2(i) of
Prop. C.4, holds for any y¯ ∈ {1, 2, dj, dj + 1, dj + 2, 2dj, 2dj + 1, 2dj + 2} even.
(ii) Suppose now that y¯ is odd. (Still, we keep the assumption that some
expert j ∈M with dj > 0 has received signal A∗ and considers a deviation σ′j
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that reduces the outcome by y¯). Then the deviation σ′j turns all outcomes in
which A wins and 0 < y ≤ y¯ into a win of alternative B for y = 1, 3, ..., y¯ − 2
and into a tie for y = y¯. Therefore,
EU
sj=A
∗
|0<y≤y¯(σˆ−j, σ
′
j) =∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m(PA(x|B)(
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2 PA(x,y)+
1
2
PˆA(x,y¯))+ 12PA(x|A)PˆA(x,y¯))∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m(PA(x|A)+PA(x|B))
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯ PˆA(x,y)
.
The denominator is the probability that an outcome under σˆ is reached such
that the deviation has some effect. The numerator consists of the probability
that B is true for the cases where the deviation leads to a win of alternative
B and of half the probabilities that A or B are true when the deviation leads
to a tie.
The expected utility of the sincere strategy profile amounts to
EU
sj=A
∗
|0<y≤y¯(σˆ−j, σˆj) =
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m PA(x|A)(
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2 PˆA(x,y)+PˆA(x,y¯))∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m(PA(x|A)+PA(x|B))
∑
y=1,3,...,y¯ PˆA(x,y)
.
The numerator is the probability that A is true under the cases where the
deviation has some effect. Since the denominator is the same as above, we can
rewrite inequality C.7 as∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(
PA(x|A)
(∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2 PˆA(x, y) + PˆA(x, y¯)
)
− PA(x|B)
·
(∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2 PˆA(x, y) +
1
2
PˆA(x, y¯)
)
− 1
2
PA(x|A)PˆA(x, y¯)
)
≥ 0 and further
simplify it to ∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(PA(x|A)− PA(x|B))
·
( ∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2
Pˆ (x, y|dj) + 1
2
PˆA(x, y¯)
)
≥ 0.
(C.11)
Now, we plug in PA(x|A) =
(
m
m+x
2
)
p
m+x
2 (1−p)m−x2 m+x2
m
and PA(x|B) =
(
m
m−x
2
)
p
m−x
2 (1−
p)
m+x
2
m+x
2
m
; as well as PˆA(x, y) =
ν(x,y|dj)
( m−1m+x
2 −1
)
. This yields:
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(
m
m+x
2
) m+x
2
m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
·
( ∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2
ν(x, y|dj)(
m−1
m+x
2
−1
) + 1
2
ν(x, y¯|dj)(
m−1
m+x
2
−1
) ) ≥ 0. (C.12)
Again, the factors
(
m
m+x
2
)
,
m+x
2
m
, and 1
( m−1m+x
2 −1
)
cancel out since their product is
1. Hence, inequality C.12 becomes
11
∑
x=−m+2,−m+4,...,m
(
p
m+x
2 (1− p)m−x2 − (1− p)m+x2 pm−x2
)
·
( ∑
y=1,3,...,y¯−2
ν(x, y|dj) + 1
2
ν(x, y¯|dj)
)
≥ 0.
(C.13)
Inequality C.13 holds for any y¯ ∈ {1, 2, dj, dj + 1, dj + 2, 2dj, 2dj + 1, 2dj + 2}
odd and coincides with condition 2(ii) of Prop. C.4.
We have derived the implications for an arbitrary expert with degree dj > 0
and for some arbitrary y¯ ∈ {1, 2, dj, dj + 1, dj + 2, 2dj, 2dj + 1, 2dj + 2}. The
derived conditions 2(i) and 2(ii) must hence hold for any dj ∈ {d1, ..., dm}
such that dj > 0. For the case of the empty network, in which no single expert
has an audience, the strategy profile σˆ is not interesting to study because
communication is impossible, but formally still Prop. C.4 applies. In this
special case condition 2 is trivially satisfied. Thus, we have shown that if σˆ is
an equilibrium, then the second condition of Prop. C.4 is also satisfied.
Part II. “IF”. Suppose that the two conditions of Prop. C.4 are satisfied. We
show that σˆ is an equilibrium by deriving the implications of these two conditions
for every kind of player.
• Non-experts without a link: Consider any non-expert i ∈ N with di = 0. The
set of strategies is {A,B, φ} and σˆi = φ. Suppose condition 1 of Prop. C.4
holds, which is inequality C.6. In part I of the proof we used a sequence of
transformations to rewrite inequality C.1 as inequality C.6. Since these were all
equivalence transformations, the assumption that inequality C.6 holds implies
that inequality C.1 holds. Thus, condition 1 of Prop. C.4 implies that for a
non-expert without a link deviating from σˆ does not increase expected utility,
given that the outcome is y = +1, i.e., given that the deviation has any effect
on the outcome.
• Experts with an audience: Consider any expert j ∈ M with dj > 0. This
expert has (3× 3)2 = 81 strategies because she chooses one of three messages
and one of three voting actions after receiving one of two signals. To evaluate
different strategies we can assume w.l.o.g. that the expert has received signal
A∗ because neither the utility function nor the strategy profile depends on
the label of the alternatives. This reduces the number of strategies to nine.
Consider any deviation σ′j. This deviation reduces the voting outcome y that
is attained under σˆ by a number y¯ ∈ {1, 2, dj, dj+1, dj+2, 2dj, 2dj+1, 2dj+2}.
For each of these numbers conditions 2(i) and 2(ii) of Prop. C.4 are equivalent
to inequality C.7 since the conditions 2(i) and 2(ii) were derived by equivalence
transformations of inequality C.7. Thus, for any deviation of an expert with an
audience, the expected utility is weakly smaller than under σˆ, when restricting
attention to the cases where the deviation has some effect on the outcome and
hence in general as well.
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• Experts without an audience: Consider any expert j ∈ M with dj = 0.
W.l.o.g. assume that j has received signal A∗. Under σˆ expert i would vote A.
Alternatively, she can vote B respectively abstain, which reduces the outcome
y by two respectively by one vote. (These deviations have already been con-
sidered for experts with an audience when letting y¯ = 2, respectively, y¯ = 1.)
These deviations are not increasing expected utility since condition 2(i) of
Prop. C.4 holds in particular for y¯ = 2 and condition 2(ii) of Prop. C.4 holds
in particular for y¯ = 1 such that inequality C.7 is satisfied.
• Non-experts with a link: Consider any non-expert i ∈ N with di = 1. W.l.o.g.
assume that i has received message A. Under σˆ non-expert i votes A. Al-
ternatively, he can vote B respectively abstain, which reduces the outcome y
by two respectively by one vote. (The effect of these two deviations is as if
an expert with signal A∗ would vote for B respectively abstain.) Again, since
condition 2(i) of Prop. C.4 holds in particular for y¯ = 2 and condition 2(ii) of
Prop. C.4 holds in particular for y¯ = 1, inequality C.7 is satisfied such that
these deviations do not increase expected utility.
We have shown in part II of the proof that the conditions 1 and 2 provided in
Prop. C.4 imply that no player can beneficially deviate from σˆ.
C.3 Equilibrium Analysis of Examples 1, 2, and 3
We define the concept of a transmission network g∗ ⊆ g as follows: A link g∗ij between
non-expert i ∈ N and expert j ∈ M exists if and only if j truthfully transmits her
signal to i. Truthful transmission requires that (1) the expert sends a message
m∗j ∈ {A,B, ∅} whenever her signal is A∗ and sends a different message m∗′j ∈
{A,B, ∅} ,m∗′j 6= m∗j whenever her signal is B∗; and that (2) the posterior belief of
the non-expert, conditional on the message received, equals the posterior belief of
the expert, conditional on her signal. In equilibrium, (1) implies (2). A transmission
network g∗ arises in the communication stage on the equilibrium path. Note that
different communication strategies support a given g∗, e.g., sending message A after
signal A∗ and message B after signal B∗ transmits the same information as sending
messageB after signalA∗ and messageA after signalB∗. Since we are only interested
in the information transmission (and voting behavior) in equilibrium and not in the
precise “language” that transmits the information, we will not fully specify the
communication strategies but refer to the resulting transmission network instead.
Hence, we can drop any explicit reference to the full strategy profiles σ. Let v denote
the strategy profile of all players on the voting stage. Then, any type of equilibrium
of our examples 1,2, and 3 can be fully characterized by g∗ and v. Note that any
two equilibria that are characterized by a given g∗ and v are identical with respect
to all equilibrium beliefs, voting strategies and outcomes.6
6We do not explicitly specify off-equilibrium beliefs; hence the equilibria of one type may differ
in those. However, equating the off-equilibrium belief with the priors for any non-expert who,
surprisingly, finds himself uninformed after an expert’s deviation from g∗ on the communication
stage supports all selected equilibria.
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Let m˜i (sj) ∈ {A,B, ∅} denote the meaning that non-expert i ascribes to message
m∗j if g
∗
ij = 1 for some expert j who received signal sj ∈ {A∗, B∗}: i believes that
the expert’s vote recommendation is m˜i, with m˜i = A indicating a recommendation
to vote for A, m˜i = B indicating a recommendation to vote for B, and m˜i =
∅ indicating a recommendation to abstain. Slightly abusing notation, we write
vi (m˜i) ∈ {A,B, ∅} to denote the voting strategy of non-expert i with g∗ij = 1 for
some j. Analogously, the voting strategy of a non-expert i with g∗ij = 0 for all j ∈M
is denoted by vi (∅) ∈ {A,B, ∅}. Note that m˜i = ∅ implies g∗ij = 0 and gij = 1 in the
three examples. Let s˜l denote either signal sl ∈ {A∗, B∗} received by l ∈ M or the
meaning m˜l of the message received by l ∈ N . Then, we write vl (s˜l) ∈ {A,B, ∅} to
denote the voting strategy of l ∈M ∪N .
We now define the following four selection criteria that guide our equilibrium
analysis:
1. Purity: The equilibrium is in pure strategies.
2. Symmetry: Any two experts, as well as any two non-experts, with the same
degree in the transmission network apply identical strategies.
3. Monotonicity: If vi
(
m˜i
′) = m˜i for some m˜i′ ∈ {A,B, ∅}, then vi (m˜i) = m˜i;
and if m˜i
(
s′j
)
= sj for some s
′
j ∈ {A,B}, then m˜i (sj) = sj.
4. Neutrality: (i) Unbiased voting: Either vl (s˜l) = s˜l for all s˜l ∈ {A,B} or
vl (s˜l) 6= s˜l for all s˜l ∈ {A,B}; and vi (∅) = ∅. (ii) Unbiased information
transmission: Either m˜i (sj) = sj for all sj ∈ {A,B}, or m˜i (sj) = ∅ (i.e.,
g∗ij = 0) for all sj ∈ {A,B}.
We now define a voting strategy profile v for any transmission network g∗ as
follows: Order the experts according to their degrees d∗j in g
∗ in decreasing order,
indicate the experts with the highest degree in the transmission network by the
index δ∗1 and the experts with the second-highest degree with the index δ
∗
2, etc.
Indicate the lowest degree of experts by index δ∗M and the lowest possible degree of
non-experts by index δ∗N = 0.
7 Order the non-experts according to their degrees d∗i
in decreasing order, indicate the non-experts with degree one in the transmission
network by the index 1 and the non-experts with degree zero with the index 0. Then,
a strategy profile on the voting stage is given by
v =
{
vδ1 (A) , vδ1 (B) ; vδ2 (A) , vδ2 (B) ; ..., vδM (A) , vδM (B) ;
v1 (A) , v1 (B) ; v0 (A) , v0 (B) , v0 (∅)
}
.
Note that a deviation of some expert j from g∗ on the communication stage is
either a lie that cannot be identified as such (i.e. v0(A) = v1(A) and v0(B) = v1(B))
or an empty message. Hence, in what follows we can drop v0(A) and v0(B) as
elements of the strategy profiles.
7The lowest degree of non-experts is zero off equilibrium, even though it might be one on the
equilibrium path.
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C.3.1 Example 1
In Example 1, we have two possibilities. Either the transmission network is empty
due to a babbling equilibrium. Then, the strategy profiles conforming to our se-
lection criteria imply that either all experts abstain or all experts vote their signal
while all non-experts abstain. The latter strategy profile is a “let the experts decide
(LTED)” equilibrium. This is an equilibrium in every game and we do not discuss
it further in this analysis. The second possibility is that r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} experts
transmit their signal to the non-expert linked to them, while the remaining experts
do not. (Note that we fully characterize g∗ by r in this example.) Hence, there
are two possible types of experts and two types of non-experts: those with degree
d∗l = 1 and those with d
∗
l = 0. Hence, the strategy profiles on the voting stage are
of the form
v = {v1 (A) , v1 (B) ; v2 (A) , v2 (B) ; v1 (A) , v1 (B) ; v0 (∅)} .
The strategy profiles on the voting stage that conform to our selection criteria Purity,
Symmetry, Monotonicity, and Neutrality are as follows:
v1 = {A,B;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v2 = {A,B;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v3 = {A,B; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} ,
v4 = {A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v5 = {∅, ∅;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v6 = {∅, ∅;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v7 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} , and
v8 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} .
Checking deviation incentives for all types of players and all strategy profiles on
both the communication and the voting stage reveals the following result that we
state without proof.8
Proposition C.5. Strategy profile v1 and r ∈ {3, 4} are (sincere) equilibria; v2 and
r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are (LTED) equilibria; v3 and r ∈ {1, 3} are equilibria (with sincere
voting and expert abstention); v4 and r ∈ {1, 3} are (“let some experts decide”)
equilibria; v5 and r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are (delegation) equilibria and outcome-equivalent
to σ∗; v6 and r ∈ {2, 4} are (“let some experts decide”) equilibria; v7 and r ∈ {1, 3}
are (delegation) equilibria.
The equilibria characterized in the above proposition are also depicted in Fig-
ure 11.
C.3.2 Example 2
Again, we have two possibilities. Either the transmission network is empty due to a
babbling equilibrium and a LTED equilibrium exists. The second possibility is that
8The proof of this and all other propositions in this subsection can be obtained by the authors
upon request.
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Figure 11: All equilibria of Proposition C.5.
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Figure 12: All equilibria of Proposition C.6.
the center of the star (expert 1) transmits her signal to all non-experts. We now
consider this second possibility and refer to the resulting transmission network as
g∗2. The strategy profiles on the voting stage that conform to our selection criteria
Purity, Symmetry, Monotonicity, and Neutrality are as follows:
v1 = {A,B;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v2 = {A,B;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v3 = {A,B; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} ,
v4 = {A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v5 = {∅, ∅;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v6 = {∅, ∅;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v7 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} , and
v8 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} .
Checking deviation incentives for all types of players and all strategy profiles on
both the communication and the voting stage reveals the following result.
Proposition C.6. Strategy profile v2 and g
∗
2 are (LTED) equilibria; v3 and g
∗
2 are
equilibria (with sincere voting and expert abstention); v4 and g
∗
2 are (“let some ex-
perts decide”) equilibria; v7 and g
∗
2 are (delegation) equilibria.
The equilibria characterized in the above proposition are also depicted in Fig-
ure 12.
C.3.3 Example 3
In this example we have three possibilities which reduce to two if we ignore the
empty transmission network whose only equilibrium LTED has been discussed above.
These two possibilities are the following: (1) Either gij = g
∗
ij for all i, j ∈ N ∪M ;
then, the two experts with degree two in g are symmetric, the four non-experts are
symmetric, and the three experts with degree zero in g are symmetric. (2) Or degree
dj = d
∗
j = 2 for exactly one expert j and d
∗
j′ = 0 for the other expert j
′ who has
degree dj′ = 1 in g. Then, this other expert j
′ is symmetric to the experts with
degree zero in g; the two non-experts i with g∗ij = 1 are symmetric, and the two
non-experts with g∗ij = 0 are symmetric.
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Possibility (1). Let us first consider the case in which the transmission net-
work equals the exogenous network; and let g∗31 denote this network. Then, the
profiles on the voting stage that conform to our selection criteria Purity, Symmetry,
Monotonicity, and Neutrality are as follows:
v1 = {A,B;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v2 = {A,B;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v3 = {A,B; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} ,
v4 = {A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v5 = {∅, ∅;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v6 = {∅, ∅;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v7 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} , and
v8 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} .
Checking deviation incentives for all types of players and all strategy profiles on
both the communication and the voting stage reveals the following result.
Proposition C.7. Strategy profile v1 and g
∗
31 are (sincere) equilibria; v2 and g
∗
31 are
(LTED) equilibria; v5 and g
∗
31 are (delegation) equilibria; v6 and g
∗
31 are (“let some
experts decide”) equilibria.
The equilibria characterized in the above proposition are also depicted in Fig-
ure 13 below.
Possibility (2). Let us now consider the case in which the transmission network
differs from the exogenous network in that only one expert transmits his signal, and
let us refer to this transmission network as g∗32. Then, the profiles on the voting
stage that conform to our selection criteria Purity, Symmetry, Monotonicity, and
Neutrality are as follows:
v1 = {A,B;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v2 = {A,B;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v3 = {A,B; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} ,
v4 = {A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v5 = {∅, ∅;A,B;A,B; ∅} ,
v6 = {∅, ∅;A,B; ∅, ∅; ∅} ,
v7 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅;A,B; ∅} , and
v8 = {∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅, ∅; ∅} .
Checking deviation incentives for all types of players and all strategy profiles on
both the communication and the voting stage reveals the following result that we
state without proof.
Proposition C.8. Strategy profile v2 and g
∗
32 are (LTED) equilibria; v3 and g
∗
32 are
equilibria (sincere voting with some experts abstaining); v4 and g
∗
32 are (“let some
experts decide”) equilibria; v7 and g
∗
32 are (delegation) equilibria.
The equilibria characterized in the above proposition are also depicted in Fig-
ure 13.
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Ex. 3, LSED and delegation
abstain
ݒ଻	ܽ݊݀	݃ଷଶ
∗
Non‐experts
Experts
3
4 5
2
2 3
41
1
abstain abstain
vote message abstain
(d) “LSED” and delegation
Figure 13: All equilibria of Propositions C.7 and C.8 .
C.4 Equivalence of Definitions 2.2 and 5.1
Definitions 2.2 and 5.1 both define the notions of strong and weak balancedness. We
show here that Definition 5.1 of the general model introduced in section 5 applied
to the specific model introduced in section 2 is indeed equivalent to Definition 2.2
and moreover that strong balancedness implies weak balancedness.
Formally, we consider the general model introduced in section 2 and make the
assumption that the set of voters V can be partitioned into a set of experts M who
receive an informative signal of the homogenous quality pj = p > 0.5 and a set
of non-experts N who receive a non-informative signal of precision pi = 0.5. The
network structure g is bipartite such that there are only links between experts and
non-experts. Moreover, audiences are non-overlapping, i.e. each non-expert is linked
to at most one expert.
Notice that the neighborhood of an expert Vj consists of her audience of linked
non-experts (if any). The neighborhood of an non-expert Vi consists of the linked
expert (if any). Therefore, an expert j ∈ M is a believer of a set S ⊆ V , i.e.
j ∈ V +(S), if and only if j ∈ S; and a non-expert i ∈ N is a believer of a set S ⊆ V ,
i.e. i ∈ V +(S), if and only if j ∈ S for the linked expert j (with ij in g). Thus, for
any set S ⊆ V , the set of believers V +(S) consists of the experts who are in S and
of their audiences of non-experts. Hence
|V +(S)| = |M ∩ S|+
∑
j∈(M∩S)
dj. (C.14)
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Notice also that the expertise of a set of voters S ⊆ V is proportional to the
number of experts in the set since
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) = |S ∩M | ∗ log(
p
1−p). Thus, a set
of voters S ⊆ V is better informed than the complementary set V \ S if and only if
S contains a majority of experts. Formally,∑
j∈S
log(
pj
1− pj ) >
∑
k∈V \S
log(
pk
1− pk ) if and only if |M ∩ S| > |M \ S|, (C.15)
or equivalently∏
j∈S
pj
1− pj >
∏
k∈V \S
pk
1− pk if and only if |M ∩ S| >
m
2
. (C.16)
Strong balancedness. Strong balancedness according to Definition 5.1 (a) is sat-
isfied if and only if ∀S ⊆ V ,∏
j∈S
pj
1− pj >
∏
k∈V \S
pk
1− pk implies |V
+(S)| > |V −(S)|.
Since in the specific model pj = p for all j ∈M and pi = 0.5 for all i ∈ N , and since
|V +(S)| = |M ∩ S|+∑j∈(M∩S) dj, this is equivalent to ∀S ⊆ V ,
|S ∩M | > m
2
implies |M ∩ S|+
∑
j∈(M∩S)
dj > |M \ S|+
∑
k∈(M\S)
dk.
Since in a set S the non-experts S ∩N do not matter for the above equations, the
statement above is equivalent to ∀M ′′ ⊆M ,
m′′ >
m
2
implies m′′ +
∑
j∈M ′′
dj > m−m′′ +
∑
k∈(M\M ′′)
dk. (C.17)
If equation C.17 holds for a given set M ′′, then it also holds for a superset of
it. Hence, for m odd, the condition above (which makes a requirement on all sets
M ′′ ⊆M with m′′ > m
2
) is equivalent to ∀M ′′ ⊆M such that m′′ = m+1
2
,
m+ 1
2
+
∑
j∈M ′′
dj >
m− 1
2
+
∑
k∈(M\M ′′)
dk,
which simplifies to
1 +
∑
j∈M ′′
dj >
∑
k∈(M\M ′′)
dk
and finally to ∑
j∈M ′′
dj ≥
∑
k∈(M\M ′′)
dk,
which is the definition of strong balancedness according to Definition 2.2.
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Weak balancedness. Definition 5.1 part (b) uses the following two notions. For
a voter i ∈ V , Si collects all sets of voters S, of which i is a believer, i.e. i ∈ V +(S),
and which have slightly more believers than non-believers, i.e. |V +(S)| − |V −(S)| ∈
{0, 1, 2}. Qi collects all subsets of these sets that belong to i’s neighborhood, i.e.
Qi := {Q ⊆ V |Q = (Vi ∪ i) ∩ S for some S ∈ Si}.
Under the specific assumptions (that nest the model of section 2 in the framework
of section 5), these notions simplify as follows. For an expert j ∈M , Sj collects all
sets of voters S, that include expert j, i.e. j ∈ S, and whose experts together with
their audiences have slightly more voters than the complementary set, i.e.
|M ∩ S|+
∑
k∈(M∩S)
dk − (|M \ S|+
∑
l∈(M\S)
dl) ∈ {0, 1, 2},
which is equivalent to∑
k∈(M∩S)
(dk + 1)−
∑
l∈(M\S)
(dl + 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (C.18)
Moreover, for an expert j ∈M , Qj collects all subsets Q of these sets S that belong
to i’s neighborhood, which consists of the expert j herself and a (possibly emtpy)
subset of her audience of linked non-experts, i.e. j ∈ Q ⊆ {Vi ∪ j}. Hence, either
Sj = ∅, then Qj = ∅; or Sj 6= ∅, then {{j}} ∈ Qj.
For a non-expert i ∈ N , Si = ∅ if di = 0 because i /∈ V +(S) for any set S. If non-
expert i is linked to some expert j, then Si = Sj, i.e. the set Si coincides with the
corresponding set of the expert linked to non-expert i. Moreover, for a non-expert
i ∈ N , Qi collects all subsets of these sets that belong to i’s neighborhood, which
consists only of the expert j who is linked to i, i.e. Q = {{j}}. Hence, either Si = ∅
(e.g. because di = 0), then Qi = ∅; or Si 6= ∅, then Qi = {{j}} with ij ∈ g.
On the other hand, Definition 2.2 part (b) uses the following notion. For an
expert j ∈M ,Mj is the set of expert sets M ′′ ⊆M that contain expert j and form
a slight majority when adding their audiences of non-experts, i.e.∑
k∈M ′′
(dk + 1)−
∑
l∈M\M ′′
(dl + 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (C.19)
Hence, there is a strong relation between the sets Sj andMj. To every set S ∈ Sj
there corresponds one set M ′′ ∈ Mj simply by M ′′ = S ∩M , and equation C.18
above holds for the set S if and only if equation C.19 holds for the set M ′′ = S ∩M .
Now, suppose a network is weakly balanced according to Definition 5.1. We
show weak balancedness according to Definition 2.2, which requires that for every
expert j ∈ M , Mj 6= ∅ implies that there is at least one element consisting of a
weak majority of experts, i.e. ∃M ′′ ∈ Mj such that m′′ ≥ m+12 . If for some expert
j ∈ M , Mj = ∅, then the condition cannot be violated for this particular expert.
Consider any expert j ∈ M with Mj 6= ∅. Then Sj 6= ∅, because M ′ ∈ Mj implies
M ′ ∈ Sj and {{j}} ∈ Qj 6= ∅. By weak balancedness according to Definition 5.1,
∃S ∈ Sj with |M ∩ S| > m2 . We construct M ′′ := S ∩M , which satisfies M ′′ ∈ Mj
and m′′ ≥ m+1
2
.
Now, suppose a network is weakly balanced according to Definition 2.2. We show
weak balancedness according to Definition 5.1, which requires that for every voter
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i ∈ V and for everyQ ∈ Qi, there is a corresponding set of agents S withQ ⊆ S ∈ Si,
which is better informed than the complementary set, i.e.
∏
j∈S
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \S
pk
1−pk .
For voters i ∈ V with Qi = ∅, the condition cannot be violated for this particular
voter i. Now, consider any expert j ∈ M with Qj 6= ∅ and hence Si 6= ∅. Then
Mj 6= ∅, because S ∈ Sj implies (S ∩M) ∈ Mj. By weak balancedness according
to Definition 2.2, ∃M ′′ ∈ Mj with m′′ ≥ m+12 . M ′′ ∈ Mj means that j ∈ M ′′ and
that M ′′ satisfies equation C.19 and thus also equation C.18 for S = M ′′. Hence,
|V +(M ′′)| − |V −(M ′′)| ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that M ′′ ∈ Sj. Moreover, m′′ ≥ m+12 implies
that
∏
j∈V ∩M ′′
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \M ′′
pk
1−pk (because all experts j ∈ M have equal signal
precision pj). This holds for any Q ∈ Qi because all Q ∈ Qi satisfy Q ∩M ′′ = {j}
and non-experts do not affect the equations. Now, consider any non-expert i ∈ N
with Qi 6= ∅. Then Qi = {{j}} ⊆ Qj. Since for expert j linked to i there is a
set S = M ′′ ∈ Sj with S ⊇ {j} with
∏
j∈S
pj
1−pj ≥
∏
k∈V \S
pk
1−pk , this also holds for
non-expert i.
Strong balancedness implies weak balancedness. We show that a violation
of weak balancedness implies a violation of strong balancedness.
Suppose weak balancedness is violated, i.e. there is a voter i ∈ V and a set
Q ∈ Qi, such that there is no corresponding set of agents S with Q ⊆ S ∈ Si, which
is better informed than the complementary set, i.e. which is not fulfilling
∏
j∈S
pj
1−pj ≥∏
k∈V \S
pk
1−pk . Hence, ∀S ∈ Si, we have
∏
j∈S
pj
1−pj <
∏
k∈V \S
pk
1−pk . (Si 6= ∅ because
Qi 6= ∅ by assumption.) Then by strong balancedness, |V +(V \ S)| > |V −(V \ S)|,
which implies |V +(S)| < |V −(S)|. However, this contradicts S ∈ Si, which requires
that |V +(S)| − |V −(S)| ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
C.5 Simple Games: A Justification of Power
Proposition 5.2 can be interpreted in terms of expert power as defined in the class of
simple games (cf., e.g., Roth, 1988). To see this, note that our model defines a non-
cooperative game under incomplete information which is specified by an exogenous
network g and by signal precisions pj. To each of these games Γ(g, p1, ..., pn) we will
associate two cooperative games of the form (V, υ), with the characteristic function
υ : 2V → {0, 1}. In the first game (V, υ∗) a coalition S is winning, i.e., υ∗(S) = 1, if
and only if it has a larger expertise than the complementary set as quantified by the
log-odds rule, i.e.
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) >
∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk ). (This is a so-called weighted
majority game in which each voter j’s weight is log(
pj
1−pj ).) In the second game
(V, υˆ) a coalition S is winning, i.e., υˆ(S) = 1, if and only if there are more believers
than non-believers, i.e. |V +(S)| > |V −(S)|. This is a simple game which mimics the
outcome of the sincere strategy profile in the game Γ(g, p1, ..., pn). Indeed, if a set
of voters S has received signal A∗ and all others B∗, then under σˆ all |V +(S)| will
vote for A, all |V −(S)| will vote for B, and all |V 0(S)| will abstain.
In simple games, a player’s power is measured by the Shapley value, which is
then called the Shapley-Shubik index, or alternatively, with the Banzhaf index.
Both indices take into account how often a player can “swing” a losing coalition
into a winning coalition. In the simple game (V, υˆ) corresponding to Example 1,
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for instance, all five experts are equally powerful since the winning coalitions are
those which have at least three expert members. This is also true in the other game
(V, υ∗) that corresponds to Example 1 because all experts are equally well informed.
As a consequence, sincere voting is efficient in this example. The upcoming corol-
lary of Proposition 2.2 shows that this relation between power and efficiency fully
generalizes.
Definition C.1 (Power). For a weighted majority game (V, υ), define power of a
player i ∈ V as her Banzhaf index βi(υ) or her Shapley-Shubik index φi(υ). The
(raw) Banzhaf index of a player i ∈ V is the fraction of swings she has, i.e., βi(υ) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆V \{i}[υ(S ∪ {i}) − υ(S)]; the Shapley-Shubik index of a player i ∈ V is
her marginal contribution averaged over all orderings of the players, which can be
written as φi(υ) =
∑
S⊆V \{i}
|S|!(|V |−|S|−1)!
|V |! [υ(S ∪ {i})− υ(S)].
In the game (V, υ∗) power only depends on the signal qualities. There pi > pj
implies that voter i is at least as powerful as expert j. In the game (M, υˆ), power is
also monotonic in an agent’s expertise pi, in the sense that increasing a player’s signal
precision pi cannot reduce her power. Similarly, in that game power is monotonic
in a player’s degree di in the sense that adding a new link ij to g cannot decrease
the power of the agents i and j. However, a player’s power in (M, υˆ) is not a simple
function of her degree and her expertise, but depends on the network structure g as
well as on the signal precisions. For every given example, it can be computed.
Proposition C.9. Suppose there is no coalition S ⊂ V with ∑j∈S log( pj1−pj ) =∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk ).
9 If the network g is strongly balanced, then each player’s power
is the same in the two corresponding games, i.e. ∀j ∈ V, φj(υˆ) = φj(υ∗), as well as
βj(υˆ) = βj(υ
∗). For the special case of homogenous signal quality among all experts,
i.e. pj = p ∀j ∈ V with pj > 0.5, strong balancedness means that each expert is
equally powerful in (V, υˆ) and that all non-experts (with pi = 0.5) have no power.
Proof. Recall that strong balancedness is defined as follows: ∀S ⊆ V , ∏j∈S pj1−pj >∏
k∈V \S
pk
1−pk implies |V +(S)| > |V −(S)|. By the definition of the games (V, υ∗) and
(V, υˆ), strong balancedness is equivalent to the following: ∀S ⊆ V , υ∗(S) = 1 implies
υˆ(S) = 1. Now, consider a set S such that υ∗(S) = 0. By definition of υ∗, we have
either
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) <
∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk ) or
∑
j∈S log(
pj
1−pj ) =
∑
k∈V \S log(
pk
1−pk ).
The latter case is excluded by assumption. Hence, υ∗(S) = 0 implies υ∗(V \S) = 1,
which further implies by strong balancedness that υˆ(V \S) = 1, which finally implies
that υˆ(S) = 0. This shows for any set S that υˆ(S) = 1 if and only if υ∗(S) = 1, which
means that υˆ = υ∗. As a consequence, the vectors of power coincide: φ(υˆ) = φ(υ∗),
as well as β(υˆ) = β(υ∗).
We now turn to the special case of homogenous signal quality. Let M ⊆ V denote
the set of voters with an informative signal, which we call experts, i.e. ∀j ∈ M , we
have pj = p > 0.5. Since vˆ = v
∗, it is sufficient to show that all experts j ∈ M are
9This assumption only rules out non-generic cases, in which after the realization of all signals
still both alternatives are equally likely. In terms of simple games, the assumption means that the
simple game (V, υ∗) is strong, i.e. for all coalitions S ⊂ V , υ∗(S) = 0 implies that υ∗(V \ S) = 1.
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equally powerful in (V, υ∗) and that all non-experts i ∈ V \M (with pi = 0.5) have
power φ(υ∗) = 0, respectively, φ(υ∗) = β(υ∗) = 0, in that game (V, υ∗).
A non-expert i ∈ V \M contributes log( 0.5
1−0.5) = 0 to each coalition S such that
he is a so-called dummy player: ∀S ⊆ V \ {i} we have υ(S ∪ {i}) = υ(S). By
definition of the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, non-expert i’s power
is thus zero: βi(υ) = 0, respectively φi(υ
∗) = 0.
All experts j ∈M contribute log( p
1−p) > 0 to each coalition S such that they are
symmetric in the game (V, υ∗).10 Consequently, all experts are equally powerful.
The proposition gives an interpretation to Proposition 2.2 by showing that strong
balancedness means that there are the same winning coalitions in the two corre-
sponding games. When signal precisions are homogeneous, all experts are equally
powerful in (V, υ∗) such that it is intuitive that equal power of experts in (V, υˆ)
means efficiency of σˆ. This can be illustrated with Example 1, in which each expert
is indeed equally powerful in the game (V, υˆ) since the winning coalitions are those
which have at least three members.
To illustrate a violation of strong balancedness, we consider an extreme case,
in which there is a dictator, i.e., a player j who has a swing in every coalition
S ⊆ V \ {j}. A dictator has the maximal Banzhaf index and the maximal Shapley-
Shubik index of one. Any player following the dictator’s message is “cursed” in the
sense that if the own vote is decisive under σˆ, then the opposite of the message
is more likely to be correct. An example illustrating this effect is given by the
weighted majority game (V, υˆ) corresponding to Example 2, the star network, in
which expert 1 has dictatorial power.11
C.6 Complete Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof of Proposition 5.3
We show existence of inefficient strategy profiles with the network introduced in
Example 3 and extensions of it. For any t = 1, 2, ... we consider a network with two
experts of degree 2t, 1 + 2t experts of degree zero and 4t non-experts of degree one.
For t = 1 this is exactly the network depicted in Figure 2. All experts have signal
quality pj = p > 0.5, all non-experts signal quality pi = 0.5. For any t = 1, 2, ...,
denote the corresponding game by Γt and the sincere strategy profile in that game
by σˆt.
Under σˆt, 3 + 6t agents participate in the vote and a majority is reached with at
least 2 + 3t votes. If the two senders receive the same signal, say A∗, then A is the
outcome since the two senders induce 2 ∗ (1 + 2t) ≥ 2 + 3t A-votes. If both senders
receive different signals, A∗ and B∗, then A wins if and only if A receives k ≥ 1 + t
votes of the 1 + 2t experts with degree zero. Supposing that A is the true state, the
10A pair of players i, j ∈ V is called symmetric if ∀S ⊆M \{i, j} we have υ(S∪{i}) = υ(S∪{j}).
If two players i and j are symmetric, then they always have the same Banzhaf index βi(υ) = βj(υ),
respectively the same Shapley-Shubik index φi(υ) = φj(υ), by definition of the two indices.
11The simple games corresponding to Examples 1 and 2 are extreme cases with minimal, respec-
tively maximal, inequality of expert power.
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probability that the outcome is A provides the general probability that the outcome
coincides with the true state since σˆt treats A and B interchangeably. Thus, under
σˆt the probability that the outcome coincides with the true state is
EU(σˆt) = p2 ∗ 1 + 2p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + (1− p)2 ∗ 0. (B.6)
Inefficiency. We establish inefficiency of σˆt for any t and also in the limit. (Recall
that a strategy profile is efficient if and only if for any draw of nature it selects the
outcome that maximizes the probability to match the true state.) Consider the draw
of nature in which both senders receive signal A∗ and all other experts receive signal
B∗. An efficient strategy profile would implement (the majority signal) B, but σˆt
leads to A.
For an efficient strategy profile σt the probability that the outcome coincides
with the true state is below one for finite t, but converges to one for growing t,
i.e. limt→∞EU(σt) = 1 when σt efficient. Under σˆt, when both senders happen to
receive the incorrect signal, then the outcome does not coincide with the true state.
Thus, the probability of implementing the incorrect outcome under σˆt is at least
(1 − p)2, which is independent of t. Hence, limt→∞EU(σˆt) ≤ 1 − (1 − p)2 < 1, i.e.
inefficiency does not vanish for growing t.
Now, we establish that σˆt is an equilibrium for any t. We show first that there
is no profitable deviation that occurs on the voting stage only. Then we show that
there is no profitable deviation that affects both stages voting and communication.
Deviations on the voting stage only. Consider a voter i ∈ V who considers to
deviate from σˆt by changing his voting strategy vi. This can be a non-expert who
does not follow the received message or an expert who does not vote the received
signal, but chooses some different strategy instead.
Suppose one sender (i.e. a voter with pj = p > 0.5 and dj = 2t) receives signal
A∗ and the other sender receives signal B∗. Then A receives more votes than B
under σˆt if and only if more experts with degree zero (i.e. voters with pj = p > 0.5
and dj = 0) have received signal A
∗. Hence, when the two senders have not received
the same signal, then σˆt always implements the majority signal and hence induces
the outcome that is more likely to be true. Hence, if there is a beneficial deviation,
then it must also change outcomes in which both senders have received the same
signal.
Suppose that both senders have received the same signal, say A∗. Then the
number of A-votes under σˆt is at least 2 + 4t (since two senders, and 2 ∗ 2t non-
experts vote for A) and the number of B-votes is hence at most 3 + 6t− (2 + 4t) =
1 + 2t. The number of A-votes thus exceeds the number of B-votes by at least
2 + 4t − (1 + 2t) = 1 + 2t ≥ 3 votes. Hence, a single agent who changes her vote
cannot affect the outcome if the two senders have received the same signal.
Taken together a deviation that only changes one vote is neither beneficial if both
senders have received the same signal nor if they have received different signals. This
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precludes deviation incentives of non-experts, of experts with degree zero, as well as
of senders who consider to deviate in their voting behavior only, i.e. all deviations
that happen on the voting stage only. We now turn to deviations that also affect the
communication stage, i.e. which involve a sender who does not truthfully transmit
her signal, and show that any of those is neither beneficial.12
Deviations on both stages. Consider a sender j ∈ V with dj > 0. This expert
has (3 × 3)2 = 81 strategies because she chooses one of three messages and one of
three voting actions after receiving one of two signals.13 To evaluate different strate-
gies we can assume w.l.o.g. that the expert has received signal A∗ because neither
the utility function nor the strategy profile depends on the label of the alternatives.
This reduces the number of strategies to the following nine: (mj(A
∗), vj(A∗)) ∈
{(A,A), (A,B), (A, ∅), (B,A), (B,B), (B, ∅), (∅, A), (∅, B), (∅, ∅)}. The first strategy
(A,A) is sincere and hence not a deviation. The strategies (A,B) and (A, ∅) only
involve deviations on the voting stage and are hence not beneficial by the paragraph
above. This leads to the following six remaining deviations σ˜ and their correspond-
ing expected utilities EU(σ˜t):14
1. Sender j sends the opposite message and votes the signal.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=t
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p)2t+1−k+p(1−p)+(1−p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p) (B.7)
2. Sender j sends the opposite message and votes the opposite.
EU(σ˜t) = [p2 + (1− p)2]
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p) (B.8)
3. Sender j sends the opposite message and abstains.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
[
1
2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1 +
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
+ p(1− p) + (1− p)2
[
1
2
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t +
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
,
12For large t this is simple to show. In the case in which the deviating agent receives the correct
signal, say A∗, and the other sender receives the incorrect signal, the probability that the outcome
is A approaches zero for growing t. Hence, the expected utility of any such deviation is bounded
from above by limt→∞EU(σ˜t) ≤ 1− p(1− p)2 < 1− (1− p)2 = limt→∞EU(σˆt).
13In general, voters with positive degree di > 0 have more pure strategies. In this example, the
senders are linked to non-experts (i.e voters i with pi = 0.5) who are assumed by convention not
to send a message under σˆt. Since a message of an uninformed voter is meaningless, a change of
convention would not affect the result.
14Deviations that involve to vote and/or communicate an alternative unconditionally, i.e. inde-
pendent of the signal, need not be considered here because of the symmetry between the alter-
natives. Indeed, if it is beneficial to vote B after receiving A∗, then it is also beneficial to vote
A after receiving B∗, which is to vote the opposite of the signal. Similarly, there is no need to
consider strategies that involve the empty message and/or to abstain only after one of the two
signals. Indeed, if it is beneficial e.g. to abstain after having received signal A∗, then it is also
beneficial to abstain after having received signal B∗, which is to abstain unconditionally. Hence,
if none of the six symmetric deviations is an improvement over σˆt, then neither is a deviation that
treats the alternatives A and B asymmetrically.
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which is equation B.9
4. Sender j sends the empty message and votes the signal.
EU(σ˜t) = p2 + p(1− p)p2t+1 + p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k (B.10)
5. Sender j sends the empty message and votes the opposite.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p) + (1− p)2p2t+1 (B.11)
6. Sender j sends the empty message and abstains.
EU(σ˜t) = p2[1− 1
2
(1−p)2t+1] +p(1−p)1
2
p2t+1 +p(1−p)[1− 1
2
(1−p)2t+1] + (1−p)2 1
2
p2t+1
(B.12)
The derivation of the expressions (B.7)-(B.12) is shown below. We can then compare
the expected utility EU(σ˜t) of each deviation, which is given by (B.7)-(B.12), with
the expected utility of the sincere strategy profile EU(σˆt), which is given by (B.6).
Consider, for instance, the fifth deviation: Sender j sends the empty message
and votes the opposite of the signal. There are 3 + 4t votes and 2 + 2t is a majority.
Denote by (sj, sk) the signals of the two senders. There are four possibilities.
• (A∗, A∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 2t − (1 + 2t) = 1 A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero.
• (A∗, B∗): A never wins since B receives at least 2 + 2t votes.
• (B∗, A∗): A wins since it receives at least 2 + 2t votes.
• (B∗, B∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 2t− 1 = 2t+ 1 A∗-signals among the
experts of degree zero, i.e. all of them have signal A∗.
We now show that this deviation is not beneficial by considering the change in
expert j’s expected utility (which is the expected utility of every agent). Supposing
that the true state is A, the expected utility is the likelihood that A is indeed
implemented. Hence,
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p) ∗ 0 + p(1− p) ∗ 1 + (1− p)2p2t+1,
which directly simplifies to (B.11).
For the upcoming simplifications we use the following two properties:
1.
∑2t+1
k=0
(
2t+1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k = 1 and
2.
(
2t+1
k
)
=
(
2t+1
2t+1−k
)
for any k = 0, ..., 2t+ 1.
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Let ∆ := EU(σˆt)− EU(σ˜t). Then
∆ = p2
[
1−
2t+1∑
k=1
(...)
]
+p(1−p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k − 1
]
−(1−p)2p2t+1
∆ = p2
[
2t+1∑
k=0
(...)−
2t+1∑
k=1
(...)
]
+ p(1− p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k − 1
]
−(1− p)2p2t+1
∆ = p2(1− p)2t+1 + p(1− p)
[
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)−
2t+1∑
k=0
(...)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−∑tk=0(...)
+ p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− (1− p)2p2t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥p(1−p)∑2tk=t+1(...)
To simplify the last part of the equation notice the following:
• First, ∑2t+1k=t+1(pk(1− p)2t+1−k = ∑2tk=t(pk(1− p)2t+1−k + (2t+12t+1)p2t+1(1− p)0.
• Second, (2t+1
2t+1
)
p2t+1(1− p)0 = p2t+1.
• Third, p(1− p)p2t+1 − (1− p)2p2t+1 = [p(1− p)− (1− p2)]p2t+1 ≥ 0.
Thus,
∆ ≥ p2(1− p)2t+1 − p(1− p)
t∑
k=0
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p)
2t∑
k=t+1
(...)
∆ ≥ p2(1− p)2t+1 − p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
0
)
p0(1− p)2t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−p(1− p)
t∑
k=1
(...) + p(1− p)
2t∑
k=t+1
(...)
∆ ≥ p(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
[
2t∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k −
t∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
Hence, ∆ ≥ 0 if
2t∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k ≥
t∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k. (B.13)
To show that inequality B.13 holds, we substitute k in the first sum by l ≡ 2t+1−k
and consistently sum over l = 1, ..., t (instead over k = t + 1, ..., 2t). Moreover, we
use
(
2t+1
k
)
=
(
2t+1
2t+1−k
)
.
t∑
l=1
(
2t+ 1
l
)
p2t+1−l(1− p)l −
t∑
k=1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k ≥ 0
t∑
l=1
(
2t+ 1
l
)(
p2t+1−l(1− p)l − pl(1− p)2t+1−l) ≥ 0.
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For every l = 1, ..., t, we have 2t + 1 − l > l. This implies for the expression in
brackets that the first product (p2t+1−l(1 − p)l) is larger than the second product
(pl(1− p)2t+1−l). Hence, the inequality above holds, which implies inequality B.13.
Thus, EU(σˆt) ≥ EU(σ˜t) and hence this deviation σ˜t is not beneficial.
Using the same techniques as for the deviation above, we will show for the other
five deviations σ˜t that EU(σ˜t) ≤ EU(σˆt).
1. Sender j sends the opposite message and votes the signal. There are 3 + 6t
votes and 2 + 3t is a majority.
• (A∗, A∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 3t − (2 + 2t) = t A∗-signals
among the experts of degree zero.
• (A∗, B∗): A never wins since 1 + 1 + 2t < 2 + 3t.
• (B∗, A∗): A wins since 1 + 4t ≥ 2 + 3t.
• (B∗, B∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 3t−2t = 2 + t A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=t
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p)2t+1−k+p(1−p)∗0+p(1−p)∗1+(1−p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p)
Let ∆ := EU(σˆt)− EU(σ˜t).
∆ = p2[1−
2t+1∑
k=t
(...)] + p(1− p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− 1
]
− (1− p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(...)
∆ = p2
[
2t+1∑
k=0
(...)−
2t+1∑
k=t
(...)
]
+ p(1− p)
[
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)−
2t+1∑
k=0
(...)
]
+
p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(...)− (1− p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(...)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t
∆ ≥ p2
t−1∑
k=0
(...)− p(1− p)
t∑
k=0
(...)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥−p(1−p)(2t+1t )pt(1−p)t+1
+p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t
∆ ≥ p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t − p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1
Hence ∆ ≥ 0 if(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t ≥
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1
pt+1(1− p)t ≥ pt(1− p)t+1
p ≥ 1− p,
which is true.
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2. Sender j sends the opposite message and votes the opposite of the signal.
There are 3 + 6t votes and 2 + 3t is a majority.
• (A∗, A∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 3t− (1 + 2t) = 1 + t A∗-signals
among the experts of degree zero.
• (A∗, B∗): A never wins since 1 + 2t < 2 + 3t.
• (B∗, A∗): A wins since 2 + 4t ≥ 2 + 3t.
• (B∗, B∗): A wins if there are at least 2 + 3t − 1 + 2t = 1 + t A∗-signals
among the experts of degree zero.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p)2t+1−k+p(1−p)∗0+p(1−p)∗1+(1−p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1−p)
EU(σ˜t) = [p2 + (1− p)2]
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k + p(1− p)
Let ∆ := EU(σˆt)− EU(σ˜t).
∆ = p2[1−
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)]− (1− p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...) + p(1− p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− 1
]
∆ = [p(1− p)− (1− p)2]
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...) + [p2 − p(1− p)[1−
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)] ≥ 0
which is positive, since both summands are positive.
3. Sender j sends the opposite message and abstains. There are 2 + 6t votes and
1 + 3t is a tie.
• (A∗, A∗): there is a tie if there are 1 + 3t− (1 + 2t) = t A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero. For more, A wins.
• (A∗, B∗): A never wins since 1 + 2t < 1 + 3t.
• (B∗, A∗): A wins since 1 + 4t > 1 + 3t.
• (B∗, B∗): there is a tie if there are 1 + 3t− 2t = 1 + t A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero. If there are k ≥= 2 + t A∗-signals A wins.
EU(σ˜t) = p2
[
1
2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1 +
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
+p(1−p)∗0
+p(1−p)∗1+(1−p)2
[
1
2
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t +
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)2t+1−k
]
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Let ∆ := EU(σˆt)− EU(σ˜t).
∆ = p2[1− [1
2
...]] + p(1− p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− 1
]
− (1− p)2[1
2
...],
∆ = p2
[
t∑
k=0
(...)− 1
2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1
]
− p(1− p)
t∑
k=0
(...) + p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)−
(1− p)2 1
2
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t − (1− p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(...)
∆ = p2
t∑
k=0
(...)− p(1− p)
t∑
k=0
(...)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ p(1− p)
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− (1− p)2
2t+1∑
k=t+2
(...)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥p(1−p)(2t+1t+1 )pt+1(1−p)t
−p2 1
2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1 − (1− p)2 1
2
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t
∆ ≥ p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t − (1− p)2 1
2
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 1
2
p(1−p)(2t+1t+1 )pt+1(1−p)t
−p2 1
2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1
∆ ≥ 1
2
p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t − 1
2
p2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1
Hence ∆ ≥ 0 if
p(1− p)
(
2t+ 1
t+ 1
)
pt+1(1− p)t ≥ p2
(
2t+ 1
t
)
pt(1− p)t+1
p(1− p)pt+1(1− p)t ≥ p2pt(1− p)t+1
pt+2(1− p)t+1 ≥ pt+2(1− p)t+1,
which is true.
4. Sender j sends the empty message and votes the signal. There are 3+4t votes
and 2 + 2t is a majority. If both senders receive the same signal, say A∗, A
wins since there are at least 2+2t A-votes. Hence, the outcome is not different
from σˆt. If both senders receive different signals, then the outcome under σˆt
is optimal such that there cannot be a beneficial deviation.
5. Sender j sends the empty message and votes the opposite of the signal. It has
been already shown above that this deviation is not beneficial.
6. Sender j sends the empty message and abstains. Then there are 2 + 4t votes
and 1 + 2t is just half of all votes.
31
• (A∗, A∗): there is a tie if there are 1 + 2t− (1 + 2t) = 0 A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero. Otherwise, A wins.
• (A∗, B∗): there is a tie if there are 1 + 2t− 0 = 1 + 2t A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero. Otherwise, B wins.
• (B∗, A∗): there is a tie if there are 1 + 2t− (1 + 2t) = 0 A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero. Otherwise A wins.
• (B∗, B∗): there is a tie if there are 1 + 2t− 0 = 1 + 2t A∗-signals among
the experts of degree zero. Otherwise, B wins.
EU(σ˜t) = p2[1−1
2
(1−p)2t+1]+p(1−p)1
2
p2t+1+p(1−p)[1−1
2
(1−p)2t+1]+(1−p)2 1
2
p2t+1
Let ∆ := EU(σˆt)− EU(σ˜t).
∆ = p2[
1
2
(1−p)2t+1]+p(1−p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− 1 + 1
2
p2t+1 − 1
2
(1− p)2t+1
]
−(1−p)2 1
2
p2t+1
∆ = (p2 − p(1− p))1
2
(1− p)2t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+p(1− p)
[
2
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)− 1 + 1
2
p2t+1
]
− (1− p)2 1
2
p2t+1
∆ ≥ p(1− p)
[
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...) +
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)−
2t+1∑
k=0
(...) +
1
2
p2t+1
]
− (1− p)2 1
2
p2t+1
∆ ≥ p(1− p)
[
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(...)−
t∑
l=0
(...)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ (p(1− p)− (1− p)2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
1
2
p2t+1
∆ ≥ p(1− p)
[
2t+1∑
k=t+1
(
2t+ 1
k
)
pl(1− p)2t+1−k −
t∑
l=0
(
2t+ 1
l
)
pl(1− p)2t+1−l
]
∆ ≥ p(1− p)
[
t∑
l=0
(
2t+ 1
l
)
p2t+1−l(1− p)l −
t∑
l=0
(
2t+ 1
l
)
pl(1− p)2t+1−l
]
∆ ≥ p(1− p)
[
t∑
l=0
(
2t+ 1
l
)(
p2t+1−l(1− p)l − pl(1− p)2t+1−l)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
For every l = 1, ..., t, we have 2t + 1 − l > l. This implies for the expression
in brackets that the first product (p2t+1−l(1 − p)l) is larger than the second
product (pl(1− p)2t+1−l). Thus, the expression in brackets is positive.
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D Instructions
The original instructions are written in German and can be requested from the
authors. On the next pages we provide an English version which is a sentence-by-
sentence translation of the original instructions, first for Study I, then for Study II.
The instructions of each study are followed by the questions of comprehension.
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SVCnet rel. 
1 
 
Welcome to today’s experiment! 
Please note that no communication is allowed from now on and during the whole experiment. If you 
have a question please raise your hand from the cabin, one of the experimenters will then come to 
you. The use of cell phones, smart phones, tablets, or similar devices is prohibited during the entire 
experiment. Please note that a violation of this rule leads to exclusion from the experiment and from 
any payments. 
All decisions are taken anonymously, i.e. none of the other participants comes to know the identity 
of the others. The payoff is also conducted anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
 
Instructions 
 
In this experiment you will choose along with your group one out of two alternatives whereupon just 
one  alternative  is  correct  and  the other  is wrong. Only  the  correct  alternative  leads  to  a positive 
payoff  for each member of  the group. Some members of  the group will receive  information about 
the  correct alternative. This  information  is accurate  in 60 out of 100  cases. The group decides by 
voting  which  alternative  will  be  implemented.  The  group  is  furthermore  arranged  in  a 
communication network. Certain members of the group can – depending on the network structure – 
transmit a message to other members before the group ballots for the alternatives.  
The sequence of each individual round consists of the following 4 parts. 
 
1. Information 
You will receive the role of an Informed or an Uninformed at random (and you will keep it during the 
entire experiment). There are two alternatives: alternative “circle” and alternative “triangle”. At the 
beginning  of  each  round  one  of  the  two  alternatives will  be  assigned  at  random  and with  equal 
likelihood  as  the  correct  alternative.  The  “Informed”  receive  information  about  the  correct 
alternative which is accurate in 60 out of 100 cases. (The Informed will not necessarily all receive the 
same  information).  The  “Uninformed”  will  not  receive  any  information  about  what  the  correct 
alternative is. 
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2. Communication 
You will randomly be divided  into groups of 9 members. A group  is composed of 5  Informed and 4 
Uninformed. All group members are arranged  in a  communication network. At  the beginning of a 
round  you  get  to  know  the network  structure and  your position  in  the network. You  can  see  the 
possible networks pictured in the figure below.  
                
5  Informed  receive  in  randomized  arrangement  the  positions  Above  1  to  5  in  the  network.  4 
Uninformed receive in randomized arrangement the positions Below 1 to 4 in the network. Everyone 
knows therefore that someone with an upper position is an Informed and that someone with a lower 
position  is an Uninformed.   The network structure  reveals who can communicate with whom. The 
Uninformed can be recipients but not senders of a message.  The Informed who are in the position of 
a sender send either the message “circle” or the message “triangle” or they don’t send any message 
to their recipient(s).  Each sender can send exactly one message to all of its (his/her) recipients. Not 
every  Informed  is  necessarily  a  sender.  This  depends  on  the  network  structure  and  the  network 
position. The connecting  lines between upper and  lower positions  in  the network display who can 
send a message to whom. 
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3. Voting 
You  can decide  to vote  for “circle,”  to abstain  from voting, or  to vote  for “triangle.” The 2 Circle‐
advocates  always  vote  for  “circle”  and  the  2  Triangle‐advocates  always  for  “triangle.”  The  voting 
result  in  the  group  is  the  alternative  (circle or  triangle) with  the most  votes.  In  case of  a  tie  the 
computer will pick one of the two alternatives at random and with the same probability. 
 
 
4. Outcome 
At the end of the round you will get to know the voting outcome as well as the right alternative. If 
they match, e.g. the voting outcome  is triangle and the right alternative  is triangle, you will receive 
100 points. Otherwise you will not receive any points. At the end of 40 rounds 3 rounds will be drawn 
randomly, which are then relevant for the payoffs. The rate of exchange between points and Euro is 
the  following:  20  points  correspond  to  1  Euro.  You  will  receive  5  Euro  additionally  for  your 
participation in the experiment.   
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Procedure of the experiment 
40 rounds will be played  in total. The composition of the group changes from round to round. The 
network structure changes every 5 rounds. There will be a short questionnaire subsequent to the 40 
rounds of  the experiment. Prior  to  the 40  rounds of  the experiment 4  sample  rounds are played. 
These are not payoff‐relevant. (In each sample round a different network is introduced.) 
Summary of the procedure of the experiment:  
1. Reading of the instructions 
2. Questions of comprehension concerning the instructions 
3. 4 sample rounds 
4. 40 EXPERIMENTAL ROUNDS 
5. Questionnaire 
6. Payoffs 
If you have a question, please raise your hand from the cabin, we will then come to you. 
 
 Comprehension questions 
1. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. The role of the Informed/Uninformed changes from round to round.  
b. The group affiliation changes from round to round. 
c. The network changes from round to round. 
 
2. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. In each round either the alternative „circle” or the alternative „triangle“ is correct, namely with a 
probability of 50% no matter which alternative has been most frequently correct in the previous rounds. 
b.  If „triangle“ was 7 times correct in the previous 10 rounds and „circle“ only 3 times, then in the current 
round it is more likely that „circle“ is correct instead of „triangle“. 
c. If „circle“ was 7 times correct in the previous 10 rounds and „triangle“ only 3 times, then in the current 
round it is more likely that „circle“ is correct instead of „triangle“.  
 
3. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. The „Informed“ in the group know for sure which alternative is correct. 
b. All „Informed“ in the group share the same opinion about what the correct alternative is. 
c. Each „Informed“ in the group receives some information about which alternative is correct and this 
information is accurate in 60 out of 100 cases. 
 
4. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. Each „Informed“ is a sender. 
b. Each sender is an „Informed.“ 
c. A sender can be an „Informed“ or an “Uninformed.” 
 
5. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. If the correct alternative is „circle“ and you vote for circle, you will always receive 100 points. 
b. If the correct alternative is „circle“ and a majority of the participants vote for circle, you will receive 100 
points. 
c. If the correct alternative is „circle“ and a majority of the participants vote for triangle, you will receive 
100 points. 
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Welcome to today’s experiment! 
Please note that no communication is allowed from now on and during the whole experiment. If you 
have a question please raise your hand from the cabin, one of the experimenters will then come to 
you. The use of cell phones, smart phones, tablets, or similar devices is prohibited during the entire 
experiment. Please note that a violation of this rule leads to exclusion from the experiment and from 
any payments. 
All decisions are taken anonymously, i.e. none of the other participants comes to know the identity 
of the others. The payoff is also conducted anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
 
Instructions 
 
In this experiment you will choose along with your group one out of two alternatives whereupon just 
one  alternative  is  correct  and  the other  is wrong. Only  the  correct  alternative  leads  to  a positive 
payoff  for each member of  the group. Some members of  the group will receive  information about 
the  correct alternative. This  information  is accurate  in 80 out of 100  cases. The group decides by 
voting  which  alternative  will  be  implemented.  The  group  is  furthermore  arranged  in  a 
communication network. Certain members of the group can – depending on the network structure – 
transmit a message to other members before the group ballots for the alternatives.  
The sequence of each individual round consists of the following 4 parts. 
 
1. Information 
You will receive the role of an Informed or an Uninformed at random (and you will keep it during the 
entire experiment). There are two alternatives: alternative “circle” and alternative “triangle”. At the 
beginning  of  each  round  one  of  the  two  alternatives will  be  assigned  at  random  and with  equal 
likelihood  as  the  correct  alternative.  The  “Informed”  receive  information  about  the  correct 
alternative which is accurate in 80 out of 100 cases. (The Informed will not necessarily all receive the 
same  information).  The  “Uninformed”  will  not  receive  any  information  about  what  the  correct 
alternative is. 
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2. Communication 
You will randomly be divided into groups of 11 members out of whom 7 are real participants and the 
remaining  4  being  represented  by  the  computer.  A  group  is  composed  of  3  Informed  and  4 
Uninformed  (a  total of 7  real participants of  the  experiment)  as well  as 2 Circle‐advocates  and 2 
Triangle‐advocates  (group  members  represented  by  the  computer).  The  Circle‐advocates 
categorically vote for “circle;” and the Triangle‐advocates categorically vote for “triangle.” All group 
members are arranged in a communication network. At the beginning of a round you get to know the 
network structure and your position  in the network. You can see the possible networks pictured  in 
the figure below. 
 
3  Informed and 4 Advocates receive  in randomized arrangement  the positions Above 1  to 7  in  the 
network.  4  Uninformed  receive  in  randomized  arrangement  the  positions  Below  1  to  4  in  the 
network. Everyone knows therefore that someone with an upper position is either an Informed or an 
Advocate and that someone with a  lower position  is an Uninformed. The network structure reveals 
who can communicate with whom. The Uninformed can be recipients but not senders of a message. 
Sender of the message  is – depending on the network position – an  Informed or an Advocate. The 
Circle‐advocates send the message “circle” to their recipient(s) and the Triangle‐advocates send the 
message “triangle.” The Informed send either the message “circle” or the message “triangle” or they 
don’t send any message to their recipient(s). Each sender can send exactly one message to all of its 
(his/her)  recipients. Not every  Informed or Advocate  is necessarily a  sender. This depends on  the 
network  structure  and  the  network  position.  The  connecting  lines  between  upper  and  lower 
positions in the network display who can send a message to whom. 
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3. Voting 
You  can decide  to vote  for “circle,”  to abstain  from voting, or  to vote  for “triangle.” The 2 Circle‐
advocates  always  vote  for  “circle”  and  the  2  Triangle‐advocates  always  for  “triangle.”  The  voting 
result  in  the  group  is  the  alternative  (circle or  triangle) with  the most  votes.  In  case of  a  tie  the 
computer will pick one of the two alternatives at random and with the same probability. 
 
 
4. Outcome 
At the end of the round you will get to know the voting outcome as well as the right alternative. If 
they match, e.g. the voting outcome  is triangle and the right alternative  is triangle, you will receive 
100 points. Otherwise you will not receive any points. At the end of 40 rounds 3 rounds will be drawn 
randomly, which are then relevant for the payoffs. The rate of exchange between points and Euro is 
the  following:  20  points  correspond  to  1  Euro.  You  will  receive  5  Euro  additionally  for  your 
participation in the experiment.   
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Procedure of the experiment 
40 rounds will be played  in total. The composition of the group changes from round to round. The 
network structure changes every 5 rounds. There will be a short questionnaire subsequent to the 40 
rounds of  the experiment. Prior  to  the 40  rounds of  the experiment 4  sample  rounds are played. 
These are not payoff‐relevant. (In each sample round a different network is introduced.) 
Summary of the procedure of the experiment:  
1. Reading of the instructions 
2. Questions of comprehension concerning the instructions 
3. 4 sample rounds 
4. 40 EXPERIMENTAL ROUNDS 
5. Questionnaire 
6. Payoffs 
If you have a question, please raise your hand from the cabin, we will then come to you. 
 Comprehension questions 
1. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. The role of the Informed/Uninformed changes from round to round.  
b. The group affiliation changes from round to round. 
c. The network changes from round to round. 
 
2. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. In each round either the alternative „circle” or the alternative „triangle“ is correct, namely with a 
probability of 50% no matter which alternative has been most frequently correct in the previous rounds. 
b.  If „triangle“ was 7 times correct in the previous 10 rounds and „circle“ only 3 times, then in the current 
round it is more likely that „circle“ is correct instead of „triangle“. 
c. If „circle“ was 7 times correct in the previous 10 rounds and „triangle“ only 3 times, then in the current 
round it is more likely that „circle“ is correct instead of „triangle“.  
 
3. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. In each group there are 2 persons represented by the computer who always vote for “circle” and 2 
persons likewise represented by the computer who always vote for “triangle”. 
b. In each group there are 4 persons represented by the computer who always vote for “circle”. 
c. In each group there are 4 persons represented by the computer who always vote for “triangle”. 
 
4. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. The „Informed“ in the group know for sure which alternative is correct. 
b. All „Informed“ in the group share the same opinion about what the correct alternative is. 
c. Each „Informed“ in the group receives some information about which alternative is correct and this 
information is accurate in 80 out of 100 cases. 
 
5. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. Each „Informed“ is a sender. 
b. Each sender is an „Informed.“ 
c. A sender can be an „Informed“, a Circle‐Advocate or a Triangle‐Advocate.  
 
6. Consider a Circle‐Advocate who can send a message. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please 
checkmark) 
a. The Circle‐Advocate always sends the message „circle“. 
b. The Circle‐Advocate sometimes sends the message “triangle.“ 
c. The Circle‐Advocate sometimes does not send any message.  
 
7. Which of the following statements is correct? (Please checkmark) 
a. If the correct alternative is „circle“ and you vote for circle, you will always receive 100 points. 
b. If the correct alternative is „circle“ and a majority of the participants vote for circle, you will receive 100 
points. 
c. If the correct alternative is „circle“ and a majority of the participants vote for triangle, you will receive 
100 points. 
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